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

Amphibious Warfare School Nonresident Program

Introduction to Amphibious Operations

MCI 7640

INTRODUCTION TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

MCI 7640

Marine Corps Institute, Washington, D.C.

1990

Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, VA.

FOREWORD

Before World War II, the importance and affect of amphibious operations on the security of the nation was not yet realized. However, the power and flexibility of the amphibious operation in World War II demonstrated dramatically the potential, both politically and militarily, of amphibious warfare. Today, more than ever, the amphibious operation offers decision makers an even greater range of options coupled with the exact degree of power necessary to achieve the desired solution.

STUDENT INFORMATION

This information is provided to assist you in completing your course/program of study. For additional information, refer to the *MCI Procedures Manual.*

Course Activity

Unit Activity. All program packages contain preprinted final examination answer sheets (MCI-DP37) for **each** course. Complete and submit the DP37 to your training officer/NCO, who records on the Notice of Enrollment Card (MCI-R5) the date the answer sheet (primary or alternate) was mailed to MCI for grading. "Instructions for Administering Examination" and "Exam Validation" portions of the answer sheet do **not** apply to PME students.

Receipt of Examinations at MCI. Examinations submitted on DP37 are mechanically graded. If you fail the primary examination, an alternate examination is automatically mailed. You must successfully complete all course examinations with a passing score of 75 percent in order to complete the program. MCI enters the completion in the Marine Corps Manpower Management System (MMS). If you fail **both** the primary and the alternate examination, an administration notice card (MCI-R6) is forwarded to your unit. The training officer makes an entry on the MCI-R5 card and has the SRB clerk note your Service Record Book/Officer Qualification Record (SRB/OQR). You are then administratively deleted from the remaining courses of the program. If you still desire to complete the program, you must ENROLL as a new student and submit copies of course completion certificates to receive prior credit.

Disenrollment. Disenrollment occurs upon reaching the Course Completion Deadline (CCD) date or the Adjusted Course Completion Deadline (ACCD) date (6-month extension) for the program. Reenrollment will be granted upon request within 1 year after disenrollment if a reenrollment was not previously granted for the program.

> You will be disenrolled if you do not complete your course by the course completion deadline (CCD). To avoid this, ask your training officer/NCO to request a six month extension allowing you more time to complete your course/program.
>
> If you already have a six month extension and still cannot complete your course by your adjusted course completion deadline, you will automatically be disenrolled from the program. If you wish to continue the program, ask your training officer/NCO to reenroll you. **You are allowed only one extension and one reenrollment!**

Program Completion. A certificate of completion and a letter of transmittal with the course grade are forwarded to the commanding officer of each Marine who successfully completes a PME course. The commanding officer has the completion recorded in the student's SRB or OQR and presents the certificate to the student. The certificate and the letter are mailed directly to the supervisor of nonMarines and a daily completions listing is sent to the Marine Corps Reserve Center (IRR). Upon successful completion of **all courses**, a program diploma is forwarded to

your commanding officer who presents it to you at an appropriate ceremony. Notification of completion for Air Force students is sent to the Extension Course Institute, Gunther Air Force Station, Alabama, at the end of each month.

Reserve Retirement Credits. Reserve retirement credits are awarded **only** to inactive duty personnel upon successful completion of each course. Reserve retirement credits are earned at the rate of one credit for every 3 hours of estimated student effort. The total number of reserve retirement credits is indicated on the course title page and is awarded upon the successful completion of the course. Credits are not awarded for MCI study performed during drill periods if they are also awarded for drill attendance.

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Student Data. If you need to request a change to your student data in the MCI database, e.g., rank, change of address, use the MCI-R11 located at the end of each text.

Course Evaluation Questionnaire. Please take a few minutes to complete the course questionnaire located at the end of each course.

PROGRAM: THE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SCHOOL NON-RESIDENT PROGRAM

COURSE: INTRODUCTION TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS MCI 7640 (1990)

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 10 hours

RESERVE RETIREMENT CREDITS: 3

PURPOSE: To provide you with a working knowledge of the fundamentals of amphibious operations.

SCOPE: A detailed introduction to amphibious operations to include the concepts, purpose, and types of amphibious operations; the Navy's functions, assets, and force composition in amphibious operations; staff planning responsibilities, the initiating directive, and sequence of planning in amphibious operations; intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterintelligence in amphibious operations; offensive and defensive considerations of NBC weapons employment in amphibious operations; and the principles and techniques used by the Soviets to defend a coastline.

INFORMATION

COURSE: INTRODUCTION TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

MATERIALS PROVIDED: Course Text, *Introduction to Amphibious Operations* MCI-7640 (1990)

INFORMATION:

1. The "Estimated Student Effort" (10 hours) shown on the course title page indicates the time the average student needs to complete the course. This includes time required to study text material and complete chapter exercises and the final examination.

2. The material contained in this course was derived from various doctrine publications. You can achieve a broader understanding of the subjects presented by referring to the following manuals:

OH O-2	*Marine Corps Dictionary and Glossary of Abbreviations/Acronyms*
LFM O1	*Marine Corps Landing Force Manual*
FMFM O-1	*Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine*
FMFM 2-1	*Intelligence*
FMFM 3-1	*Command and Staff Action*
FMFM 11-1	*Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Operations in the FMF*

PROGRAM OUTLINE

Upon completion of Introduction to Amphibious Operations 7640, your status and future study requirements in the Amphibious Warfare School Nonresident Program (AWSNP) will be:

COURSE	ESTIMATED HOURS	RESERVE RETIREMENT CREDITS
COMMAND AND STAFF PLANNING		
Organization and Equipment of the FMF MCI 7610	5	1
Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence MCI 7611	6	2
Command and Staff Planning Procedures MCI 7612	9	3
Operations Plans and Orders MCI 7613	8	2
Professional Communications MCI 7614	6	3
Command and Staff Planning Examination MCI 7617	3	1
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS		
Concepts MCI 7620	6	2
The Threat MCI 7621	5	1
Attack Planning MCI 7622	5	1
Combat Support MCI 7623	19	6
Combat Service Support MCI 7624	3	1
Helicopterborne Operations MCI 7625	6	2
Offensive Practical Exercise MCI 7626	2	1
Offensive Examination MCI 7627	3	1
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS		
The Threat MCI 7630	4	1

Defensive Planning MCI 7631	14	4
Combat Support MCI 7632	10	3
Defensive Practical Exercise MCI 7633	2	1
Defensive Examination MCI 7634		
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS		
Introduction to Amphibious Operations MCI 7640	10	3
Operational Decisions in Amphibious Operations MCI 7641	21	7
Communications and Fire Support Planning MCI 7642	8	3
Combat Service Support in Amphibious Operations MCI 7643	12	4
Amphibious Raids MCI 7644	3	1
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations MCI 7645	3	1
Amphibious Operations Examinations MCI 7646	3	1
ADVANCED TACTICS AND OPERATIONS		
Operations MCI 7650	13	4
Environment MCI 7651		
Vol. 1 Cold Weather Operations	6	2
Vol. 2 Counterinsurgency	3	1
NBC MCI 7652	11	3
Advanced Tactics and Operations Examination MCI 7653	3	1

Note: The courses in the program are listed in numerical order. Because of low stock and an on-going revision process, you may receive texts out of sequence.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA - Assembly Area
AAW - Antiair Warfare
A/C - Aircraft
ACU - Assault Craft Unit
AO - Airborne Observer
AOA - Amphibious Objective Area
ASD(I) - Assistant Secretary Defense Intelligence
ASIS - Amphibious Support Information System
ASM - Air-to-Surface Missile
ASUW - Antisurface Ship Warfare
ASW - Antisubmarine Warfare
ATF - Amphibious Task Force
BLT - Battalion Landing Team
BMU - Beachmaster Unit
BSSG - Brigade Service Support Group
CATF - Commander Amphibious Task Force
CARGRU - Carrier Group
CDSE - Cryptologic Direct Support Element
CESM - Cryptologic Electronic Warfare Support Measures
CG - Commanding General
CI - Counterintelligence
CINCLANT - Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT - Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCPAC - Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT - Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CLF - Commander Landing Force
CMC - Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMD - Commander Mine Division
CMS - Commander Mine Squadron
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
COC - Combat Operations Center
COMPATWINGSPAC - Commander Patrol Wings Pacific
COMSEVENTHFLT - Commander Seventh Fleet
COMSURFLANT - Commander Surface Atlantic
COMSURFPAC - Commander Surface Pacific
CSS - Central Security Service (NSA)
CTF - Commander Task Force
CTG - Commander Task Group
DASC - Direct Air Support Center
DD - Destroyer
D-day - Day of the Landing
DDG - Guided Missile Destroyer
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
DMA - Defense Mapping Agency
DOD - Department of Defense
DSU - Direct Support Unit
EAM - Electronic Accounting Machine
EEI - Essential Element of Information
ELE - Element
EMB - Embarkation

EMP - Electromagnetic Pulse
ESM - Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EW - Electronic Warfare
FBH - Force Beachhead
FBHL - Force Beachhead Line
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
FF - Frigate
FFG - Guided Missile Frigate
FICEURLANT - Fleet Intelligence Center Europe/Atlantic
FIIU - Force Imagery Interpretation Unit
FMF - Fleet Marine Force
FMFPAC - Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FOI - Field Operations Intelligence
FSCC - Fire Support Coordination Center
FSSG - Force Service Support Group
GZ - Ground Zero
HDC - Helicopter Direction Center
H-hour - Hour of the Landing
HLZ - Helicopter Landing Zone
HUMINT - Human Intelligence
IIIC - Immediate Imagery Interpretation Center
IMINT - Imagery Intelligence
IR - Infra Red
ITT - Interrogator Translator Team
IUWG - Inshore Underseas Warfare Group
JATF - Joint Amphibious Task Force
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEWCC - Joint Electronic Warfare Coordination Center
JIC - Joint Information Center
JICEWACC - Joint Intelligence Center Electronic Warfare Analysis and Coordination Center
J/SSES - Joint Ship's Signal Exploitation Space
JTENS - Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems
LAAM - Light Anti-Aircraft Missile
LCC - Landing Ship Command and Control
LCM - Landing Craft Mechanized
LCU - Landing Craft Utility
LF - Landing Force
LFM - Landing Force Manual
LHA - Landing Ship Helicopter Assault
LKA - Amphibious Cargo Ship
LOI - Letter of Instruction
LP - Listening Post
LPA - Amphibious Transport
LPD - Landing Platform Dock
LPH - Amphibious Assault Ship
LSD - Landing Ship Dock
LST - Tank Landing Ship
LVT - Landing Vehicle Tracked
MAG - Marine Aircraft Group
MAGIS - Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System
MAGTF - Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MEB - Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF - Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU - Marine Expeditionary Unit
MAW - Marine Aircraft Wing
MC&G - Mapping, Charting and Geodetic
MI - Military Intelligence
MOPP - Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MSO - Minesweeper, Ocean
MSSG - MEU Service Support Group
MTI - Moving Target Indicator
NAVAIRPAC - Naval Air Pacific
NAVBEACHGRU - Naval Beach Group
NAVSPECWARGRU - Naval Special Warfare Group
NAVSURPAC - Naval Surface Pacific
NBC - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NC - Nuclear and Chemical
NIE - National Intelligence Estimate
NIPS - Naval Intelligence Processing System
NIS - National Intelligence Surveys
NSA - National Security Agency
NSC - National Security Council
NSW - Naval Special Warfare
NWP - Naval Warfare Publication
OA - Objective Area
OIC - Officer in Charge
OIR - Other Intelligence Request
OP - Observation Post
OPSEC - Operation Security
PERMA - Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, Assault
PG - Patrol Gunboat
PHIBCB - Amphibious Construction Battalion (Seabees)
PHIBGRU - Amphibious Group
PHIBRON - Amphibious Squadron
PIC - Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific
RLT - Regimental Landing Team
RS - Radiation Status
SACC - Supporting Arms Coordination Center
SCAMP - Sensor Control and Management Platoon
SDT - Submersible Diving Team
SEAL - Sea, Air, and Land
SI - Signals Intelligence
SI/EWCC - Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Coordination Center
SIGINT - Signals Intelligence
SLAR - Side-Looking Airborne Radar
SLOC - Sea Lines of Communication
SMLS - Seaborne Mobile Logistics System
SOP - Standard Operating Procedure
SPECWARGROUP - Special Warfare Group
SPINTCOMM - Special Intelligence Communications
STA - Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon
STRIKFOR - Strike Force
SUBPAC - Submarine Forces Pacific

TACC- Tactical Air Command Center
TACGRU - Tactical Air Group
TACRON - Tactical Air Squadron
TAF - Tactical Air Force
TAOC - Tactical Air Operations Center
TARBUL - Target Bulletin
TF - Task Force
TIC - Target Information Center
TRANS - Transportation
TRAPAC - Training Pacific
TVD - Soviet Theatre of Military Operations
UDT - Underwater Demolition Team
U&S - Unified and Specified (Command)
USASAU - U.S. Army Security Agency Unit
VMAQ - Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
VMFP - Marine Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
VMO - Marine Observation Squadron
V/STOL - Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 2 hours

SCOPE: Includes development of amphibious doctrine; purpose, types, phases, and characteristics of an amphibious operation; and organization of the landing force.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Define an amphibious operation.
2. Identify the three purposes of an amphibious operation.
3. Identify the four types of amphibious operations.
4. List the five phases of an amphibious assault.
5. Identify the four characteristics of an amphibious operation.
6. Identify the four elements of the landing force.
7. Identify the limiting characteristics of an amphibious operation.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Chapter 1

COMPLETE: Chapter 1 Exercise

CHAPTER 1

SECTION I. THE MARINE CORPS AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

1101. INTRODUCTION

At the conclusion of World War I, primarily as a result of the Allied catastrophe at Gallipoli, the idea of projecting offensive power against a hostile shore in the form of an amphibious assault was considered impractical. Twenty-five years later the successes achieved by both the Marines and the Army in conducting amphibious assaults had altered that concept drastically. Of the 163 amphibious landings made in the Pacific during World War II, 68 were actually opposed by the enemy, but none failed. A noted British military historian called the amphibious assault "... *in all probability ... the most far-reaching development of the war*," (J. F. C. Fuller: **The Second World War**, 1949). The Marine Corps' development of rudimentary amphibious tactics and techniques during the 1930's paved the way for these success in the Pacific.

Marine Corps responsibilities with respect to amphibious warfare are defined in the National Security Act of 1047 as amended by the **Functions Paper** of 1958 and further elaborated in **Unified Action Armed Forces** (JCS Pub. 2). The responsibilities of the Marine Corps are as follows:

a. Provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

b. Provide detachments and organizations for service of armed vessels of the Navy, and security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.

c. Develop, in coordination with the other services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. (The Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.)

d. Designate an appropriate command or agency responsible to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. Specifically, this will include the following:

(1) Development of those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces

(2) Evaluation of tactics and techniques and making appropriate recommendations thereon

(3) Evaluation of the adequacy of equipment and making appropriate recommendations thereon

(4) Evaluation of the adequacy of joint training and making appropriate recommendations

(5) Review of publications covering the conduct of joint training and making recommendations

e. Participate with the other services in joint amphibious training and exercises as mutually agreed by the Services concerned.

f. Train and equip, as required, Marine Corps forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, in accordance with policies and doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is construed to mean that the Marine Corps will not, unless authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, train and equip parachute units, but will, in general, limit the training and equipping for airborne operations to transportation of Marine forces by air.

g. Develop, in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for airborne operations.

SECTION II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE

1201. INTRODUCTION

Although throughout the history of the United States, the economy of the nation has been associated, at least in part, with the sea; it was not until just prior to the Spanish-American War in 1898 that there was recognition within U.S. military and naval circles of the relationship of seapower, economy, and politics in the world. Perhaps the greatest contributor to this understanding was a naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who maintained in his writings that seapower and national interest should be consistent with one another. His thesis was that a nation must be able to support its national interests anywhere in the world. When he applied this to the United States, he concluded that this could be accomplished only through the maintenance of a strong Navy capable of operating for protracted periods of time in any given locality.

The impact of Mahan's theories was brought to the forefront during the Spanish-American War. The relatively easy victory over Spain did not conceal the fact that the U.S. Fleet would have been incapable of sustained operations, even in waters as close as Cuba, without the acquisition of advanced bases. As you remember from Marine Corps history, a Marine expeditionary force was used in Cuba at Guantanamo Bay for the express purpose of seizing an advanced base facility. However, it is doubtful whether this force would have been as successful as it was if the Spanish resistance had been determined and well-organized.

1202. SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR TO WORLD WAR I

Shortly after the Spanish-American war, the General Board of the Navy, which had studied the problems of the recent conflict and had become influenced by Mahan's theories, decided to establish a permanent advanced base force within the Naval Establishment. This force was to have the mission of seizing and defending advanced naval bases under wartime conditions. The Marine Corps was selected to perform this

mission. The Marine Corps had long maintained (even before the Spanish-American War) that such a function should be performed by Marines because the Corps was composed of ground troops with naval experience who traditionally came under naval authority.

Immediately following its designation to perform the advanced base role, the Marine Corps took steps to prepare itself for this new mission. In 1901, guns were removed from battleships and mounted on shore by Marines and classes for officers and enlisted men were formed at Newport, Rhode Island, for instruction in advanced basework.

In the winter of 1902-03, a battalion of Marines participated in advanced base exercises at Culebra Island in connection with the fleet maneuvers of that year. However, shortly after these exercises, advanced base work was discontinued due to the commitment of a major portion of the Marine Corps to Panama and Cuba.

Not until 1910 was further formal training in the advanced base function accomplished. At this time, a training school was established at New London, Connecticut. The following year it was moved to Philadelphia, where it remained until 1920. During this period, an advanced base forced was organized. It consisted of one infantry regiment and one regiment of specialists including, principally, coastal artillery, engineers, and communication personnel.

It has often been claimed that the seeds for later amphibious training may be found in this advanced base work, though the claimants recognize that the emphasis in training was not on offensive operations. In fact, there is little resemblance in concept between this early advanced base function and the function which required specially trained troops for amphibious assaults. In theory, the advanced base force was supposed to be prepared to seize, and defend the bases. However, in practice, all the training concentrated on the defense, which could possibly be attributed to the predominance of the defense over the offense during World War I.

1203. WORLD WAR I TO 1930

Even though the advanced base function continued to be a primary role of the Marine Corps during World War I when the force grew to over 70,000 men, there was a distinct lack of interest demonstrated by high-ranking Marine officers in this role following the war. Remember that Marine Corps participation in World War I was limited primarily to fighting in ground combat alongside army units. As a result, when the war was over many Marines felt that the future of the Marine Corps lay in large-scale ground operations coordinated with the Army as in World War I.

However, that this thinking was very short-lived may be partially attributed to Major Earl E. Ellis, who visualized the future and what it held for the Marine Corps. At the time that Major Ellis was doing his preliminary work, he probably did not consider its importance. To understand what he did, you need to review certain aspects of the Versailles Treaty. Major Ellis detected flaws in the Treaty which he felt would be of utmost importance in future years to the security of the United States. He was not alone in his beliefs, but was one of the most emphatic and outspoken of the group. Therefore, he got most of the credit for what eventually evolved.

The Versailles treaty gave Japan a mandate over former German possessions in the Pacific including the Carolines, the Marshalls, and the Marianas. Before the Treaty,

Japanese imperial ambitions had been apparent and, now, with the awarding of a mandate over these islands, the Japanese were in a position to strengthen their hold over the Pacific area, even though the Versailles Treaty contained provisions that the islands could not be fortified.

Major Ellis was one of a group who foresaw the strategic significance of Japanese occupation of these islands and how U.S. security in the Pacific would be affected. He felt that if these islands were fortified and supported by the Japanese Fleet, they would constitute a serious challenge to the U.S. Fleet operating in the Pacific. Based on his convictions, he presented a plan for offsetting the Japanese in this area. The plan was known as Operation Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia.

In this plan, Major Ellis explained the necessity to seize, by assault, the bases required to project fleet operations across the Pacific. He specifically called for seizure of the Marshall, Caroline, and Palau groups. He also predicted the size and composition of units that would be necessary, the types of landing craft that should be used, the best time of day to make the landings, and other details needed to ensure the success of the various operations.

Major Ellis never lived to see whether his concepts would be successful under modern war conditions. He was killed in the Palau Islands in 1923. However, before his death, he did stimulate considerable thought and a certain amount of training within the Marine Corps and the Navy. Though the training was somewhat sporadic due to commitments beyond the control of the Marine Corps, some opportunity was afforded to test his ideas. Some of the more important ideas on techniques which he discussed in his writings were as follows:

a. Transports with assault troops should approach the transport area off the beach under cover of darkness, followed by a landing during the early morning so as to permit maximum use of all weapons and to afford the landing force (LF) ample daylight to secure a beachhead.

b. Naval gunfire should be delivered to cover the movement of the troop units from ship-to-shore.

c. Aircraft should be used before the landing for reconnaissance purposes, and during the landing to strafe the beaches as the boats carrying troops approached. In addition, he felt that aircraft could be used to lay smokescreens over the transport area and landing craft during their approach to the beach, provided most measures were taken to ensure against masking enemy targets from the naval *men-of-war.*

d. Power craft with mounted guns should protect the troops with close-in support during the movement from ship-to-shore.

e. Demolition specialists should be in the first wave of boats to clear obstacles at the beach.

For the remainder of the 1920s, little training was accomplished. However, in 1927 the LF role of the Marine Corps was officially recognized in a directive issued by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy. This directive stated that the Marine Corps would provide and maintain forces "*for land operations in support of the fleet for the*

initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential for the prosecution of a naval campaign." In addition, the Marine Corps was placed on an equal basis with the Army in LF matters.

1204. ACTIVATION OF THE FLEET MARINE FORCE

Even though the Joint Board recognized the LF role of the Marine Corps, from a practical standpoint there was little effect. The Marine Corps was not organized to handle the role. In fact, shortly after the Joint Board *edict*, the major part of the fighting forces of the Marine Corps was ordered to Nicaragua for duty. Consequently, no effective efforts were made to carry out the LF role.

When the last Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua in 1933, it was decided that, in order to prevent the dispersion of units in the future, a permanent force responsive to the orders of the fleet commanders would have to be organized. A recommendation was made to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in late October 1933. On 8 December 1933, Navy Department General Order 241 was issued establishing such a force. The essential element of this directive was the establishment of a force which, while operating with the fleet, would come under the operation control of the fleet commander. When this force was not embarked in Navy ships or engaged in fleet exercises, it would revert to the control and command of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).

It was to be some years before units of a significant size would be available to implement the basic ideas and fundamentals which had been developed by Major Ellis a decade earlier. One explanation for this was that the Marine Crops suffered manpower cuts simultaneously with the establishment of the FMF, which in August 1934 totaled only 3,000 officers and men.

Even if sufficient troop units had been available to provide an FMF that would have meaning under conditions requiring their employment, it is doubtful whether they could have been successful without adequate training. Training would have had to be conducted on a *hit or miss* basis as there was no training text for use as a reference. This situation was remedied in a short period of time. In November 1933, the CMC ordered that all classes at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, be suspended and that the staff, assisted by resident students, prepare a manual for landing operations. The results of this effort were the **Tentative Manual for Landing Operations** issued in January 1934. On 1 August 1934, the title was changed to **Manual for Naval Overseas Operations.** At the same time, minor changes were made to the original manual. a few months later, the title was returned to its original form. The CNO gave his approval to this form. The Navy accepted the contents of this manual as official doctrine in 1938 when **Fleet Training Publication 167** was published. In 1941, the War Department put the Navy text between Army covers and issued it as FM 31-5, **Landing Operations on Hostile Shores.**

The **Tentative Manual for Landing Operations** became the basis on which landing exercises of the 1930s were conducted. Through landing exercises, which were conducted between 1935 and 1941, Marine Corps and Navy advocates for strong amphibious forces could test and evaluate the doctrine. When World War II came and it became evident that the United States would get involved, the importance of this pioneering in amphibious warfare became evident.

Neither the Marine Corps nor any other branch of the U.S. Armed forces was fully prepared at the outbreak of World War II to conduct an amphibious assault against a hostile shore. The numerous errors committed during the series of landing exercises after 1934 disclosed, without a doubt, that there was still a long road ahead before perfection could be claimed. However, the very fact that the errors had been noted and catalogued was a stride in the right direction. This is seldom possible to accomplish during periods of peace. Since World War II, it has been said that the real achievements of the Marine Corps lay in the period of peace between the two World Wars, rather than in the amphibious assaults conducted in the Pacific during the war. Also important is the doctrine itself. Like the principles of war, amphibious warfare principles were eventually applied by all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces and its Allies.

SECTION III. CONCEPT OF AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE

1301. DEFINITION

An amphibious operation is "*an attack launched from the sea by naval and landin forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore.*" (JCS Pub 1.) This definition of amphibious operations must be taken apart to see just what it means.

a. First, an amphibious operation is *an attack launched from the sea.* Combat operations such as river crossings or other operations of shore-to-shore type, although attacks against enemy positions, do not fall into the category of amphibious operations because they are not *attacks launched from the sea.* Further, operations in river deltas, inland waterways, or riverine environments are not amphibious operations for the same reason.

b. An amphibious operation involves *naval and landing forces.* Here two forces are organized, trained, and equipped to perform different functions which are integrated into the concept of a military operation. If these forces are to be successful, there must be close cooperation and detailed coordination at all echelons. There must also be a clear understanding of the mutual obligations, capabilities, and problems of each component.

c. Amphibious forces are *embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore.* Although the troops may have been embarked in ships or craft, administrative landings conducted over the beach do not qualify as amphibious operations because the landing is not made against *a hostile shore.*

1302. PURPOSES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The major goal of any amphibious operation is to establish an LF on a hostile shore. These landings are made for several military purposes.

a. **To prosecute further combat operations** is the first purpose. Basically, this means to obtain a lodgment from which a land campaign can be launched and supported. Okinawa and the Normandy landings are excellent examples. Forces were landed on Okinawa to secure a base from which the contemplated invasion of Japan could be launched. In Normandy, the landings were effected to launch an attack against the heartland of Nazi Germany.

b. Another purpose for an amphibious operation is **to obtain a site for an advanced naval base or airbase.** One of the costliest amphibious operations conducted by Marines in the Pacific during World War II, the battle for Iwo Jima, was to obtain a site from which the Air Force could carry the air war to Japan. Seizure of the island provided a base of operations for the fighter aircraft that were needed to protect the bombers attacking Japan.

c. The final purpose of conducting an amphibious operation is **to deny the use of an area or facilities to the enemy.** The first offensive action in the Pacific in World War II was conducted for this reason--to deny the Japanese the airfield facilities on Guadalcanal to prevent them from interdicting the line of supply from Pearl Harbor to Australia.

1303. CHARACTERISTICS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

a. An amphibious operation is essentially naval in character, employing an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) that has the ability to defend and sustain itself. The ATF is unique in that it combines all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, and LFs in a concerted military effort against a hostile shore.

b. An amphibious operation normally requires extensive air participation and is characterized by closely integrated efforts of forces trained, organized, and equipped for different combatant functions. It concentrates balanced forces to strike against a selected point with great force.

c. Since an amphibious operation is the projection of seapower ashore and is naval in character, a naval officer always commands the operation.

d. Combat operations that involve waterborne movement, such as inland-water, ferrying, and shore-to-shore operations in which LF's are not embarked in naval ships possess certain characteristics and employ some of the techniques of amphibious operations. These are not, however, amphibious operations.

1304. LIMITING CHARACTERISTICS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The amphibious operation must be conducted in the face of two important limiting characteristics-**natural hazards** and **initial vulnerability.**

a. **Natural Hazards.** The special effects of weather, surf, and hydrography are very important in planning for and executing the amphibious operation. These natural hazards can often be circumvented by the use of the LVT, helicopter, or units such as SEAL teams. A four weather plan employing larger landing craft to accomplish the ship-to-shore movement is made for all amphibious operations. The foul weather plan significantly changes the build-up ashore, and employment of this plan must be carefully considered. Such matters as selection of landing sites, D-day, and H-hour relate directly to aspects of natural hazards and are considered early in the operational planning. A fine example of proper amphibious planning and execution overcoming natural hazards is the First Marine Division's amphibious landing at Inchon, Korea, in 1950. The tide conditions were so severe that this site was considered by many to be totally unsuited for an amphibious landing.

b. **Initial Vulnerability**. Complete understanding of the amphibious operation must include recognition of its chief limitation-the vulnerability of the LF during the early hours of the assault. Strength ashore must be built up from zero combat power ashore to a coordinated, balanced force capable of accomplishing the assigned mission. Once the ship-to-shore movement is launched, the assault is relatively inflexible until the necessary strength is established ashore. The build-up ashore must be quick, uninterrupted, and include forces strong enough to overcome the enemy. Pre-D-day bombardment is the first step in overcoming initial vulnerability and is followed by pre-H-hour bombardment. Waves in the ship-to-shore movement are organized and closely timed to ensure accelerated build-up of sufficient initial combat power ashore. Maximum use of supporting arms is planned. These special measures are introduced to overcome the limitations of amphibious operations and constitute the organizational and technical differences between amphibious and land warfare.

1305. TYPES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The principal type of amphibious operation is the **amphibious assault** involving the establishment of an LF on a hostile shore. The lesser types of amphibious operations--the **raid**, the **demonstration**, and the **withdrawal**--have the distinctive features of an amphibious assault, but do not involve the establishing an LF ashore.

a. **Amphibious Raid**. The chief distinction between a raid and an amphibious assault is the duration of the operation. In the latter case the LF comes to stay, while a planned withdrawal is an integral part of a raid. In effect, the raid includes a ship-to-shore movement as well as a shore-to-ship movement. Raids are conducted for purposes such as the following:

(1) Inflicting loss or damage.

(2) Securing information.

(3) Creating a diversion. The raid on Choiseul Island during World War II is an excellent example of a force creating a diversion. The primary purpose of the raid was to cause the enemy to believe that this was the major U.S. effort. By so doing, the landing on Bougainville was facilitated.

(4) Capturing or evacuating individuals and material.

b. **Amphibious Demonstration**. This is an operation to deceive the enemy with a show of force to cause him to adopt an unfavorable course of action. This is not a landing since it terminates when a *turn away* line is reached and the desired effect accomplished. All the apparent steps are taken to make the enemy believe that this is the actual landing. The demonstration includes a partial ship-to-shore movement as necessary, short of landing, to accomplish this purpose. Elements of the 2d Marine Division conducted a highly successful demonstration off the southern beaches of Tinian when that island was invaded during July 1944. The enemy deployed his forces to the vicinity of Tinian Town only to see the LF turn away. He soon realized that the actual landing was being made on the northern end of the island. Overall planning supported this demonstration. Pre-D-day fires were concentrated on the southern area whereas the actual landing beaches were relatively ignored. Further, the beaches at Tinian Town were better for landing than the narrow ones to the north.

c. **Amphibious Withdrawal.** One of the more difficult of the lesser types of operations is the withdrawal. A withdrawal or embarkation from a hostile shore can be made incident to the termination of an operation and the redeployment of units. The withdrawal should not be confused with the withdrawal inherent in the raid. The raid withdrawal is planned to be conducted at a specified time. The amphibious withdrawal is not predetermined, but is based on strategic or tactical considerations and is conducted by a large force such as a division. The embarkation of the 1st Marine Division at Hamhung was the culmination of a very successful amphibious withdrawal. This operation was conducted under enemy pressure from a hostile shore and provided a large unit for commitment elsewhere.

1306. RELATED OPERATIONS

the following three paragraphs discuss two other kinds of operations and a landing, all of which are related to the amphibious operation. The two operations are **preassault operations** and **supporting operations**, and the landing is called a **subsidiary landing.**

a. **Preassault Operations**

(1) The important points to remember about preassault operations are that they are conducted in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) by subordinate elements of the ATF and normally, by an advance force.

(2) Preassault operations take place before the assault phase of an amphibious assault and are conducted for the following purposes:

(a) To isolate the objective area

(b) To gain information about the enemy

(c) To prepare the objective area

(3) The advance force, which conducts preassault operations, is a temporary organization within the task force. The decision to employ an advance force, if not made by higher authority, is made by the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), after consultation with the Commander, Landing Force (CLF). The decision is made after weighing the relative advantages of surprise as compared to the requirements for preparation of the objective area.

(4) Functions performed by preassault forces include reconnaissance, minesweeping, naval gunfire, airstrikes, underwater demolition, and destruction of beach obstacles.

b. **Subsidiary Landings**

(1) A subsidiary landing is conducted outside the main landing area to support the main operation. It is important to realize that a subsidiary landing may be conducted before, during, or after the main landing.

(2) Subsidiary landings may be executed to accomplish one or all of the following:

(a) To capture a specific position for use in support of the main landing

(b) To capture an area to deny its use to the enemy in opposing the main landing

(c) To induce a hostile reaction, which will favor the main landing through deception

NOTE: Diversion of forces from the ATF to effect subsidiary landings is justified only when such employment will be of anticipated value greater than commitment to the main landing.

c. **Supporting Operations**

(1) Supporting operations differ from preassault operations in two important aspects: They are conducted by forces external to the ATF; normally, they are conducted outside the area for which the ATF commander is responsible at the time of their execution. Supporting operations may be conducted, on occasion, in the AOA, but in such instances they are always done at the request of, or coordinated with, the CATF. Although supporting operations may be in response to requests of the CATF, higher authority orders them.

(2) The following are examples of supporting operations:

(a) Demonstrations

(b) Isolation of the objective area

(c) Assistance in gaining or maintaining air, ground, or naval supremacy

(d) Operations designed to secure information

(e) Psychological and unconventional operations

1307. PHASES OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

The amphibious operation follows a definite pattern in its evolution, i. e., it includes a sequence of events or activities that is always recognizable. Familiarity with this sequence is necessary to orient yourself properly at any given point during one of these operations. The general sequence of events in the amphibious operation can be broken down into five major phases--**planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement,** and **assault.** To remember these phases, note that the first letters of each phase, in the proper sequence, combine to form *PERMA.*

a. **Planning.** This phase extends from issuance of the initiating directive to embarkation of assigned forces. During this phase, the necessary coordinated planning is effected. However, planning does not cease at any given point, but continues

throughout the operation. For this reason, the phases are titled according to the dominant activity taking place. It is necessary to distinguish between the planning phase and subsequent operational phases since a marked change occurs in command relationships. During the planning phase, the CATF coordinates planning. He is the coordinating authority and, upon commencement of operations or of embarkation, he assumes operational command of all assigned forces. During this planning phase, both the CATF and the CLF are equals. Any differences which cannot be resolved are referred to their common superior for resolution. This relationship is very important as it ensures that neither the LF nor the naval force requirements dominate the planning considerations to the detriment of a particular force. More detailed information on command relationships is included in chapter 4.

b. **Embarkation.** This signals the commencement of the operational phases. It is the phase during which the forces with their equipment and supplies are embarked in assigned shipping. At the beginning of the embarkation phase, the CLF becomes subject to the orders of the CATF. This is because the CATF assumes full responsibility for the entire force and for the operation at this time.

c. **Rehearsal.** The third phase of the amphibious assault is the period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed to test the adequacy of plans and combat effectiveness of units, to ensure that all echelons are familiar with the plans, test communications, and to test the timing of detailed operations. Rehearsals can be classified as either ramp-down or turn-away. The type of rehearsal employed depends largely on the available time, characteristics of the rehearsal area, landing means employed, and equipment to be landed.

(1) A full-scale, ramp-down rehearsal provides the best evaluation of the plans and the readiness of the naval and LF units involved. However, adequate time and facilities must be available to allow for the necessary re-embarkation and maintenance or replacement of expended equipment and supplies. Most elements of the LF participate in this type of rehearsal.

(2) In a turn-away rehearsal, the landing craft or helicopters form in accordance with prepared plans. However, instead of landing, they turn away when a designated location is reached and return to assigned ships. Participation of LF elements is limited to the initial loads scheduled and, perhaps, some on call elements only. Training before embarkation must ensure adequate preparation of those elements which will not take part in the rehearsal. The reduced participation can be accepted if prior planning provides adequate training in advance.

d. **Movement.** This phase begins when the components of the ATF depart from the ports of embarkation en route to the AOA. It terminates when the ATF arrives at its assigned positions in the AOA. Movement may be via a rehearsal area. For purposes of this study, the rehearsal phase precedes the movement phase.

e. **Assault.** The assault phase begins with the arrival of the ATF in the AOA and ends with the accomplishment of the mission by the ATF.

1308. TERMINATION OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

a. The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the mission ATF in accordance with the specific conditions contained in the governing instructions set forth in the initiating directive. The firm establishment of the LF ashore is usually specified as one of these conditions.

b. The LF is regarded as firmly established ashore when in the opinion of the CLF:

(1) The force beach head has been secured.

(2) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to ensure the continuous landing of troops and material requisite for subsequent operations.

(3) Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities have been established ashore.

(4) The CLF has stated that he is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations.

c. When the CATF and the CLF are satisfied that the above conditions have been met, the CATF reports these facts to the higher authority designated in the initiating directive. This authority then terminates the amphibious operation, dissolves the ATF, and provides additional instructions as required, to include command relationships and disposition of forces.

SECTION IV. LANDING FORCE ORGANIZATION

1401. DEFINITION

The LF is a task organization of troop units, which includes both aviation and ground organizations. (Collectively, all of the aviation units assigned are called LF aviation.)

The culmination and ultimate purpose of U.S. amphibious power is the projection ashore, by vertical and/or surface assault, of the LF--a Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) varying in size and composition with its mission. It is landed from, and subsequently supported by, the ATF. Both the LF and the ATF are capable of being task organized rapidly for a mission or for a variety of missions. The LF organization for combat meets this requirement for flexible, yet accurate response, through three basic *task* organizations: the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). These LF organizations enable an ATF to be tailored and adjusted to the size and complexity of the particular mission. (See figure 1-1.)

	Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)	Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)	Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
	MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT (MAU)	MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE (MAB)	MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (MAF)
GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT	BATTALION LANDING TEAM (BLT)	REGIMENTAL LANDING TEAM (RLT)	DIVISION (REINFORCED)
AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT	COMPOSITE SQUADRON	MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP (MAG)	MARINE AIRCRAFT WING (MAW)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT	MAU SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (MSSG) RESOURCES FROM FSSG	BRIGADE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (BSSG) SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES FROM FSSG	FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (FSSG) LOGISTIC/ENGINEER SUPPORT
COMMANDER	COLONEL	BRIG GENERAL	MAJ GEN/LT GEN
CAPABILITY/ MISSION	COMBAT OPERATIONS OF LIMITED SCOPE ROUTINE FORWARD AFLOAT DEPLOYMENTS IMMEDIATE REACTION SEABASE	COMBAT OPERATIONS OF LIMITED SCOPE AIR/GROUND AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS IN POTENTIAL CRISIS CONTROL SEABASE/ASHORE	WIDE RANGE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

Fig 1-1. Landing force organizations/missions.

1402. ORGANIZATION OF MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCES

The composition of MAGTFs may vary, but the organizational structure will include a single **command element** with a **ground combat, aviation combat,** and **combat service support element** as co-equal subordinate elements. (See figure 1-2.) The term element, in this case, refers to those major organizations which report directly to the MAGTF commander.



Fig 1-2. Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.

The **command element** is the MAGTF headquarters, which is composed of the commander, the general or executive and special staff sections, the headquarters section, and the requisite communication and service support facilities. The establishment of a single headquarters over the aviation, ground, and combat service support elements provides the command, control, and coordination capability essential for effective planning and execution of operations.

The **ground combat element** is task organized for the conduct of ground warfare. It is structured around an infantry or armored unit and varies in size from a Battalion Landing Team to a reinforced Marine division or divisions. The ground combat element also includes appropriate combat support and combat service support units. Normally, there is only one ground combat element in a MAGTF.

The **aviation combat element** of a MAGTF is task organized to provide the required functions of Marine aviation. These functions--air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles--are provided in varying degrees based on the tactical situation and the size of the MAGTF. Normally, there is only one aviation combat element in a MAGTF. It includes those aviation command (including air control agencies), combat, combat support, and combat service support units required by the situation. It varies in size from a composite aircraft squadron to an aircraft wing(s).

The **combat service support element** is task organized to provide the MAGTF with that combat service support which is beyond the organic capability of the subordinate elements. Depending on the assigned mission, it is task organized to provide any or all of the following functions: supply, maintenance, engineer, medical/dental, automated data processing, material handling equipment, personnel services, food services, transportation, military police, disbursing, and financial management. It can, to a limited extent, provide smaller task organizations such as maintenance/supply contact teams in support of MAGTF operations.

Under normal circumstances, there is only one ground or air combat element in the MAGTF. Under unusual circumstances, a requirement for more than one ground or air combat element may occur. The very purpose of task organizing a MAGTF is to integrate single ground, air, and service support elements under a commander. In the event that the single integrated elements of the MAGTF are insufficient in size to accomplish the mission, consideration is first given to expanding to a higher MAGTF rather than adding more elements to the existing one.

Although there are always four major elements within a MAGTF, other temporary, separate task organizations may be required to perform combat support or combat service support functions. The commanders of these separate organizations, by the nature of the support provided, report directly to the MAGTF commander. These organizations may include, but are not limited to, engineer, force reconnaissance, and artillery organizations.

1403. CONCEPT OF AIR SUPPORT

Marine aviation is only part of the total airpower that may be used during an amphibious operation. When we talk about air support in an amphibious operation, we mean all air operations conducted to satisfy the requirements of the entire ATF.

The first air operations in the area of intended operations may well be area air force or fleet air units conducting supporting operations to gain and maintain air superiority and reduce the enemy's war potential. These supporting operations must not reveal the intention to conduct an amphibious assault and generally should range over a wide area.

When the advance force of the ATF arrives in the AOA, the advance force commander takes control of all air operations in the area and begins conducting preassault operations. The objective of the operations is to continue reducing the enemy's air and ground power, but, in addition to this, they must begin to isolate the battle area and start neutralizing enemy positions in the AOA. The duration of these preassault operations is based on two conflicting considerations: They should be long enough to reduce the enemy force to a level that gives Marine units numerical and firepower superiority, but they must not be so long that they conclusively reveal the intention to conduct an amphibious assault at a specific site.

When the ATF enters the AOA on or about D-1, the CATF takes control of air operations and begins assault operations. These operations continue to reduce enemy forces and isolate the battlefield, and they concentrate on neutralizing the landing beaches and helicopter landing zones (LZ). In addition, since forces are concentrated in a small area, more assets must be committed to air defense so that the enemy cannot, with his remaining airpower, prevent the accomplishment of the mission.

From the time the decision is made to make an amphibious landing until H-hour, all air strikes are preplanned and scheduled. However, after H-hour, air support operations cannot be preplanned in detail. Air support must be flexible to support the ever-changing tactical situation as it develops. This means that air support operations after H-hour are planned to provide maximum response to the ground and air threat. The air schedule, then, will consist primarily of aircraft on ground and air alert.

The air element of the MAGTF may participate in all three of these phases of operations from advanced bases in or near the AOA. The size of the force required to reduce the friendly/enemy power ratio to an acceptable level determines when the Marine air element starts operations.

1404. LANDING FORCE AVIATION

a. The MAGTF air element is at the same command level as the ground element, and the commander of the air element is normally the CLF's tactical air commander. In this capacity, he advises the CLF on aviation matters, the support he can provide, an the additional air support that the CLF will need to accomplish the mission. The command of the specific air units involved in supporting pre-assault and early assault phases may shift to several commanders before these units become a part of the LF ashore.

b. **Command Relationships.** The operational control of LF tactical squadrons could shift to the fleet commander during supporting operations, to the advance force commander during preassault operations, to the CATF during the early assault phase and, finally, to the CLF when he assumes control ashore.

c. **Methods of Operational Deployment.** LF aviation can be, and usually is, deployed in three ways to support an amphibious assault.

(1) Aviation units can come across the beach with the assault forces. The air control units (DASC, TAOC, TACC) and the LAAM battalion usually come ashore this way so that they can phase control of air ashore as soon as possible.

(2) Squadrons can operate from carriers to support operations until facilities are, established ashore. Helicopters are normally employed like this aboard LPH/LHAs so that they can participate in the ship-to-shore movement. Because they would be replacing rather than augmenting naval air units aboard carriers, fixed-wing squadrons are not usually employed aboard carriers.

(3) LF aviation can be prepositioned at advanced bases to augment the other forces conducting operations until bases ashore with the LF are uncovered or established. The squadrons normally flight ferry from home base to these advanced bases and set up for temporary operations.

d. **Phasing Ashore.** LF aviation should move ashore in the objective area as soon as the tactical situation permits for two reasons.

(1) As the tactical units on the ground move away from the beach, they also move away from the ATF's antiair defenses. Therefore, the air control and air defense units of LF aviation will augment and extend inland the Navy's systems.

(2) Deploying the aircraft units into the AOA reduces the distance involved for air support operations. By reducing the distance, aircraft can carry more ordnance, stay on station longer, fly more sorties per day, and have a more rapid response. This represents an increase in air support capability without an increase in the number of aircraft.

SUMMARY

Amphibious operations are unique because they are launched from the sea against a hostile shore. The Marine Corps' amphibious doctrine was developed after World War I and perfected in the crucible of combat during World War II. There are five phases to an amphibious operation: the planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault phases. The landing force is composed of four elements: the command element, the ground combat element, the aviation combat element, and the combat service support element.

CHAPTER 1 EXERCISE: Answer questions 1 through 7 by filling in the spaces provided. Solutions are located on the next page.

1. **State the definition of an amphibious operation.**

An amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval & landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore

2. **What are the three purposes of an amphibious operation?**

a. to prevent further enemy ops

b. to obtain a site for an advance naval & airbase

c. to deny the enemy use of an area or facilities

3. **The principal type of amphibious operation is the assault: List the three other types of amphibious operations.**

a. Raid

b. Demonstration

c. withdrawal

4. **What are the five phases of an amphibious operation?**

a. Planning

b. Embarkation

c. Rehearsal

d. Movement

e. Assault

5. **What are the two limiting characteristics of an amphibious operation?**

a. Natural hazards

b. Critical vulnerability

6. **List three operations related to amphibious operations.**

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

7. **List the four elements of the landing force.**

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

Chapter 1 Exercise Solutions

Question	Answer	Reference
1.	An amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore.	1301
2.	a. To prosecute further combat operations. b. To obtain a site for an advanced naval or airbase. c. To deny the enemy the use of an area or facilities.	1302
3.	a. Raid b. Demonstration c. Withdrawal	1305
4.	a. Planning b. Embarkation c. Rehearsal d. Movement e. Assault	1307
5.	a. Natural hazards b. Initial vulnerability	1304
6.	a. Preassault Operations b. Supporting Operations c. Subsidiary Landings	1306
7.	a. Command element b. Ground Combat element c. Aviation Combat element d. Combat Service Support element	1402

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 1.5 Hours

SCOPE: Includes Navy's mission, functions, power projection assets, role of national strategy, fundamental warfare tasks, tactical force organization, and task force composition.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Identify the U.S. Navy's mission in accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code.
2. Identify the Navy's power projection assets.
3. Identify the purpose of an amphibious task force.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Chapter 2

COMPLETE: Chapter 2 Exercise

CHAPTER 2

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

2101. INTRODUCTION

a. Naval operations conducted in support of an amphibious operation are relatively consistent with respect to Navy functions and roles. What changes is the number of units which must be committed to defeat or neutralize the threat. Title 10, U.S. Code defines the U.S. Navy's mission as *". . .to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S. national interests."*

b. The Navy's functions are to conduct sea control and power projection operations. Sea control of designated areas includes the airspace and underwater. Sea control is achieved by the destruction or neutralization of hostile aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Mahan originally described sea control as total control of all the seas. However, the increase in the number and size of navies throughout the world has caused the meaning of sea control to take on a more restrictive definition. It now refers to control in *designated sea areas* to reflect the ability of a single Navy to dominate a limited area, as opposed to the British Navy's dominance of the world's oceans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

c. Power projection operations are those aspects of naval operations which attack the enemy's homeland, bases, or defensive positions. They include **strategic nuclear response by fleet ballistic missile forces, employment of carrier-based aircraft, amphibious assault,** and **naval bombardment with guns and missiles of enemy targets ashore in support of air or land campaigns.**

d. In some cases, sea control and power projection operations are interchangeable or overlapping; e.g., carrier aircraft strikes against an enemy airfield would appear to be power projection operations. But, if the intention of the strikes were to prevent enemy aircraft from attacking the naval force, the strikes would be classified as sea control operations. A fine line of separation like the operation in the case above is really irrelevant. Think of strikes against the beach as power projection and strikes at sea as sea control.

e. The Navy contributes to national strategy in the following way:

(1) Maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrence.

(2) Deploying forces overseas (approximately 30%).

(3) Providing security for the sea lines of communication (SLOC).

f. Naval operations concentrate on training for, and, if required, execution of the following fundamental and supporting warfare tasks:

(1) **Antiair Warfare (AAW).** Destroying enemy air platforms and airborne weapons, whether launched from air, surface, subsurface or land platforms. AAW comprises all the measures that are used to achieve air superiority.

(2) **Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW).** Destroying or neutralizing enemy submarines.

(3) **Antisurface Ship Warfare (ASUW).** Destroying or neutralizing enemy surface combatants and merchant ships.

(4) **Strike Warfare.** Destroying or neutralizing enemy targets ashore by using conventional or nuclear weapons. This includes targets assigned to strategic nuclear forces, building yards, and operating bases from which an enemy can conduct or support air, surface, or subsurface operations against U.S. or allied forces.

(5) **Amphibious Warfare.** Attacks, launched from the sea by naval forces and by LFs embarked in ships or craft, designed to achieve a landing on a hostile shore. Amphibious warfare includes fire support of troops in contact with enemy forces by using close air support or shore bombardment.

(6) **Mine Warfare.** Consists of the control or denial of sea or harbor areas by laying minefields and countering enemy mine warfare by destroying or neutralizing hostile minefields.

(7) **Supporting Warfare.** This includes the following tasks:

(a) Special warfare

(b) Ocean surveillance

(c) Intelligence

(d) Command, control, and communications

(e) Electronic warfare

(f) Logistics

SECTION II. FLEET ORGANIZATION

2201. INTRODUCTION

An amphibious operation involves an extensive number of naval ships, units, and craft--more different types than any other naval operation--but the amphibious operation itself is only part of the overall field of fleet operations. An understanding of these operations is necessary as a background to a study of amphibious operations. This will help you appreciate the naval considerations and give you insight into the fleet's capability to provide the LF with the support it needs.

There are two major U.S. fleets, the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, both of which are permanent organizations. Their commanders, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), are the naval component commanders under their respective unified commanders, Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), and Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). These major fleet commanders are under the administrative control of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), but under the operational control of the commanders of the unified commands who operate

under the strategic direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In order to carry out its varied tasks, each fleet is organized along two functional lines--**operational** and **administrative**--which are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. (Also refer to figure 2-1.)

2202. THE TYPE (ADMINISTRATIVE) ORGANIZATION OF A FLEET

a. The basic organization for everyday activities is the **administrative or** ***type*** **organization**. Through this organization, the following tasks are accomplished:

(1) Administrative functions such as personnel, material, and fiscal.

(2) Repair, overhaul, and upkeep.

(3) Type training.

(4) Type development.

b. *Type* means the type of service, operation, or ship that can be provided to assist in mission accomplishment. The major fleets contain the following *type* commands:

(1) **Naval Surface Force.** All amphibious-type ships and units; all cruisers, destroyers, frigates, tenders, repair ships, oilers, communication ships, supply ships, tugs, nonamphibious cargo ships, reefers, miscellaneous service ships, and minelaying and minesweeping ships and craft, excluding aircraft and submarines employed in minelaying. Note that this is an administrative grouping of assets and not a task-organized force structured for a particular operation.

(2) **Fleet Marine Forces.** Assigned Marine air and ground units.

(3) **Naval Air Forces.** All naval air units and aircraft carriers attached to the fleet (not to be confused with U.S. Air Force units).

(4) **Submarine Forces.** All submarines in the fleet including submarine tenders.

(5) **Training Command.** No ships of its own assigned, but receives ships from other type commanders and brings them to prescribed levels of operational readiness.

2203. THE TASK (OPERATIONAL) ORGANIZATION OF A FLEET

Since the major fleets are sometimes confused with the task (or numbered) fleets, you need to know the difference. As you have seen there are two major fleets, named geographically, i.e., the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. All the naval operational assets in the given geographic area belong to the permanent fleet commander. The numbered fleets stem from the task organization system of operational control.

The Navy uses a flexible method of task organization which responds to the requirements of a given mission. There are four numbered or task fleets in existence today. The Second Fleet in the Atlantic, the Third Fleet in the Eastern Pacific, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.



Fig 2-1. Functional organization.

To illustrate this concept, look at the Seventh Fleet. Within the mission of the commander of the Seventh Fleet there are requirements for air operations, surface operations, subsurface operations, Marine operations, and logistic operations. The various forces required to do these tasks or jobs, are drawn from the assets of the type commanders under the Pacific Fleet commander. All designated units remain under the **administrative** control of their type commanders, but report for **operational** control to the Commander, Seventh Fleet. The assignment to the Seventh Fleet is mission or task oriented, and in most cases is temporary in nature. Once the unit's assignment is completed in the Seventh Fleet, it will be assigned by the permanent fleet commander (CINCPACFLT) to either another task organization or to its type commander.

As an example, if directed to conduct an operation involving an amphibious assault in a specified country, CINCPACFLT will direct that a current contingency plan, with preassigned forces, become effective. If the operation is in COMSEVENTHFLT's area, he will carry it out with his assigned forces. Alternatively, CINCPACFLT develops a plan based on the situation and assigns operational commanders and forces from those available within his organization. A CATF and a CLF will be assigned, both drawn from the type commands. Naval Surface Force Pacific (NAVSURFPAC), Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPAC); and Naval Air Forces, Pacific (NAVAIRPAC) will all provide units, as directed, to the operational commander for the duration of the mission. If, for example, he needs reconnaissance missions by both airborne and submarineborne reconnaissance teams, NAVAIRPAC and Submarine Forces; Pacific (SUBPAC), is directed to make the aircraft and submarines available. The CG, FMFPAC, will provide the reconnaissance personnel. Next, if it should be determined that an advance force is necessary to prepare the objective with airstrikes and/or shore bombardment, forces will be assigned to the advance force from NAVAIRPAC and NAVSURFPAC. This advance force would operate in support of the CATF's mission, and its commander would be the CATFs direct representative.

In summary, the major fleet commander is the naval component commander under the unified command. He is also the overall commander of the type commands. Thus, when assigned his mission by the unified command, he directs his type commanders to make available those forces he requires, including the services of personnel who are necessary. One further point of difference between the administrative and operational forces is the internal organization of each. The type command is subdivided into groups and squadrons while the task-organized fleets are subdivided into task forces, groups, units, and elements.

SECTION III. ORGANIZATION OF NAVY SURFACE FORCES

2301. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Now, let's turn to the administrative organization of the surface forces--one of the type commands--and examine its composition and capabilities to support an amphibious operation. These organizations are similar on both coasts.

2302. NAVAL SURFACE FORCES

The Commanders of the Naval Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFPAC and COMNAVSURFLANT) are vice admirals. COMNAVSURFPAC is located at the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California, and COMNAVSURFLANT is located in Norfolk, Virginia. There is an Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU) assigned to each of these commanders. COMPHIBGRU TWO is assigned to COMNAVSURFLANT, and COMPHIBGRU THREE is assigned to COMNAVSURFPAC. A PHIBGRU has a rear admiral as its commander and usually has a staff of about 35 officers and 80 enlisted men. Additionally, COMPHIBGRU ONE is assigned to COMSEVTHFLT. He is stationed in Okinawa and is responsible for conducting amphibious operations in the SEVENTHFLT theatre of operations.

COMPHIBGRU TWO and COMPHIBGRU THREE are organized along similar lines. There are about 30 ships in each group. Each organization has amphibious squadrons (PHIBRONS) composed of five to eight ships and commanded by a Navy captain with a staff of about 10 officers and 20 enlisted men. One PHIBRON from the east coast is normally assigned to the Mediterranean Ocean as a part of the Sixth Fleet, and 1 PHIBRON from

the west coast is normally assigned to WESTPAC as part of the Seventh Fleet. All East Coast amphibious ships are stationed in Norfolk, VA, and all west coast amphibious ships are stationed in San Diego, Ca.

Additionally, within each PHIBGRU, there is a Naval Special warfare group (NAVSPECWARGRU) commanded by a Navy captain. He is responsible for the specialized training of special warfare forces and exercises administrative control of the SEA, AIR, and LAND Teams (SEAL TEAMS), a special boat squadron (SBS) and a submersible diving team (SDT). There is a naval beach group (NAVBEACHGRU) consisting of an amphibious construction battalion (PHIBCB), also a beachmaster unit (BMU), an assault craft unit (ACU), and a tactical air group (TACGRU) in each PHIBGRU.

2303. COMMISSIONED UNITS

Up to this point, you have covered the various types of ships and their organization under a PHIBGRU and PHIBRON. Now direct your attention to the tactical air control group (TACGRU), NAVBEACHGRU, and NAVSPECWARGRU. The following are some o the special units of the surface forces which are available for operational assignment to tasks fleets under the amphibious commander.

The TACGRU is the administrative senior for the TACRON. There is one TACGRU in NAVSURFLANT and one TACGRU in NAVSURFPAC. A Navy captain, who is an aviator, command each TACGRU and TACRON. The TACGRU is composed of TACRONs which have Navy commanders as officers-in-charge. There are representatives from the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps assigned to TACRONs. Depending on the size of the ATF, either a TACRON or TACGRU deploys with the ATF. The TACRONs are the units task organized within the ATF which actually exercise control of air operations within the AOA until such time as this control is passed ashore. The TACRON personnel operate the tactical air command center (TACC) aboard the ATF flagship. TACC provides the control link between the attack aircraft and the troops on the beach. TACC also controls or coordinates aircraft involved in antiair warfare and antisubmarine defense of the ATF in the AOA. TACRONs are strictly control organizations since they do not have aircraft assigned as part of the squadron. Helicopter direction centers (HDC) are manned by officers and enlisted personnel assigned as ship's company of the helicopter transport group commander's flagship. TACRON personnel may augment an HDC. For purposes of planning, rehearsals, and operations, TACRONs are assigned to the ATF.

The naval beach group (NAVBEACHGRU) is probably a familiar term, but you may be less familiar with its composition and the varied tasks it performs. Its overall mission is vital to the success of any amphibious assault. The NAVBEACHGRU is a permanently organized Navy command within both NAVSURFLANT and NAVSURFPAC comprised of a commander, a captain, and his staff; a PHIBCB; a BMU; and an ACU. Its mission is to provide an administrative group from which required Navy elements may be made available to the ATF and LF commanders to support the landing requirements.

a. The BMU is organized administratively and tactically into a unit headquarters and beach party groups. Its mission is to provide Navy elements of the shore party in order to facilitate the beach landing and movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. It also assists in evacuating casualties and POWs from the beach. Tasks include control of landing ships, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles from the surfline to the high-water mark on the beach; directing them to beaching points; and directing their withdrawal. It is responsible for preparing the beach and its approaches and for

determining and marking landing sites. The beachmaster is the officer in charge of all naval elements on the beach. While on the beach he works directly for the shore party commander.

b. The mission of the PHIBCB is to support the naval beach party during the early phases of the assault. Tasks of this unit include construction and operation of pontoon causeways, lighterage, barges, warping tugs, and installation and operation of the ship-to-shore bulk fuel systems. The Seabees are responsible for performing their tasks through the BMU in support of shore party operations.

c. The ACU is organized into a unit headquarters and one or more assault craft divisions. The mission of the assault craft is to provide the heavy lighterage (LCU and LCM) for the ship-to-shore movement. It has a minor boat repair capability.

Lastly, the NAVSPECWARGRU is the administrative senior to two other highly specialized amphibious groups: the SEAL Teams; and the special boat units, consisting of small, high-speed craft and gunboats. Of the subordinate units administered by NAVSPECWARGRU, the one most well known is the SEAL Teams, which perform tasks in two areas: the first is to reconnoiter and clear beach approaches of obstacles and to conduct hydrographic reconnaissance from the 3 1/2-fathom line (6 meters) inshore to the high water mark. The second is to conduct special warfare in maritime areas, restricted water, river deltas, rivers, and lakes.

2304. AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF)

The ATF is a task organization that is established for the purpose of conducting amphibious operations. It consists of LF assault shipping and supporting naval units. The two type commands primarily concerned are the naval surface forces and FMFs, although other type commands normally provide supporting forces for the operation. The ATF is always commanded by a naval officer (the CATF).

2305. PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

The considerations that control the organization of naval forces for other types of operations apply to the organization of task forces for amphibious operations. However, the amphibious operation is influenced by the interrelationship between the organization of the LF and the organization of the corresponding naval elements which transport, land, and support it.

For the operation to be successful the naval forces must be organized to best support the LF tactical plan. Thus, the task organization of the ATF is based primarily on the requirements for the assault phase of the operation. No standard organization applies to all situations that may be encountered. The requirements of the particular operation determine the task organization. A flexible task grouping is essential. Once the organization becomes effective, the task organization titles of the various task components of the force are used exclusively for operational purposes.

The organization of the ATF is based primarily on the requirements for the assault phase of the operation. For an understanding of the functions of the ATF, it is necessary to consider how the naval components support that phase of the operation.

2306. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. Figures 2-2 and 2-3 show the organization as presently used in the Seventh Fleet. The first component that appears in an ATF task organization is the LF, which is a part of the ATF and is assigned a task force numerical designator (see figure 2-4). Some definitions of forces which are assigned either to, or in support of, the CATF follow:

(1) **Transport Group.** The transport group provides for embarkation, movement to the OA, landing, and logistic support of the LF. It comprises all shipping in which the LF is embarked, including the shipping which transports the helicopters and the heliborne troops. The Navy landing craft to be employed in the ship-to-shore movement are organic to, or attached to, the transport group.

(2) **Control Group.** Personnel, ships, and craft designated to control the waterborne ship-to-shore movement.

(3) **Tactical Air Control Group.** Shipborne organization necessary to operate a TACC and a TADC (afloat) for the control of air operations.

(4) **Fire Support Groups.** Groups of naval combatants assigned to provide naval gunfire and guided missile support for the landing and subsequent operations ashore.

(5) **Shore-Based Navy Tactical Air Groups.** Task organizations of tactical air units assigned to the ATF which are to be land-based within, or sufficiently close to, the OA to provide tactical air support to the ATF.

(6) **Support Battle Group.** A task organization of an aircraft carrier with embarked aircraft and supporting ships which provides naval air support to the ATF. If there is more than one carrier in this organization, this is called a battle force.

(7) **Mine Warfare Group.** A task organization which conducts offensive and defensive mine warfare operations in support of the ATF.

(8) **Close Covering Group.** A task organization which provides protection against attack by aircraft, subsurface and surface ships. It is ordinarily composed of aircraft carriers and other combatants as required.

(9) **Maritime Patrol Group.** A task organization of patrol aircraft which conducts such missions as scouting, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine operations while the ATF is en route to, and in, the AOA.

(10) **Screening Group.** A task organization to furnish protection to the ATF en route to the OA and during operations in the OA.

(11) **Reconnaissance and Underwater Demolition Group.** A task organization including ships, embarked reconnaissance troops, and SEAL Teams which conduct reconnaissance, hydrographic surveys, and demolition of natural or man-made obstacles.

(12) **Tactical Deception Group.** A task organization which conducts deception operations against the enemy. It includes electronic, communication, visual, and other methods designed to misinform and confuse the enemy.

(13) **Air Transport Group.** A task organization of transport aircraft units that provides air transport for LF components and or provides logistical support.

(14) **Inshore Undersea Warfare Group.** A task organization which provides surface and subsurface detection of enemy targets in the seaward approach to the AOA.

(15) **Administrative Group.** The agency which is responsible for administrative and special details in the OA. During initial stages of the assault, the CATF or his subordinates participating in the assault perform all administrative functions. These duties are passed to the commander of the administrative group as the assault progresses.

(16) **Naval Beach Group.** A task organization which may consist of traffic control, communications, beach/surf salvage, pontoon and fuel elements of the beach party; assault craft not organic to assault shipping, and combat stevedore units.

(17) **Movement Group.** The shipping and LF units assigned to the CATF may be located at widely separated embarkation points. Thus, movement of the ATF may result in separate units sailing from different ports at different times in order to arrive in the AOA at the prescribed time. The movement group is organized to accomplish one thing--movement to the OA. There is no standard organization that applies to all situations.

b. In addition to those forces assigned directly to the CATF, there are various units assigned to support the ATF mission. For example, protecting the ATF from air, surface, and subsurface threat, would be the responsibility of a battle group commander who would provide the required assets.

c. Airstrike operations within the AOA are the responsibility of the CATF, who uses forces of the battle group or battle force assigned to support the ATF in the AOA.

d. Replenishment operations are provided by the logistic support force commander who provides the replenishment ships (oilers, ammunition ships, stores ships and associated aircraft) needed to keep the ATF operating.

NOTE: **For a further description and breakdown of naval organization, see Naval Warfare Publications (NWP) 2, Organization of the U.S. Navy.**



Fig 2-2. Organizational relationship to operating forces reporting to COMSEVENTHFLT.



Fig 2-3. Organizational relationship of operating forces reporting to CTF 76.



Fig 2-4. Organizational relationship of operating forces reporting to CTF 79.

CHAPTER 2 EXERCISE: Answer questions 1 through 3 by filling in the spaces provided. Solutions are located on the following page.

1. **What is the Navy's mission as defined in Title 10, U.S. Code?**

_____

_____

_____

_____

2. **List the Navy's four power projection assets.**

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

3. **What is the purpose of an ATF?**

_____

_____

_____

_____

Chapter 2 Exercise Solutions

Question		Answer	Reference
1.		To be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S. national interests.	2101
2.	a.	Strategic nuclear response by fleet ballistic missile forces	2101
	b.	Employment of carrier-based aircraft	
	c.	Amphibious assault forces	
	d.	Naval bombardment with guns and missiles of energy targets ashore in support of air or land campaigns	
3.		An ATF is a task organization that is established for the purpose of conducting an amphibious operation	2304

CHAPTER 3

AMPHIBIOUS STAFF FUNCTIONING

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 2.5 hours

SCOPE: Includes responsibilities for amphibious planning, the initiating directive, planning characteristics, the sequence of planning, and organizational planning.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Identify the purpose of the initiating directive.
2. Identify the nine essential elements of an initiating directive.
3. Identify the purpose of the commander's planning guidance.
4. Identify the purpose of the planning directive.
5. Identify the purpose of the CLFs planning schedule.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Chapter 3

COMPLETE: Chapter 3 Exercise

CHAPTER 3

AMPHIBIOUS STAFF FUNCTIONING

SECTION I. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING

3101. APPROACH TO PLANNING

All combat operations generally require careful and detailed planning. The amphibious operation, however, is complicated by the following:

a. The need to coordinate in detail the actions of all forces involved.

b. The complexity of logistic support activities.

c. The need for precise timing in air, naval gunfire, and artillery fire support.

d. The need for effective command relationships.

e. The requirements of other operational factors unique to the operation.

The concurrent participation of the various forces comprising the ATF requires a close and continuous relationship in planning between corresponding echelons of command. Parallel planning begins when the CLF reports to the CATF at the beginning of the planning phase.

The very nature of the amphibious assault, which integrates the actions of such a wide variety of forces, necessitates detailed planning at all command levels. In many instances, this detailed planning may include command decisions which will restrict the degree of freedom of action and authority normally allowed subordinate commanders in the performance of their assigned tasks.

Planning for the amphibious operation is a continuous process from receipt of the initiating directive until termination of the operation. This process is distinguished, as mentioned in the previous chapter, by the necessity for **concurrent, parallel,** and **detailed planning** by all participating forces.

The necessity for concurrent planning by two or more echelons in the same command and by corresponding echelons of different commands arises from the many problems that are of mutual concern to all participants. The final decisions of senior commanders are influenced by recommendations and estimates of subordinate commanders produced during preliminary planning.

3102. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. The CATF has the responsibility for the preparation of the overall ship-to-shore movement and the landing plan, including the allocation of ships and landing craft.

b. The CLF is responsible for the following:

(1) Determining and presenting his ship-to-shore movement requirements to the CATF.

(2) Presenting the availability of landing force helicopters and amphibious vehicles to the CATF and the commander of subordinate LF elements.

(3) Preparing the troop landing plans.

SECTION II. THE INITIATING DIRECTIVE

3201. PURPOSE

The initiating directive is an order directed to the CATF, with copies to the CLF and other major subordinate commanders, to conduct an amphibious operation. The basic purpose of the initiating directive is to **provide the information necessary to begin the planning phase of an amphibious operation. The initiating directive is issued by the commander having overall responsibility for the operation.** The commander having responsibility for the operation is usually a fleet commander, who is the common senior in the operational chain of command of the type forces (NAVSURF/FMF) involved. However, in the event the ATF includes Army or Air Force participation, the initiating directive would normally have to be issued by the respective unified or subunified commander. The ATF would then become a Joint ATF (JATF). Remember that the initiating directive is a formal document, usually a Letter of Instruction (LOI), which initiates an amphibious operation from planning to termination.

3202. CONTENT

Before examining the initiating directive, let us consider the information and instructions that are included in an effective initiating directive. Remember that the initiating directive brings the ATF into being; it has no specific format. The commander having overall responsibility for the amphibious operation issues it. An initiating directive provides for these nine essential elements.

a. Provides for the establishment of the ATF, the assignment of a mission, and forces necessary to accomplish the mission. It also provides for the establishment of the LF.

b. Designates the CATF, the CLF, and other commanders, as appropriate.

c. Provides special instructions on command relationships.

d. Defines the AOA in terms of sea, land, and airspace, and prescribes command authority within the AOA.

e. Provides a code name and sets target dates for the execution of the operation.

f. Contains special instructions on the allocation, employment, and the control of NC weapons.

g. Governs the control of positive instructions covering the termination of the operation, including command arrangements and disposition of forces which are to be effective at the end of the operation and operations to be conducted after termination of the amphibious operation.

h. Assigns responsibility for the conduct of combat or logistic operations which relate to or support the amphibious operation; announces appropriate coordinating instructions.

i. Provides appropriate instruction in operational security and signal security with respect to release of classified information via non-secure means. In this regard, such instruction shall be provided prior to the initial planning phase.

3203. A SAMPLE INITIATING DIRECTIVE

In the LOI which follows, the essential elements of an effecting initiating directive have been blocked to highlight them. Do not attempt to study the LOI in detail, but, rather, try to become familiar with its general content and organization. (This particular LOI is used at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Resident Program.)

COMSTRIKFORSOUTH
U.S.S. LITTLE ROCK
at sea
1 May 198_

From: Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH)
To: Commander, Amphibious Group TWO

Subj: Letter of Instruction, Operation JAGUAR

Ref: (Omitted)

Encl: (1) Intelligence (Omitted)
(2) Amphibious Objective Area
(3) Assignment of Forces
(4) NATO Southern Region Command Structure

PURPOSE: This directive establishes Task Force 61 (Amphibious Task Force) and Task Force 62 (Landing Force), effective this date, and initiates planning for Phase II, Operation JAGUAR.

---

1. **SITUATION**

a. **General.** Aggressor military forces are in control of the Italian peninsula with the exception of the toe and heel areas of Italy which are presently held by loyal armed forces of Italy. Consolidation by enemy occupation forces is complete: communist puppet government is firmly imposed. The Italian populace is resentful but subdued except for scattered guerrilla activity in mountainous areas and major population centers.

Aggressor naval and air forces dominate the Adriatic and the immediate area of the Italian peninsula but have made no effort to interfere with CINCSOUTH's air and naval activities in other parts of the Mediterranean.

Nuclear weapons have not been employed by Aggressor forces. In view of the limited nature of the conflict to date, no employment of nuclear weapons is anticipated.

b. **Aggressor Forces.** See enclosure (1). (Intelligence-Omitted)

c. **Friendly Forces**

(1) **Under command of CINCSOUTH**

(a) COMNAVSOUTH, in conjunction with COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, maintains naval supremacy in the Mediterranean; COMSTRIKFORCE seizes and secures an area

in southern Italy, vicinity of Naples, as a base for subsequent operations of NATO forces. Upon completion of the amphibious assault, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH prepares to conduct subsequent amphibious operatio as directed.

(b) COMAIRSOUTH gains and maintains air superiority in the Mediterranean; conducts supporting operations in isolating and preparing the objective area as directed by CINCSOUTH.

(c) COMLANDSOUTH embarks forces and lands in the Naples area, when direct passes through the landing force (TF 62); and seizes the Italian peninsula to restore the lawful government of Italy.

(d) COMLANDSOUTHEAST prepares to conduct supporting operations, as direct

(2) **Under command of COMSTRIKFORSOUTH**

(a) **Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 60)**

- Provides antiair warfare defense for the ATF enroute to and in the objective area, as directed.

- Assists in isolation and preparation of the objective area. (Phase I, Operation JAGUAR.)

- From D-5 to D+5, supports TF 61 and TF 62 by providing surface and airborne air defense forces, close air support aircraft, and other supporting aircraft, as required by CTF 61.

- After D+5, prepares to support CINCSOUTH operations in the Southern Region.

(b) **Mobile Logistic Support Force (TF 63).** Provides fleet logistic support to all Operation JAGUAR surface and subsurface forces in the Mediterranean, as requested.

2. **Mission of Amphibious Task Force (TF 61).** Conducts an amphibious operation for the purpose of establishing a beachhead in southern Italy, vicinity of Naples, of sufficient size to provide a base for the subsequent landing of follow-up NATO forces to be engaged in the seizure of Italy in order to restore the lawful government.

3. **OPERATIONS**

a. **Phases as established by CINCSOUTH**

(1) **Phase I (D-5 to commencement of advance force operations, if conducted, or 0001, D-day, whichever date is earlier).** COMNAVSOUTH, in conjunction with COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, maintains naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. COMAIRSOUTH gains and maintains general air superiority in the Adriatic and western Mediterranean and conducts supporting operations in isolating and preparing the AOA.

(2) **Phase II (Commencement of advance force operations, if conducted, or 0001, D-day, whichever date is earlier, to about D+16).** COMSTRIKFORSOUTH conducts an amphibious operation, seizes and secures an area of sufficient size in southern Italy, vicinity of Naples, to permit the deployment of follow-up NATO forces under COMLANDSOUTH.

(3) **Phase III (About D+17---).** COMNAVSOUTH and COMSTRIKFORSOUTH support COMLANDSOUTH forces, Naples area, and continue to maintain naval supremacy in the Mediterranean area.

b. **Coordinating Instructions**

(1) **Code name.** JAGUAR.

(2) **Objective area.** See enclosure (2).

(3) **Command relationships**

(a) Phase I, as prescribed by COMSTRIKFORSOUTH OpO__.

(b) During amphibious planning and phase II, as prescribed by NWP 22(B) (LFM 01).

(c) CTF 61 controls all operations of U.S. and NATO forces in the AOA commencing with advance force operations, if conducted, or 0001, D-day, whichever date is earlier until the termination of the amphibious operation (Phase II).

(4) **Target date, amphibious operation.** 28 May - 4 June 198_. Both dates inclusive.

(5) **Assignment of forces.** Enclosure (3), Assignment of Forces.

(6) **Air Defense.** CTF 61 provides for air defense in the AOA commencing with advance force operations, if conducted, or 0001, D-day, whichever date is earlier. Coordinate air defense plans with CTF 60 and COMAIRSOUTH. Upon termination of the amphibious operations, COMAIRSOUTH assumes air defense responsibility as the air component commander of CINCSOUTH.

(7) **Termination of the Amphibious Operation**

(a) Upon recommendation of the Amphibious Task Force Commander (CTF 61), the amphibious operation (Phase II, Operation JAGUAR) will be terminated by COMSTRIKFORSOUTH.

(b) On order, on termination of Phase II, COMLANDSOUTH assumes command ashore, Naples area, relieving Landing Force Commander (CTF 62).

(c) On order, on termination of Phase II (approximately D+16), ATF will reembark the landing force in preparation for subsequent operations, as directed.

(8) **Nuclear Weapons.** Employment of nuclear weapons is not presently authorized. However, be prepared to employ such weapons, if directed.

(9) Operational Security as prescribed in reference ( ).

4. **LOGISTICS**

a. Logistics in accordance with COMSTRIKFORSOUTH OpO__.

b. Submit nuclear and chemical weapons requirements to COMSTRIKFORSOUTH.

c. CTF 61 submit follow-up shipping requirements to COMSTRIKFORSOUTH.

d. CTF 61 designated coordinating authority for ATF and LF logistics during Phases I and II.

5. **COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS**

a. Rear Admiral HAWK, USN, Commander, Amphibious Group TWO, designated Amphibiou Task Force Commander (CTF 61).

b. Major General LANCER, USMC, CG II MAF, designated Landing Force Commander (CT 62).

c. See enclosure (4) for NATO Southern Region Command Structure.

d. COMSTRIKFORSOUTH is coordinating authority with CINCSOUTH and CINCSOUTH component commanders.

e. Direct liaison authorized among CTF 61, CTF 62, CTF 60, CTF 63, and COMLANDSOUT forces that land and deploy in the Naples area subsequent to amphibious operation.

f. Communications as prescribed in reference ( ).

g. Signal security as prescribed in reference ( ).

S. S. SOUTH

Copy to:
CINCSOUTH
COMNAVSOUTH
COMAIRSOUTH
COMLANDSOUTH
COMLANDSOUTHEAST
Commander Attack Carrier Strike Force (CTF 60)
Commander Mobile Logistic Support Force (CTF 63)
CG, II MAF (CTF 62)



AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA
ENCLOSURE (2) to COMSTRIKESOUTH LTR OF 1 MAY 8_ SUBJ., LETTER OF INSTRUCTION, OPERATION JAGUAR

ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES

Enclosure (3) to COMSTRIKFORSOUTH ltr of 1 May 198_, Subj: Letter of Instruction, Operation JAGUAR.

NAVY FORCES

Commander Amphibious Group Two	COMPHIBGRU 2 and STAFF
Mt WHITNEY (LCC-20)	1 LCC
Commander Amphibious Squadron Two Commander Amphibious Squadron Four Commander Amphibious Squadron Six Commander Amphibious Squadron Eight	4 COMPHIBRON and STAFF
FRANCIS MARION (LPA-249) PAUL REVERE (LPA-248)	2 LPA (From Naval Reserve Force)
TRIPOLI (LPH-10) IWO JIMA (LPH-2) GUADALCANAL (LPH-7) INCHON (LPH-12) NEW ORLEANS (LPH-11)	5 LPH
TARAWA (LHA-1) SAIPAN (LHA-2)	2 LHA
SHREVEPORT (LPD-12) PONCE (LPD-15) RALEIGH (LPD-1) AUSTIN (LPD-4) NASHVILLE (LPD-13) CORONADO (LPD-11) TRENTON (LPD-14)	7 LPD
FORT SNELLING (LSD-34) HERMITAGE (LSD-34) PLYMOUTH ROCK (LSD-29) PENSACOLA (LSD-38) PORTLAND (LSD-37) SPIEGEL GROVE (LSD-32)	6 LSD
CHARLESTON (LKA-113) EL PASO (LKA -117) MOBILE (LKA-115) ST LOUIS (LKA-116) TULARE (LKA-112)	5 LKA (TULARE From Naval Reserve Force)
NEWPORT (LST-1179) MANITOWOC (LST-1180) SUMTER (LST-1181)	15 LST

SAGINAW (LST-1188)	
BOULDER (LST-1190)	
SPARTANBURG COUNTY (LST-1192)	
FAIRFAX COUNTY (LST-1193)	
LAMOURE COUNTY (LST-1194)	
HARLAN COUNTY (LST-1196)	
BARNSTABLE COUNTY (LST-1197)	
PEORIA (LST-1183)	
FREDERICK (LST-1184)	
SCHENECTADY (LST-1185)	
CAYUGA (LST-1186)	
TUSCALOOSA (LST-1187)	
COMPATDIV TWENTY-ONE	4 PG
ANTELOPE (PG-86)	1 AGP
DOUGLAS (PG-100)	
GRAND RAPIDS (PG-93)	
READY (PG-87)	
GRAHAM COUNTY (AGP-1176)	

Enclosure (3)

Tactical Air Control Group Two	1-TACGRU
Tactical Air Control Squadron 21, 22	2-TACRON
Naval Beach Group Two	1-NBG
Amphibious Construction Battalion Two	1-ACB
Beachmaster Unit Two	1-BMU
Assault Craft Unit Two	1-ACU
(19 LCU, 21 LCM-8)	
Navy Special Warfare Group Two	1-NSWG
SEAL Team Two	1-SEAL
UDT 21	1-UDT
Composite Operational Readiness Group	1-DET
In shore Underseas Warfare Group Two	1-IUWG
MIUW 21	
MIUW 22	
MIUW 23	
Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Two	3-CG and STAFF
Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight	
LITTLE ROCK (CG-0004)	3-CG
YARNELL (CG-0017)	
ALBANY (CG-0010)	
Commander Destroyer Squadron Two	6-CDS and STAFF
Commander Destroyer Squadron Four	
Commander Destroyer Squadron Six	
Commander Destroyer Squadron Ten	
Commander Destroyer Squadron Twenty	

Commander Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Two

BARNEY (DDG-6)
MULLINNIX (DD-944)
VOGELESANG (DD-862)
BYRD (DDG-23)
R. A. OWENS (DD-827)
SAMESON (DDG-10)
VREELAND (FF-1068)
BLAKELY (FF-1072)
CONE (DD-866)
SELLERS (DDG-11)
JOHNSTON (DD-821)
BRUMEY (FF-1044)
MACDONOUGH (DDG-0039)
GLENNON (DD-840)
EORDELON (DD-881)
SEMMES (DDG-18)
KRAUS (DD-849)
VESOLE (DD-878)
MCCARD (DD-822)
ADAMS (DDG-2)
SARSFIELD (DD-837)
WARE (DD-865)
BIGELOW (DD-942)
POWER (DD-839)
TALBOT (FFG-0004)
BASILONE (DD-824)
SHERMAN (DD-931)
RUSH (DD-714)
FARRAGUT (DDG-0037)
BARRY (DD-933)
GARCIA (FF-1040)
PAGE (FFG-0005)
MCDONNELL (FF-1043)
PATTERSON (FF-1061)

8 DDG (Guided Missile Destroyer)
2 FFG (Guided Missile Frigate)
18 DD (Destroyer)
6 FF (Frigate)
34

Enclosure (3)

Commander Mine Squadron Twelve	1-CMS and STAFF
GUAM (LPH-9) HELO DET	1-LPH (6-CH-53D)
Commander Mine Division One Twenty-One	1-CMD and STAFF
ADROIT (MSO-509)	5-MSO
AFFRAY (MSO-511)	
DASH (MSO-428)	
DETECTOR (MSO-429)	
INFLICT (MSO-456)	

Mobile Construction Battalion 40	1-MCB
MSC Shipping (To be designated)	1-T-AP 5-T-AK

MARINE CORPS FORCES

Hqtrs, II MAF
2d MarDiv

2d MAW
2d FSSG

Enclosure (3)

NATO SOUTHERN REGION COMMAND



Enclosure (4)

This, then, is what a typical initiating directive may look like. The information contained in the essential elements is so important that, to emphasize this content, we will discuss each element individually.

a. **Establishment of the ATF and Mission and Forces Assignment**

(1) Refer again to the LOI for Operation JAGUAR. The ATF and LF are established in the PURPOSE paragraph. They are given task force designations of 61 and 62, respectively.

(2) Now that the forces are activated, you need a mission. Looking back, you see that the ATF mission is spelled out in paragraph 2. This is somewhat different from an operation order as you know it in the Marine Corps. In your operation order, paragraph 2, MISSION, gives the mission of the Commander who writes the order. This order is a letter of instruction from COMSTRIKFORSOUTH to CATF and is designed for the purpose of initiating an amphibious operation. **In an initiating directive, the mission listed is always the mission of the ATF commander.**

(3) The ATF has been established and the mission assigned. Next, you need the assets (forces) to accomplish the mission. Look at subparagraph 3b(5). You have been assigned the forces as outlined in enclosure (3). There is no need to dwell on the detailed organization of the forces. For your purposes, it will suffice to realize that both the naval and LFs that form the ATF have been listed. If Air Force units were going to participate as a subordinate force under CATF authority, they would also have been listed in enclosure (3).

b. **Designation of Commanders.** Paragraph 5 designates the CATF and the CLF. Notice that paragraph 5 also informs the two commanders of certain command relationships with commanders who are not part of the ATF.

c. **Command relationships**

(1) Near the end of Chapter 1, you studied the command relationships that normally occur during an amphibious operation.

(2) The initiating directive always provides special instructions concerning these command relationships. It can either confirm the relationships as established in doctrinal publications or it can alter them to meet the requirements of a particular amphibious operation.

(3) In the case of Operation JAGUAR, refer to subparagraph 3b(3). The relationships are prescribed as established in doctrinal publications. Reference is also made to special command relationships that exist during Phase I of this three-phase operation.

d. **Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)**

(1) The next element outlines the AOA. Look at subparagraph 3b(2), and see that in this instance, you are referred to enclosure (2).

(2) The AOA must be large enough to do the following:

(a) It should provide sufficient airspace and sea area for the CATF to effectively use forces assigned for protection of his force from enemy air, surface, and subsurface threat.

(b) The AOA also includes sufficient land area to permit the CATF to launch air strikes against the enemy force's attempting to reinforce its ground forces and to destroy enemy airfields within striking distance of the task force without referring to higher authority.

(c) The size of the AOA is largely based on the requirements for airspace. Air is the striking arm with the longest range. It must have an objective area large enough to permit effective employment of aircraft in antiair warfare (AAW), close air support, and strikes inland beyond the force beachhead. The AOA shown in enclosure (2) meets these requirements.

(3) Looking at subparagraph 3b(3)(c), you see that the authority of the CATF within the AOA is defined.

e. **Code Name and Target Dates.** Referring to subparagraph 3b again, you find that subparagraph (1) designates the operation code name JAGUAR, and that subparagraph (4) indicates that the target dates for the amphibious assault (D-day) are 28 May-4 June, inclusive.

f. **Instructions Concerning Employment of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons.** Remember that one of the essential elements of an effective initiating directive is instructions on the employment of NC weapons. You would normally expect some very definite instructions. However, in Operation JAGUAR, subparagraph 3b(8) simply indicates that use of nuclear weapons is not authorized. The order to use nuclear weapons, if directed, will probably require the preparation of an alternate plan to cover this possibility.

g. Termination and Future Operations

(1) The initiating directive must provide specific instructions on when and how the operation will be terminated, who has the authority to terminate it, and what happens to the ATF forces upon termination. It should also include information on any anticipated future operations. Each of these points is covered in subparagraph 3b(7).

(2) The termination is predicated upon accomplishing the mission assigned the ATF in the initiating directive. Just when is the mission accomplished? This is a valid question as the mission accomplishment may mean something different to the commanders involved. To avoid confusion, the initiating directive contains specific instructions which must be met before the mission can be considered accomplished. The firm establishment ashore of the LF is usually specified as one of these conditions. The LF is firmly established ashore when, in the opinion of the CLF, the following conditions exist:

(a) The beachhead is secured.

(b) Sufficient tactical/support forces are ashore to ensure the continuous landing of troops and material.

(c) Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities are established ashore.

(d) CLF has stated his readiness to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations ashore.

(3) When both the CATF and the CLF are satisfied that these conditions have been met, as well as any others stated in the initiating directive, the CATF reports these facts to the originator of the initiating directive. This higher authority then terminates the operation, dissolves the ATF, and provides necessary instructions to include command relationships and disposition of forces. Bear in mind that all of the conditions set forth in the initiating directive must be met before the CATF can report to higher authority and request that the operation be terminated.

(4) Neither the CATF nor the CLF has the authority to terminate the operation. To further illustrate this, let's look at the landing on Okinawa in World War II. The Navy was taking heavy casualties from the Japanese kamikaze attacks, and the CATF realistically desired to move his fleet from this threat as soon as possible. To do this, the operation would have to be terminated. Accordingly, the CATF asked the CLF if he *was firmly established ashore.* The answer was in the negative, and termination was effected at a later date. This is an example of the CLF's position in determining when the conditions for termination have been met, and the degree to which the CATF is restricted in this area.

h. **Responsibility for Combat and Logistic Operations Related to or in Support of the Amphibious Operation.** In Operation JAGUAR, as is normally the case, assignment of combat operations in support of the amphibious operation is done separately from responsibility for logistic operations. For instance, subparagraph 1c(2) assigns responsibility for supporting combat operations, and paragraph 4 assigns logistic responsibilities.

i. **Instructions on Operational and Signal Security.** To guard against the unauthorized or inadvertant disclosure of classified information pertaining to the amphibious operation, instruction on these security matters is provided at the onset of planning.

The essential elements of an effective initiating directive are no more than the essential elements of any effective order. Every order requires that a mission be assigned and assets be made available to the commander to accomplish the mission. Coordinating instructions cover most of the elements regarded as essential to the success of the mission. Logistic responsibilities are spelled out, and command relationships are formalized.

SECTION III. PLANNING CHARACTERISTICS

3301. BACKGROUND

You now have the initiating directive. Next, you need to know the characteristics of planning and the sequential steps in the accomplishment of planning, but first, some background. Amphibious operations have been conducted by military forces for over 2,400 years. Some of these operations, such as Caesar's invasion of Britain in ancient history and the more recent campaigns in the Pacific during World War II and in Korea, have been complete successes. Others, such as the Persian defeat at Marathon where the LF suffered over 6,000 casualties versus 192 for the Greek defenders, and the catastrophe suffered by the Allies at Gallipoli in World War I, were serious military defeats. Why were some of these expeditions so successful and others disastrous? Without exception, the failures all had one distinguishing characteristic--poor planning in one or more phases of the operation.

How long does it take to plan for an amphibious operation? For the Inchon operation, the planners had exactly 22 days from the time they received the mission while at Camp Pendleton until the LF was coming across the beach. Normally, you need from 45 to 60 days to plan for an operation and to move from a land base to the AOA to conduct the operation.

In preparing for deployments to the Mediterranean or to the Caribbean, planning usually starts about 90 days before embarkation. However, once afloat in a contingency posture and after receipt of a specific mission, planning is measured in hours rather than months or days. Obviously, under the afloat circumstance, rapid reaction is demanded, and there is little time to waste.

3302. CHARACTERISTICS OF AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING

In 1943, President Roosevelt, referring to amphibious operations in a message to Congress, said, *"People who have seen, or planned this kind of operation do not speak glibly of landing a great expedition on a few days' notice."* This military truism that amphibious operations require time for adequate planning is as apropos today as it was then. Thus, one of the basic factors in planning this type of operation is the effect of time and space. Forces assigned as participants are generally physically separated and must be assembled. There is also an inherent time lapse between the inception of planning and execution of the assault during which the planning data and information available are liable to change. The amphibious assault is one of the most complex of military operations. It is an integrated effort of forces trained, organized, and equipped for different functions. The state of training of these forces, status of their equipment, and their skill in the conduct of amphibious operations prescribe the continuous and flexible nature of amphibious planning. It should be emphasized that while one of the phases of the amphibious operation is planning, this does not mean that all planning is accomplished during that phase. **Planning is continuous and never stops until termination of the operation.**

a. **Characteristics**

(1) **Concurrent.** The mutual concern of the participants exemplifies the fact that planning is and must be conducted by two or more echelons of the same command and by corresponding echelons of different commands at the same

time. The amount of detail involved would require a prohibitive amount of time for planning if it were to be successive at each echelon and by each component. Visualize the effect of planning if the naval component delayed until the LF had completed its plans or vice versa. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful whether planning for a successful landing would ever be accomplished. The interrelationship of the plans, determination of requirements, and allocation of means demand that planning be done concurrently at all echelons in all components of the ATF. Concurrent planning not only saves time, it permits the early detection of problems which can be quickly resolved and allow the planning process to continue.

(2) **Parallel**

(a) A close interrelationship exists between the naval and LF components during planning. This interrelationship and the requirement for concurrent planning dictate establishment of parallel chains of command within the components participating in the operation. Corresponding commanders at each echelon closely coordinate their planning with the opposite commander in the parallel chain of command.

(b) Although various echelons must conduct their planning simultaneously, a high degree of coordination must exist between the participating staffs. The very nature of amphibious operations demands close coordination among all elements. Participation among naval, ground, and air components must be cooperative, with each component thoroughly understanding the role the other must play. Common understanding and a free exchange of information is a prerequisite for successful planning. This is accomplished by close liaison and early distribution of outline plans and tentative drafts. Decisions must be reached on the basis of complete accord with regard to objectives and procedures, and must be disseminated immediately to interested or affected units even though the given decision may be entirely within the cognizance and authority of a single commander.

(3) **Detailed.** Common also to the amphibious operation is an increase in the number of variables that the planner must consider. Plans therefore must be developed in more detail than is required for other types of operations. The interdependence of units, the diversity of forces, and the mutual dependence of sections of the plan to each other particularly emphasize this requirement. The initial lack of physical contact with the enemy, the necessity of building up combat power ashore after the landing from an initial zero to the full coordinated striking power required to ensure success, and the complete reliance of the LF on logistic resupply necessitate infinite detail in the plans for an amphibious operation.

(a) In developing these detailed plans, remember that the initial information is likely to change, e.g., a change in enemy strength or dispositions or a modification in logistic support. Therefore, the plans must be sufficiently flexible that they can be modified as the situation changes or as later information becomes available during the

planning phase. Accordingly, planning must be continuous throughout--until accomplishment of the mission.

(b) An example of this characteristic is the planning for the allied invasion of France in World War II. Initially, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had set May 1944 as the target date for the invasion. However, preliminary estimates indicated a lack of sufficient landing craft at that time, and the plans had to be modified to allow for an additional month's production of these craft in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

b. **Concurrent and Parallel Planning.** Using figure 3-1, you may be able to see these characteristics more clearly. The relationship between the CATF and the CLF has already been discussed. As these two commanders and their staffs develop their plans, information is passed down to subordinates for their use. One of the first things is to establish the transport groups. These are the task groups that provide for the embarkation, movement to the objective, landing, and logistic support of the LF. The task groups comprise all the shipping in which the LF is embarked, including the shipping which transports the helicopters and the heliborne troops. The Navy landing craft employed in the ship-to-shore movement are organic, or attached, to the transport groups. The commander of this group and the commanders of LF units at the highest level must plan together. As units subordinate to the transport group are determined, they are matched up with corresponding LF units, and planning on their level is conducted. This is carried all the way down to the BLT commander and the individual ships in which his units will be embarked. Planning gets progressively more detailed down the chain of command to the point where each individual Marine and his equipment are taken into account.



Fig 3-1. Corresponding commanders and parallel echelons.

SECTION IV. PLANNING SEQUENCE

3401. PLANNING GUIDANCE

Commander's (CATF/CLF) Planning Guidance. In deriving his planning guidance the commander considers the information contained in the initiating directive and other instructions that may have been received. **This guidance is the commander's assistance to his staff in preparing or revising their estimates.** In addition, concurrent planning at subordinate levels of command and by corresponding echelons of different commands is based upon this preliminary information. The commander's planning guidance may take many forms and may include the following:

a. An announcement or reaffirmation of the commander's policies

b. The commander's analysis of the overall mission

c. The commander's general plan for using NC weapons

d. Assumptions that are necessary because of lack of positive information

e. Broad and general courses of action which the commander particularly desires to be considered

f. Previous decisions on related operations

The commander's initial guidance is usually incomplete, but is developed and expanded as more information is obtained. The CLF provides initial planning guidance as soon as possible after receiving his initiating directive. Staff officers may be required to assist in the formulation of the commander's planning guidance or the commander may do this himself. The intelligence officer provides information early since it is needed to develop the commander and staff estimates. Subordinate commanders provide responsive guidance as the situation permits. Subsequent guidance at all levels will be provided throughout the planning process. This may take the form of planning directives, memorandums, outline plans, or it may be announced at informal staff conferences or briefings.

3402. PLANNING DIRECTIVES

a. **CATF's Planning Directive.** After receiving the initiating directive, the CATF promulgates a planning directive to ensure that interdependent plans are coordinated, planning is completed in the time allowed, and important aspects of planning are not overlooked. The planning directive specifies the principal plans to be prepared and establishes time limits for the completion of each major step in the planning process by the ATF headquarters and major subordinate commands of the force.

b. **Landing Force Planning Program.** Using the ATF planning directive as a guide, the CLF prepares a planning program which outlines the sequence in which planning will be carried out and the deadlines by which plans need to be completed. There is no prescribed format for a planning program.

c. **Planning Directive.** As a result of the planning program, the CLF issues a planning directive to his subordinate units. This directive establishes deadlines necessary to accomplish his planning schedule. Similarly, if conditions warrant, unit commanders publish planning directives.

d. **Planning Schedule.** A planning schedule may be included in the planning directive or issued alone to indicate the planning program. Normally the chief of staff or executive officer prepares it and graphically shows the specific period of time allowed for the completion of each planning task. From this, each section of the staff can, in turn, prepare it's own planning schedule. The time period set in planning schedules is sufficient to permit timely completion of assigned tasks as well

as coordination with other interested staff sections and headquarters. The following factors should be considered when formulating a planning schedule:

(1) Provisions of the planning directive issued by higher headquarters.

(2) The date on which the operation is scheduled to be conducted.

(3) Time required for reproduction, promulgation, and delivery of completed plans.

(4) Time required by subordinate commanders to prepare and promulgate supporting plans and orders.

(5) Workloads and availability of staff officers concerned.

(6) Other current planning requirements.

(7) Other activities in which the command or its elements may be involved.

3403. PLANNING MEMORANDUMS

When information becomes available and as additional guidance and instructions are received, commanders issue planning memorandums before preparing formal plans. They are designed to ensure that subordinate commanders have all details which will affect their own planning.

3404. OUTLINE PLAN

Upon arriving at his initial concept of operations ashore, the CLF normally prepares and issues an outline plan as a basis for concurrent and parallel planning. The outline plan sets forth the salient features or principles of a plan under consideration before the initiation of detailed planning. In planning an amphibious operation, the outline plan normally includes the mission, concept of operations ashore, basic undertakings, and scope of initial and subsequent operations. While a commander may provide planning guidance in a variety of ways, such as conferences, planning memorandums, etc., the outline plan is his principal means of initiating and continuing concurrent and parallel planning.

SECTION V. ORGANIZATIONAL PLANNING

3501. BASIC ORGANIZATIONS

As LF participation in an amphibious operation proceeds from the inception of planning to the termination of the operation, it passes through three organizational evolutions. These organizations are practical means designed to ensure the most efficient use of all available resources. Any changes are always designed to support the concept of operations ashore. These basic organizations are: the **tactical organization, organization for landing,** and **organization for embarkation.**

3502. TASK ORGANIZATION

This first organizational structure is the basic **tactical organization**, more commonly known as the LF **task organization**. This is the organization of the LF units for combat and involves various combinations of combat, combat support, combat service support, and aviation units needed to accomplish the mission ashore. Figure 3-2 illustrates how the concept of operations ashore essentially determines the task organization. Bear in mind that the situation is used to illustrate organizational structures.



This concept involves landing one BLT over the southern beach to secure ATF Objective 1 (port facility) and LF Objectives A and B to establish blocking positions along avenues of approach from the east; and simultaneously conducting a heliborne assault with one BLT to secure Objective 2 (airfield). A subsequent heliborne assault with one BLT is planned to seize LF Objective C and to secure the northern portion of the force beachhead line (FBHL) to ensure freedom of action within the beachhead.

Fig 3-2. Sample concept of operations ashore.

BLT 1/23 is going to land over RED Beach, seize Objective 1, and prepare to seize Objectives A and B. BLT 2/23 will land simultaneously by helicopter in its designated LZ, secure Objective 2, and establish blocking positions. Since only one BLT is coming across the beach and rapid seizure of Objectives A and B is desired after Objective 1 is secured, attaching at least a company of LVTs for maximum mobility would be considered. Aware that some enemy armor is in the vicinity, it is planned to attach two platoons of tanks to BLT 1/23 with the remainder of the tank company in general support. Since BLT 2/23 is to secure the airfield, it should be task organized with sufficient heliborne engineer support to expedite preparation of this airfield, if required. The other heliborne BLT (3/23) will also require the necessary attachments

in order to perform its assigned mission. Since this BLT has the additional mission of severing the lines of communications on the north-south axis, it also requires engineer support to assist in this effort.

The important point is the relationship among the mission, concept of operations, and the task organization. By considering his concept of operations against the terrain, mission, and the enemy situation, the commander formulates the necessary task organization to ensure the accomplishment of the mission. The task organization is documented in the basic operation plan or order, or in an annex.

3503. ORGANIZATION FOR LANDING

The **organization for landing** is the second organizational form in which the LF appears. It is the specific tactical grouping of the LF for the assault. The organization for landing, like the task organization, is based upon the concept of operations ashore, particularly the scheme of maneuver. The CO of each BLT must ensure that his organic units, as well as those attached, are organized for the ship-to-shore movement to place the desired amount and mix of combat power ashore at the desired time and place. This requires that the CO, BLT 1/23, provides for the rifle companies to join up with the LVTs (their landing means) for the ship-to-shore movement and subsequent operations ashore. The tanks must be scheduled to land early to support the concept of operations. Accordingly, these units must be loaded aboard ship to support this sequence. As you can see, this is directly related to embarkation, but is not considered organization for embarkation. One other point should be made at this time: If the tanks had not been attached to BLT 1/23, but had been given the mission of direct support of 1/23, the same considerations would have existed--i.e., CO, BLT 1/23, would have been responsible for ensuring that the tanks landed in the desired sequence to support the concept of operations. Obviously, close liaison with the parent tank unit would be required to ensure the desired result. The shipping carrying BLT 1/23 must be placed in the transport area to facilitate the orderly movement ashore of all elements of the BLT to support the BLT commander's scheme of maneuver.

The COs of the heliborne BLTs have considerations relating to their planned buildup ashore in the LZs and mesh their plans for landing to the intended scheme of maneuver ashore. Simply stated, the organization for landing is the grouping of LF elements to accomplish the ship-to-shore movement to conduct the assault. This organization involves correlating the number of boats and amphibious vehicles available aboard assigned shipping and then assigning units, elements, or detachments to them to land them at the right time, at the right place, and in the correct sequence. The division of the LF into the landing categories, in turn, assigns a relative priority of landing to all elements. The organization for landing appears in the landing plan, an annex to the basic operation plan or order. Included in this landing plan are numerous tables, documents, and schedules which set forth the detailed plan for landing of the LF.

3504. ORGANIZATION FOR EMBARKATION

The final LF organization is the **organization for embarkation**. This follows logically in order since once the task organization and organization for landing have been determined, it becomes necessary to organize the LF administratively for assignment to shipping in order to support both of the previously discussed

organizational structures (see figure 3-3). The organization for embarkation is the administrative grouping of forces for the overseas movement. To the maximum possible degree, it is based on the organization for landing. Obviously, embarkation cannot completely depend on the task organization or organization for landing. You cannot expect to load BLTs and RLTs in nice, neat groups, each one aboard its assigned shipping. The organization for embarkation must be a compromise. While you need to retain as much tactical integrity as possible to support the task organization and organization for landing, these factors must also be balanced with the amount of shipping available, the maximum use of shipping space, and the requirement for combat loading of LF units. Embarkation officers have a tremendous job balancing all these factors and making things come out in a workable manner.

To demonstrate how a MEB might be organized for embarkation, assume that you are back in the United States. Remember, a MEB embarks a MEB headquarters, a RLT, a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG), and a Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG). Perhaps the best way to explain this is to compare the MEB organization for embarkation from the east coast with one from the west coast. On the east coast, the MEB could be embarked from four sites. The RLT and the MEB headquarters could embark out of Morehead City/Onslow Beach, the MAG out of Norfolk, and the BSSG out of Sunny Point. On the west coast, the RLT and MEB headquarters will embark out of San Diego, the MAG out of Long Beach, and the BSSG out of San Diego. In each case, four administratively organized embarkation groups are embarked in different ways. The east coast affords a greater capability for multiple embarkation points, but all points on the west coast are more centrally located. Therefore, it is a matter of the naval and LF planners determining together the best way to embark their MEB based on MEB composition, available shipping, and the capabilities of available embarkation points.

Embarkation groups are subdivided into embarkation units, embarkation elements, and embarkation teams. Formation of the various embarkation echelons depends upon the degree of decentralization of command and control necessary to successfully accomplish the embarkation. The embarkation group and embarkation teams are always formed as these echelons represent the essential ingredients for embarkation.



Fig 3-3. Parallel naval and landing force organization for embarkation.

a. **Embarkation Group.** The embarkation group has, as its nucleus, a major subdivision of the task organization of the LF, such as division, wing, brigade, or other comparable troop echelon. It may consist of two or more units (when formed), a combination of units and elements (when required), or two or more teams if units and elements are not formed.

b. **Embarkation Unit.** The embarkation unit is the next subordinate echelon below the group level. It consists of two or more elements (when formed) or two or more teams (when elements not formed). The number of units formed varies, depending primarily on the LF organization for landing, and geographical locations of the embarkation areas and of the troop units.

c. **Embarkation Element.** The embarkation element (when formed) is the next subordinate echelon below the unit level and consists of two or more teams.

d. **Embarkation Team.** The embarkation team is the basic troop organization for embarkation. It consists of the troops, supplies, and equipment embarked in a single ship. The embarkation team must be organized and loaded with meticulous care.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, you studied the responsibilities for amphibious planning, the initiating directive, planning characteristics, the sequence of planning, and organizational planning. Amphibious operations are extremely complex, but concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning will help ensure the success of your operation.

CHAPTER 3 EXERCISE: Answer items 1-5 by filling in the blanks. Solutions are located on the next page.

1. **What is the purpose of the initiating directive?**

   _____

2. **List the nine essential elements of an initiating directive.**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

   f. _____

   g. _____

   h. _____

   i. _____

3. **List the three purposes of the planning directive.**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

4. **What is the purpose of the commander's planning guidance?**

   _____

5. **What is the purpose of the CLF's planning schedule?**

   _____

Chapter 3 Exercise Solutions

Question		Answer	Reference
1.		Provide the information necessary to begin the planning phase	3201
2.	a.	Establishes the ATF, assigns a mission and forces. Also establishes the landing force	3202
	b.	Designated CATF, CLF, and other commanders as appropriate	
	c.	Provides special instructions on command relationships	
	d.	Defines the AOA and prescribes command authority within the AOA	
	e.	Provides a code name and sets target dates	
	f.	Special instructions on allocation, employment and control of nuclear and chemical weapons	
	g.	Governs the termination of the operation and subsequent operations	
	h.	Assigns responsibility for combat or logistic operations to support the amphibious operation	
	i.	Instruction in operational and signal security	
3.	a.	To ensure interdependent plans are coordinated	3404
	b.	To ensure planning is completed in the time allowed	
	c.	To ensure that important aspects of the planning are not overlooked	
4.		To assist his staff in preparing or revising their estimates	3401
5.		To promulgate the planning program	3402

CHAPTER 4

INTELLIGENCE IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 2.5 hours

SCOPE: Includes sources of intelligence information, information collection agencies, reconnaissance and surveillance, amphibious reconnaissance, amphibious reconnaissance planning considerations, counterintelligence operations, and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Identify the intelligence responsibilities of the CATF.
2. Identify the intelligence responsibilities of the CLF.
3. Identify and select the primary intelligence agencies and systems which support intelligence collection, processing and dissemination in an amphibious operation.
4. Identify the role of MAGIS in amphibious intelligence.
5. Identify the role of NIPS in amphibious intelligence.
6. Identify the purpose of the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Chapter 4

COMPLETE: Chapter 4 Exercise

CHAPTER 4

SECTION I. INTELLIGENCE IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

4101. INTRODUCTION

The Marine Corps' stock in trade and major reason for existing is the **projection of U.S. military power ashore, forcible penetration from the sea, and the securing of advance naval bases--in short, the Corps exists to conduct amphibious operations.**

All military operations require thorough intelligence, but amphibious operations are characterized by unique factors which challenge, and in many cases, hamper the intelligence effort. In this chapter, you will study the factors involved in amphibious operations, the special intelligence considerations, and some of the agencies and systems available to support amphibious intelligence. In amphibious operations there is a physical separation of combatants with limited or no contact before the assault. The basic character of amphibious operations creates some unique factors which impact on intelligence.

The first factor you must contend with is the physical separation of friendly forces. In the pre-embarkation phase, the LF and its amphibious shipping are separated like the CATF and the CLF. Additionally, the Corps' own forces may be separated. Using the east coast as an example, the Marine Corps ground combat elements are located at Camp Lejeune, while the air combat assets are located at Cherry Point, New River and Beaufort, SC. This factor may cause increased difficulty due to the concept of independent MAGTFs joining to form a larger MAGTF which may not marry up unit the rehearsal phase or even later.

After embarking, the LF elements are separated within the ATF. The separation of friendly forces poses a problem in planning for the collection of information and the dissemination of intelligence once received. However, the single most important factor the G-2/S-2 must deal with is the separation of combatants. **Normally, you are separated from your enemies by thousands of miles. This is the major distinguishing feature of an amphibious operation.** There are several factors resulting from this distance problem which impact on intelligence. The first of these is a curtailed collection capability. Both the Navy and Marine Corps organic collection assets are tactical in nature, and as a result, are too limited to overcome the distance involved. This fact has the greatest impact on intelligence operations. The collecting of information and intelligence is most difficult at the time you need it most--during basic planning. Therefore, **amphibious operations initially depend on outside agencies for intelligence and information collection support.** This is the second derivative factor of distance.

The third derivative factor of distance is the changing enemy situation. Distance is time. The elapsed time from the initiating directives to the execution of the landing may involve major changes in the enemy situation. The situation may not change; however, it may change either in favor of the LF or may further imperil the LF.

The first three factors pertain to the physical separation of U.S. and enemy forces. The next two factors deal with internal problems relating to intelligence requirements and amphibious operations. The first of these is a staff coordination problem. When various elements of the LF are located apart from one another, serious

difficulties may arise in coordinating the activities of the different intelligence staffs. This separation occurs at a time when the need to conduct coordinated activity is critical to the conduct of the entire command and staff function.

The final derivative factor is a problem with dissemination. Separation from each other not only causes a problem with coordinating the intelligence effort, but makes it difficult to get the intelligence and information you receive to the people who need it. Once embarked, you will continue to have problems due to communication security measures which the CATF imposes.

To make matters worse, while you have all these factors against you, the enemy has the intelligence advantage. Control of the objective allows the enemy to conduct extensive terrain and hydrographic studies. This, coupled with the enemy's knowledge of U.S. amphibious doctrine, assists him in predicting the probable landing sites, the times of the landing, and the probable objective of such an operation. To this end, he can prepare the battlefield based on his knowledge of the weather, enemy, and terrain.

4102. PLANNING REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. The specialized intelligence that major force commanders need governs intelligence planning for an amphibious operation.

(1) To arrive at the basic decisions about objectives, beachheads, landing areas, landing sites, concept of operations ashore, landing beaches, landing zones, and drop zones.

(2) To conduct subsequent planning.

(3) To execute the operation.

b. Intelligence planning is divided into three distinct phases.

(1) The collection and evaluation of information and the production and dissemination of derived intelligence required to develop the plans for the operation.

(2) The preparation of the intelligence annex to the operation plan or order.

(3) The preparation of intelligence plans, estimates, and summaries during the operation.

4103. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER

During planning, the CATF is responsible for the following:

a. Determining intelligence requirements for planning by the naval forces, reviewing intelligence requirements of the LF and other forces, and consolidating intelligence requirements for the ATF as a whole.

b. Collecting and processing information and disseminating intelligence to major elements of the ATF in accordance with the special requirements of each.

c. Acquiring and distributing maps, charts, photographs, and other intelligence materials.

d. Preparing intelligence estimates affecting the forces as a whole.

e. Preparing intelligence studies which relate to the mission and area of operations.

f. Establishing liaison with operational intelligence agencies which are not part of the ATF, including area and departmental agencies as necessary.

g. Initiating requests and directives for the collection of information by reconnaissance, observation, friendly/indigenous forces, and other operating agencies.

h. Insuring security and counterintelligence measures, in addition to those specified by higher authority.

i. Preparing and distributing an intelligence annex to the ATF operation plan.

j. Establishing a Target Information Center (TIC).

k. Establishing a Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) at the outset of planning in conjunction with the CLF.

4104. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LANDING FORCE COMMANDER (CLF)

During planning, the CLF is responsible for the following:

a. Determining intelligence requirements for planning by the LF and making these requirements known to the CATF.

b. Collecting and processing information and disseminating derived intelligence to the LF.

c. Establishing liaison with intelligence agencies of the ATF and with area intelligence agencies, in cooperation with the CATF, to assist in collecting information of primary interest to the LF.

d. Disseminating maps, charts, photographs, and other intelligence materials to troop units.

e. Preparing and distributing an intelligence annex to the LF operation plan.

f. Assisting in determining the requirement for a JIC and providing representatives.

SECTION II. THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER

4201. INTRODUCTION

Deployed amphibious squadrons/groups/forces and MEUs/MEBs/MEFs contain organic intelligence staff elements which provide intelligence support to their respective

commanders and staffs. Establishing a JIC, manned by personnel from the ATF and the LF, (1) enables consolidation of intelligence materials, personnel, and intelligence support functions; (2) eliminates duplicate functions; (3) results in the production of more comprehensive and timely intelligence; and (4) promotes close cooperation and coordination among the intelligence staffs of the ATF. The JIC provides the CLF with two things he would not otherwise have: working spaces and communications. The JIC provides the CATF and the CLF with an effective means of satisfying the many combat intelligence requirements they share, while avoiding a duplication of effort.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of the JIC is to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to the commands of the ATF and interested agencies.

b. **Mission.** The mission of the JIC is to provide the CATF, the CLF, and subordinate commanders with the intelligence support necessary to conduct amphibious operations.

The JIC accomplishes the mission by performing the following functions:

(1) Collecting and evaluating information, and producing and disseminating intelligence, required to plan and conduct amphibious operations.

(2) Determining and consolidating intelligence requirements for the ATF.

(3) Preparing the intelligence annex to the operation plan or order.

(4) Preparing and updating intelligence plans, estimates, summaries, target and other special studies, situation maps, and lists of targets.

(5) Preparing an integrated joint collection plan and/or worksheet.

(6) Coordinating and processing collection requests, and managing collection assets and activities, to ensure proper use.

(7) Preparing directives to organic collection assets and requests to higher and supporting collection activities.

(8) Acquiring, distributing, and consolidating of maps, charts, photos, and pertinent directives.

(9) Providing joint intelligence support to the TIC.

(10) Providing target intelligence support to the TIC.

(11) Formulating and implementing counterintelligence (CI) measures in support of operation security (OPSEC) in addition to those specified by higher authority.

(12) Establishing liaison with higher, adjacent, and supporting intelligence activities.

(13) Initiating requests and directives for the collection of information by reconnaissance, observation, friendly/indigenous forces, and other operating agencies.

4202. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

The N-2 and the G-2 are directly responsible to their respective commanders for the intelligence requirements of each command; therefore, they have coequal responsibilities for the JIC. However, when embarked and until command has shifted ashore, the CATF N-2 is the supervising intelligence officer and is directly responsible to the CATF for all intelligence support to the ATF as a whole.

The JIC is manned by personnel from the intelligence staffs of the CATF and the CLF and augmented with personnel from the Flagship's intelligence center. Direct liaison between members of all ATF intelligence staffs is encouraged and normally authorized.

4203. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JIC

Ideally, the JIC should be formed as early as possible in the planning phase. The CATF and the CLF are responsible for establishing the JIC. At the earliest possible time after the decision to establish a JIC is made, the N-2,. G-2 and if applicable, the ship's intelligence officer will establish initial contact. Information which should be discussed and exchanged during this meeting includes the following:

a. Mutual staff requirements (estimates, scenarios, etc.).

b. Flagship intelligence spaces and capabilities.

c. JIC organization and manning requirements.

d. Location of the JIC ashore, before embarkation.

e. Mapping, photographic, publications, and directive requirements, including arrangements to duplicate materials that the CLF needs after command is passed ashore.

f. Determination of the date, time, location, and attendees of the initial JIC planning conference.

4204. INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE

The establishment of the JIC is the result of the initial planning conference. The intelligence personnel attendees of this conference ar the N-2, G-2, and ship's intelligence officer as well as the principal personnel of the various JIC sections. The following issues are addressed:

a. Developing the intelligence annex and associated appendixes to support operation orders and plans.

b. JIC organization structure and manning.

c. Numbers, ranks, reporting, and detachment dates of JIC personnel.

d. Communication requirements.

e. Dissemination and routing plan.

f. Designation of responsibilities, milestones, and deadlines for each JIC requirement and goal.

g. Mutual intelligence requirements, essential elements of information (EEI), tactical exploitation of national capabilites, hydrography, aerial, targets, etc.

h. Required cryptologic support.

i. Reporting procedures.

j. Message release authority.

4205. ORGANIZATION OF THE JIC

The JIC organization varies depending on the units (PHIBGRU with a MEF/MEB; PHIBRON with a MEU), the assets available, and the mission. The N-2 and G-2 usually designate an intelligence operations officer to coordinate and direct the function of the JIC sections. The ATF N-2 and the LF G-2/S-2 are directly responsible to their respective commanders for the intelligence requirements of each command. At a minimum, they are responsible for the intelligence planning duties described in paragraphs 601 and 602 of Landing Force Manual (LFM).

4206. FUNCTIONS OF THE JIC SECTIONS

a. **Analysis Center.** The analysis center is responsible for processing information into usable intelligence, disseminating that intelligence to the tactical commanders, and identifying intelligence gaps which require collections. The analysis center consists of the Navy, Ground, and Air sections. The senior officer in the analysis center also acts as the head of the analysis center. He and the ranking officer of the other watch sections within the analysis center serve as Senior Watch Officers.

(1) **Navy Section** in the analysis center is responsible for maritime intelligence analysis to include threat warning and protection of the ATF. Recommended manning for each watch section includes a Navy officer as head analyst/watch officer, and an appropriate number of Navy intelligence specialists who conduct analysis, maintain the navy plot, conduct research, prepare and present intelligence briefs, and perform other tasks required by the watch officer.

(2) **Ground Section** of the analysis center is responsible for all ground intelligence analysis dealing with operations ashore. Recommended manning for each watch section includes a Marine officer as head analyst/watch officer and an appropriate number of Marine enlisted assistants who conduct analysis, maintain the enemy ground situation map, conduct research, prepare and present intelligence briefs, and perform other tasks required by the watch officer.

(3) **Air Section** of the analysis center is responsible for intelligence analysis dealing with all enemy air activity, to include naval air. Recommended manning for each watch section includes a Navy or Marine officer as head analyst/watch officer and an appropriate number of enlisted assistants who conduct analysis, maintain the enemy air situation map, conduct research, prepare and present intelligence briefs, conduct analysis of air defense, and perform other tasks required by the watch officer. Due to the overlapping requirements for air intelligence by the CATF and the CLF, it is recommended that the air analysis section be manned jointly by both Navy and Marine intelligence personnel. This ensures that appropriate expertise for both task force protection and the air threat to the LF ashore is available.

b. **Collection and Requirements Section.** The collection and requirements section is responsible for the management and tasking of intelligence collection assets organic to the ATF and requesting collection by external activities. It is recommended that CATF and CLF officers **jointly head** this section, and that it include an appropriate number of enlisted personnel to carry out the critical functions of collection management. Close coordination with the analysis center is essential to ensure that accurate and timely collection planning and tasking is conducted. Representatives from organic units with a collection capability may be assigned to the section to provide operation and technical advice on the proper employment of their units' assets.

c. **Imagery Interpretation Section.** The imagery interpretation section is responsible for interpreting and analyzing imagery and providing derived information to the JIC. Normally, the flagship will receive photography that has already received initial interpretation and screening for tactically significant information. The imagery interpretation section identifies targets and provides target and terrain studies and other products as required. This section includes both Navy and Marine photo interpretation personnel, and the OIC may be either a Navy or Marine Corps officer who provides technical assistance to the collection and requirements section for the planning of aerial reconnaissance.

d. **Storage and Retrieval Section.** All amphibious ships carry the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) non-computerized mini-data base on board for reference. NIPS is solely a shipboard system. MAGIS (Marine Air/Ground Intelligence System), a subsystem of NIPS, is an automated intelligence system used primarily to give continued support to the LF ashore. In addition, if an LCC or LHA is serving as the ATF flagship, the JIC has a storage and retrieval section with the automated (computerized) NIPS. This section maintains the current intelligence data base on electronic accounting machine (EAM) cards and magnetic tapes and can be used to store and retrieve tactical information in support of intelligence analysis. For operational planning, the NIPS data base may be used to develop the initial list of targets. The section is usually headed by a member of the ship's company, assisted by a number of enlisted data processor specialists.

e. **Amphibious Support Information System (ASIS)/Target Coordinator.** If an LCC is serving as the ATF flagship, a Marine officer, who is a member of the LF staff, is normally assigned to provide guidance and assistance in using the ASIS. He ensures that JIC personnel are to provide guidance and assistance in the use of the ASIS. He ensures that JIC personnel are trained in the use of the ASIS Tactical Intelligence File and the Target List File. He is also responsible for the interface between ASIS

and NIPS. As the target systems coordinator, he also ensures that intelligence data is made available to the TIC as appropriate.

f. **Target Information Center (TIC).** The TIC processes intelligence data to identify likely targets for attack by the ATF or supporting units. It is of paramount importance that the TIC receive timely and accurate target intelligence from the analysis center. In this regard, TIC personnel must ensure that analysis center personnel are familiar with TIC targeting requirements. The TIC is located in the supporting arms coordination center (SACC) and is responsible to the CATF's supporting arms coordinator. It is headed by the ATF target intelligence officer. The LF target intelligence officer (a member of the LF G-2 Section) and the LF target information officer (a member of the LF fire support coordination center (FSCC)) assist him. When embarked on an LCC, the ATF target intelligence officer will use the ASIS target list to establish the CATF target list and daily target bulletin (TARBUL). The target list will also be used to generate pre-AOA arrival strike planning for accompanying carrier battle groups. Before tactical reconnaissance inputs, the initial target list will be derived from the NIPS data base. Enlisted assistants may be assigned to the TIC. Special efforts should be made to ensure that appropriate JIC personnel have a clear understanding of the difference in duties and functions of each of the officers in the TIC. The TIC is dissolved when the LF headquarters is displaced ashore and assumes control of the target list.

g. **Administration Section.** The administration section is responsible for providing clerical assistance to the JIC, to include typing messages, pickup and routing of incoming message traffic, typing briefs, maintaining and researching various instructions and regulations, and other required duties. This section is jointly manned by both N-2, G-2/S-2, and flagship enlisted personnel with the senior member acting as section head.

h. **Counterintelligence Section (CI).** The G-2 staff CI officer normally reports directly to the N-2/G-2 and is responsible for all ATF CI matters. Additionally, he provides personnel, organizational, and installation targeting information to units supporting the ATF. This section functions separately from CI assets, which function as organic collection assets under the collection and requirement section.

i. **Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Intelligence Section.** The NSW intelligence section prepares target folders for NSW forces when assigned to the ATF. Target folders are prepared in support of advance force operations and subsequent direct action missions. The section nominates targets to and receives target tasking from the CATF NSW plans officer. When activated, the section is manned by an officer from NSW assets. To obtain information for target folder preparation, section personnel maintain close liaison with the analysis center, imagery interpretation section, and the CI Section.

j. **Joint Intelligence Center Electronic Warfare Analysis and Coordination Center (JICEWACC).** The JICEWACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and managing signals intelligence for the ATF. It provides an interface between the joint ship's signal exploitation space (J/SSES), the joint electronic warfare coordination center (JEWCC), and the JIC. In addition, the JICEWACC conducts analysis, sanitization, an dissemination of information collected through cryptologic electronic warfare support measures (ESM), and information received via special intelligence communications (SPINTCOMM). The JICEWACC coordinates the collection of information in support of ATF EW plans and in response to intelligence requirements identified by the collection and

requirements section of the JIC. It ensures that time sensitive signals intelligence is rapidly disseminated. The JICEWACC is jointly headed by the amphibious force staff cryptologic officer and the LF staff signals intelligence officer. Additional manning includes an appropriate number of officer and enlisted cryptologic and electronic warfare analysts. Due to the complexities and sensitivities of JICEWACC operations, joint planning should commence as soon as possible after establishing the JIC. Plans include establishing JICEWACC in signal intelligence (SI) secure spaces both while aboard the flagship and ashore. Ashore, the LF signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Coordination Center (SI/EWCC) undertakes the JICEWACC's functions.

k. **Joint Ship's Signal Exploitation Space (J/SSES).** If the ATF flagship is configured to conduct cryptologic electronic warfare support measures (CESM), a J/SSES may be activated. The J/SSES is responsible for providing CESM and SPINTCOMM support to the ATF. The J/SSES responds to tasking as directed by the JICEWACC. Due to the complexities and sensitive nature of J/SSES operations, detailed planning and coordination must be conducted as early as possible in the planning phase. The J/SSES is manned by the naval security group cryptologic direct support element (CDSE), by a Marine radio battalion direct support unit (DSU), by the flagship and ATF cryptologic technical operators, and by Marine radio battalion DSU special communications operators. The Marine radio battalion DSU conducts joint CESM. The Marine radio battalion DSU special communications operators conduct SPINTCOMM operations.

l. **Joint Electronic Warfare Coordination Center (JEWCC).** The JEWCC is responsible for planning and coordinating EW for the ATF. It consolidates the EW requirements of the LF and other task force units and develops an EW plan for the ATF. The JEWCC functions under the cognizance of the CATF N-3; however, it maintains close coordination with the JICEWACC for cryptologic matters. JEWCC manning will include CATF/flagship EW personnel and representatives from the SI/EWCC.

4207. EXTERNAL COLLECTION AGENCIES

During the planning phase and most of the movement phase of an amphibious operation, organic and attached information collection agencies cannot satisfy most of the ATF's intelligence requirements. The problem confronting the JIC is satisfying those requirements which are beyond the capability of LF collection assets and existing databases. In the planning phase and throughout most of the movement phase, there is nearly total reliance upon external agencies to satisfy intelligence requirements.

Intelligence agencies at the national level offer a potential means for overcoming the limitations of the combat intelligence effort. Encyclopedic material produced by these agencies routinely provides much of the basic information in all forms of operations. Beyond this support, certain information collection assets of various national agencies are available to the ATF. These collection assets can alleviate the shortage of intelligence information caused by the inability of the ATF to employ its own collection agencies. Specific guidance for using national agency collection assets is contained in a Department of Defense (DOD) publication, **Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (JTENS) Manual.**

Another form of assistance to the intelligence effort is theater intelligence agencies. Such agencies support the theater commander and his operating forces and are also available to the ATF. Paramount among theater intelligence agencies capable of contributing to ATF requirements are the **Fleet Intelligence Centers** (FIC) and the intelligence agencies of the **United and Specified (U&S) commands.**

a. **Fleet Intelligence Centers.** Two FICs, Fleet Intelligence Center Europe/Atlantic (FICEURLANT) Norfolk, VA, and Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC), Pearl Harbor, HI, discharge the mission of providing intelligence support to naval forces within their areas of intelligence responsibility. FICs function as component elements of the NIPS, providing automated and hard copy amphibious intelligence support in areas pertinent to the requirements of the LF. Intelligence support from the FICs is limited to finished intelligence. Neither FIC can provide information collection assistance to the LF. Materials provided by the FIC include the following types of intelligence products:

(1) Order of battle

(2) Biographic data

(3) Coast and landing beach information

(4) Port and harbor information

(5) Transportation data

(6) Helicopter landing zone/drop zone data

(7) Target materials

b. **United & Specified Commands.** Additional intelligence support for the LF may be provided by the intelligence agencies of the U&S commands and by the intelligence agencies of the service component commands. Answers to many of the ATF's questions may already exist in the files of the U&S commands' service component commands.

In addition to providing intelligence products, the intelligence agencies just mentioned constitute another source of assistance in collecting information. The intelligence agencies of the service component commands generally have information collection assets organic or in support. For instance, the U.S. Army component command of a U&S command will have, as one of its subordinates, a military intelligence (MI) group, which may be able to have as one of its subordinates a military intelligence (MI) group, which may be able to respond to requests for imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), or signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. The U.S. Air Force component command of a U&S command normally includes a tactical reconnaissance wing capable of performing all forms of aerial reconnaissance.

The ability to obtain the assistance of intelligence agencies of U&S commands and their service component commands will, in most cases, require specific instructions in an operations order.

c. **Administrative Considerations.** Procedures for obtaining support from national and theater intelligence agencies vary. Some request procedures are contained in various existing directives, while others must be established in the operation order. The JIC may request that the proper authority grant permission for direct liaison with the supporting intelligence agency. The advantage of this relationship lies in removing intermediate levels of command from other than information considerations, thus allowing direct contact and enhancing timeliness.

The N-2/G-2 must remember that most information and intelligence provided by external agencies is strategic, not tactical in nature. While adequate for planning during the planning and movement phases, usefulness of this type of information substantially decreases as the assault phase commences. At this time, the collection effort is done primarily by using organic resources.

4208. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

Collection management is the key to efficient intelligence operations in any unit. Collection management involves the process of identifying the information needs of the command, tasking or requesting the appropriate agencies to collect the information, and supervising the collection effort to ensure that the information requirements are efficiently answered. Inherent in the collection management program is the responsibility of the N-2 and G-2 to constantly anticipate the requirements of their respective commanders and the requirements of subordinate units. Collection management does not remain constant. Even though the assigned combat mission may not change, the dynamic nature of combat is continually changing the commander's concerns. The intelligence structure itself, in the production of intelligence, also generates new collection needs necessitating changes to the collection plan to realign the overall collection effort. The changing nature of information requirements highlights another area which requires the close collaboration of the intelligence officer and the operations officer.

a. **Collection Plan.** The collection plan is the vehicle which the JIC uses to perform collection management functions. The collection plan is an internal document which lists the essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) of the ATF, tactical activity, indicators of such activity, specific information to be collected, and the assets tasked/requested to collect the information (see Appendix D, FMFM 2-1, Intelligence). Since the collection plan itself is not published to the command, assigned information collection tasks must be communicated as orders to subordinate units.

b. **Collection Agency Tasking.** In determining the specific types of information needed to support combat intelligence production, collection management is also concerned with the action required to collect that information. The process through which this is provided is the assignment of specific collection tasks to friendly units. In deciding what tasks to assign to friendly units, the intelligence officer faces certain considerations. These considerations are the following:

(1) **Capability.** Determine the capability of friendly units to collect a specific item of information.

(2) **Suitability**. A number of units which can collect the information are identified. Of these, determine the ones which are the most suitable. The collection manager assess capabilities against requirements to find the agency best suited to a particular collection mission. His major concerns are efficiency and effectiveness.

(3) **Multiplicity**. Wherever possible, each collection requirement should be assigned to two or more collection agencies. By assigning more than one collection agency to each collection task, the collection manager accomplishes several things. If one collection agency cannot obtain the desired information, one of the other assigned agencies may obtain the required information. An addition benefit of the principle of multiplicity is in the validation of the information obtained by two or more agencies operating independently, since the report of one agency tends to confirm thee report of another.

(4) **Balance**. Ensure that the collection agencies are neither overworked nor underworked.

c. **Program Monitoring**. Once the intelligence requirements have been established and orders and requests issued, the collection manager ensures that the higher, adjacent, and subordinate agencies have received and understand them. The recipients orders and requests should be prioritized so that the most critical needs are dictated and understood. Once the collection agencies begin to report, the collection manager updates and modifies the collection plan so that he can determine which requirements have been answered. As mentioned before, as the information is processed into intelligence, additional intelligence requirements will appear. The collection manager must maintain close liaison with the N-2/G-2, intelligence operations officer and the analysis section to efficiently act on these requirements.

d. **Intelligence Cycle**. The JIC should not be considered foreign or complicated. As with any combat intelligence organization, it is simply a matter of applying the basic intelligence cycle (direction, collection, processing, and dissemination) to the operations of the JIC. Breaking down the intelligence cycle into its four phases, and the steps within these phases provides a clear picture of the operational flow within the JIC (figure 4-1).



Fig 4-1. Basic intelligence cycle.

(1) **Direction Phase**

(a) **Determine Intelligence Requirements.** The N-2/G-2 and the intelligence operations officer accomplish this based on the mission of the ATF, the needs of the commander, and the requirements of the staff and subordinate commands.

(b) **Collection Planning.** The collection and requirements section, under supervision of the intelligence operations officer, will develop the collection plan based on the intelligence requirements of the ATF. As previously mentioned, the collection plan reflects which agencies are tasked/requested to collect the information. Concurrently, the collection and requirements section uses the storage and retrieval unit, and the ASIS manager/target systems coordination section to provide information/intelligence that is available within these systems.

(c) **Issuance of Orders and Requests.** Once the appropriate collection agencies have been identified, orders and requests for the collection of information will be submitted to the N-2/G-2, via the intelligence operations officer, for signature and submission.

(d) **Supervision.** The collection and requirements section will supervise the collection planning, acting under the cognizance of the intelligence operations officer.

(2) **Collection Phase.** As collection agencies obtain information, reports come in by voice, message channels, courier, etc. The administrative section ensures that the intelligence operations officer receives all messages relating to the intelligence effort for appropriate dissemination. A reporting means must be established for all other types of communications to ensure the timely reporting and appropriate dissemination of information. The collection and requirements section updates and modifies the collection plan as intelligence requirements are satisfied. The information is then sent to the analysis center.

(3) **Processing and Dissemination Phases.** The analysis center is responsible for the processing and dissemination phases. Here the information is recorded, evaluated, integrated, and interpreted into a conclusion. It is now intelligence. Keeping timeliness, pertinence, usability of forms, and security in mind, the analysis section disseminates intelligence.

(4) **Combat Information.** Combat information is unevaluated data of a highly perishable nature which is passed directly to the tactical commander. It may be considered information of immediate tactical value, bearing directly upon the engagement in process. Therefore, there must be a secure, efficient means of providing this information to the tactical commander and other appropriate sections. For instance, the sighting of enemy armored vehicles at a specific location in the AOA is of immediate interest to the tactical commander. This information is normally subjected to the intelligence cycle before dissemination. Care should be taken to establish procedures for the **immediate dissemination** to interested units/sections of this information, with a caveat that it is unevaluated information. Concurrently the information is processed with other information into intelligence.

4209. JIC OPERATIONS DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE

A critical point in JIC operations occurs in the assault phase of an amphibious operation during that time when G-2 personnel depart the flagship and before their establishment of an operating intelligence center ashore. It is important that the JIC continue to operate during this period to ensure that crucial intelligence is processed and disseminated appropriately.

During the assault phase of an amphibious operation, the combat intelligence effort is characterized by a gradual, but distinct shift in the flow of intelligence and information. Before the assault, the flow of intelligence and information has been almost universally downward, originating from agencies external to the ATF/LF. With the beginning of the assault, elements of the LF increasingly produce intelligence and combat information.

The collection and requirements section should have direct contact with all organic collection assets. This can be done by having access to representatives of the collection assets, who in turn have some form of communication with the asset, or via the intelligence net. Regardless of the manner of communication, two conditions must be met: The collection asset must have an appropriate means to report information of the collection and requirements section, and the collection and requirements section must have a means to task the collection agency in an efficient manner.

As the assault phase progresses, a point is eventually reached when the value of internally produced combat intelligence exceeds the value of material received from outside agencies. This situation is simply a result of timeliness; information obtained by agencies of the LF more accurately reflects the enemy situation of the moment than does information available to external intelligence agencies far removed from the OA. At this point, it is desirable to phase the intelligence structure ashore. Actual movement ashore must await the displacement of the main or alternate LF CP to assure adequate staff functioning. Displacing elements in the intelligence structure ashore with the main or alternate LF CP poses an additional requirement for communications and coordination. In addition to its normal functioning, the intelligence structure must be able to function as two entities during the time that elements of the structure have displaced ashore while other elements remain aboard ship.

4210. DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE JIC

Once the CLF assumes control ashore, or the operation is terminated, the JIC will be disestablished, and the N-2/G-2 sections function independently. However, the two intelligence centers must continue to support each other through close coordination and the exchange of essential intelligence. The N-2 remains responsible for the intelligence requirements of the ATF.

SECTION III. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND INFORMATION COLLECTION AGENCIES

4301. INTRODUCTION

A collection agency is any unit, person, or means that can acquire information or through which information can be obtained. Agencies may acquire information by means of observation, research, or interrogation. Some are part of the intelligence organization of the MAGTF; some are specialized agencies assigned by higher echelons such as fleet or area commands; and some are national level intelligence organizations. The principal collection agencies available in an amphibious operation are summarized below. The LF intelligence officer must know the current availability of all collection agencies, together with their capabilities and limitations.

4302. AGENCIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The national intelligence organization consists of the individuals, agencies, and organizations of the Federal Government which have intelligence interests or responsibilities.

a. **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).** The CIA was established under the National Security Council (NSC) by the National Security Act of 1947. The director and deputy director are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The CIA's purpose is to coordinate the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security. The agency, under the direction of the NSC, advises the NSC on matters concerning the intelligence activities of the governmental departments and agencies that relate to national security.

(1) **Mission of the CIA**

(a) Makes recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to national security.

(b) Correlates and evaluates intelligence relating to national security, and provides for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities.

(c) Performs, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

(d) Performs such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may direct.

(2) **CIA Products.** The CIA has primary responsibility for the coordination of two intelligence products which the intelligence community and the armed services use as a basic source of intelligence.

(a) **National Intelligence Surveys (NIS).** NISs are digests of basic intelligence, produced on a coordinated, interdepartmental basis. The individual surveys are concerned with relatively unchanging features of a foreign country, and concentrate on the geographic, oceanographic, transportation, sociological, political, economic, scientific, and military aspects.

(b) **National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).** The NIE is an agreed-upon intelligence community estimate produced by complex coordinating machinery, representing the entire national intelligence community. It deals with appraisals of a foreign nation's current and future capabilities and actions. NIEs are regarded as vital building blocks of national security policy.

(c) **Other Products Published by the CIA.** Biographic handbooks, handbooks for special operations, the Central Intelligence Bulletin (Daily Intelligence Summary), and the Weekly Summary (Weekly Intelligence Summary).

b. **Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.** The Director of Intelligence and Research supervises a coordinated program of intelligence, research, and analysis for the Department of State and for other federal agencies and produces intelligence studies and current intelligence analyses essential to foreign policy determination and execution. In addition, the bureau through its Office of External Research, maintains liaison with cultural and educational institutions and with other federal agencies on a wide range of matters relating to government contractual and private foreign affairs research.

c. **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).** The Director of the FBI is in charge of investigating all violations of federal laws except for those which have been assigned

by legislature enactment to some other federal agency. The FBI has jurisdiction over some 180 investigative matters. Among the most important of these are espionage, sabotage, treason, and other subversive activities. In short, the FBI is the domestic CI expert of the national intelligence community.

4303. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AGENCIES

a. **Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) ASD(I)).** The ASD(I) is the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the management of intelligence resources, programs, and activities, including those for intelligence, warning, reconnaissance, and other related areas which the Secretary of Defense may designate. His responsibilities specifically include equipment, systems, and activities in the above areas which are organic to the military services.

(1) **Functions.** The ASD(I) is assigned 14 separate functions within the DOD. Five of the most important of his functions are:

(a) Planning, monitoring, and reviewing the effective use of intelligence resources.

(b) Formulating budget estimates for the intelligence portion of the DOD budget.

(c) Recommending policies of the management of intelligence operations, including operational requirements and priorities.

(d) Coordinating intelligence activities within the DOD and coordinating, as appropriate, intelligence programs for the DOD with other U.S. Government agencies.

(e) Recommending appropriate steps, including the transfer, reassignment, deletion, and consolidation of intelligence functions, which provide for more effective, efficient, and economical management of intelligence resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and contribute to improved military readiness.

(2) The ASD(I) is authorized to communicate directly with the secretaries of the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of U&S commands, and the directors of defense agencies. He must, however, keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed of all communications with the commanders of U&S commands which have strategic or military operational implications.

b. **National Security Agency (NSA).** The NSA was established by Presidential directive in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is the executive agent for the performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of the intelligence activities of the United States. Not much may be said about the NSA in any unclassified document. However, the NSA is concerned with communications and electronic intelligence.

(1) **Central Security Service (CSS).** The CSS was established in 1971 under the Director of the NSA. It has assumed and consolidated the cryptological functions of the NSA and the service cryptological agencies.

(2) The Director of the NSA directs both NSA and CSS through the civilian deputy director of NSA and a military director of CSS.

c. **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).** The DIA was established as an agency of the DOD under provisions of the National security Act of 1947, as amended, to operate under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The chain of command runs from the Secretary of Defense, though the ASD(I) to the Director, DIA. Under its Director, the DIA organizes, directs, manages, and controls DOD intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA. It also satisfies the intelligence requirements of the major components of the DOD. DIA products include the following:

(1) **Amphibious Objective Studies.** Studies designed to provide basic intelligence data of a permanent or semipermanent nature required for planning amphibious operations.

(2) **Port Studies and Briefs.** Publications designed to provide basic intelligence data of a permanent or semipermanent nature concerning ports throughout the world.

(3) **Lines of Communication.** This publication presents intelligence data on routes (whether land, water, or air) which may connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces may move.

d. **Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).** On November 5, 1971, the President directed consolidation of DOD Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic (MC&G) operations under a single DMA to obtain optimum efficiency and economy without impairing legitimate requirements of the separate services. The DMA reports through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense.

4304. AREA AGENCIES

The intelligence agencies at the unified command level consist of those which are part of the unified command headquarters and certain field agencies which operate directly under the commander of the unified command. Each of the three components of a unified command, Army, Navy, and Air Force, has a wide variety of intelligence capabilities. In combination, they represent virtually every type of collection agency in the intelligence field. Each component headquarters normally has its own intelligence staff agency.

a. **Army.** In addition to all the normal troop intelligence agencies, the Army component may include specialized intelligence agencies such as the following:

(1) **Technical Intelligence Detachments.** These detachments perform such duties as collection, identification, and examination of captured enemy materiel; conducting preliminary tests and preparing reports on capabilites, limitations, use, and effectiveness of enemy materiel; arranging for evacuation of selected enemy materiel; and recommending disposition of enemy materiel of no intelligence value.

(2) **Military Intelligence Specialists.** These specialists include prisoner-of-war interrogators, photo interpreters, language interpreters, document analysis, security unit personnel, and strategic intelligence research and analysis personnel.

(3) **U.S. Army Security agency Units (USASAU).** These units furnish information and intelligence derived from enemy communication and noncommunication electromagnetic emissions and conduct electronic warfare.

(4) **Field Operations Intelligence (FOI) Units.** These units, normally controlled at field Army level, furnish information on activities in enemy rear areas.

b. **Navy.** The Navy component may include all types of naval organizations, e.g., amphibious forces, Fleet Marine Forces, submarine forces, mine warfare forces, and fleet air forces, each of which has a variety of intelligence collection capabilities. In addition to performing normal reconnaissance and surveillance of large sear areas, submarine forces can land amphibious reconnaissance elements and SEAL teams, provide periscope reconnaissance of the sea, air, and land, and photograph coasts and landing beaches. Attack carrier striking forces can conduct aerial imagery, visual, and electronic reconnaissance. Amphibious forces include SEAL demolition teams which can conduct beach and hydrographic reconnaissance. ATFs may include aerial reconnaissance, strike aircraft, communication and electronic reconnaissance elements, and meteorological agencies. FMF agencies, which are included in the naval component, are discussed in paragraph 4306.

c. **Air Force.** The Air Force component includes such intelligence agencies as are required to support offensive and defensive air operations. These agencies normally emphasize long-range aerial reconnaissance, to include visual and multisensor imagery. Tactical reconnaissance wings of a tactical air force (TAF) normally support Army operations. The reconnaissance wings include both reconnaissance-fighter and reconnaissance-bomber aircraft. Reconnaissance-bomber aircraft normally provide night photographic, weather, and limited visual reconnaissance information. TAF high-performance reconnaissance aircraft, with fighter cover when required, perform aerial reconnaissance of the forward areas and areas at great distances beyond the FEBA.

4306. FLEET MARINE FORCE AGENCIES

a. **Force Reconnaissance Company.** The force reconnaissance company **conducts preassault and deep postassault reconnaissance in support of a LF.** Company elements are normally employed beyond the force beach head (FBH). Before D-day, teams would also be used within the FBH. It can also perform terminal guidance for initial helicopter waves. This company is organized to provide for considerable flexibility in the use of its teams. It is a small company with a headquarters platoon, a supply and service platoon, and six reconnaissance platoons.

Each reconnaissance platoon has 3 four-man teams for a total of 18 teams in the company. Each of these teams is designed to act independently in performing reconnaissance missions. Although several teams might be employed within an AOA, each team has a separate mission, and has little or no information concerning the number, locations, or missions of other teams.

The company is primarily employed to conduct reconnaissance missions. To facilitate entry into OAs, all team members are trained as surface and underwater swimmers, inflatable boat handlers, and parachutists. Additionally, they are trained to use several types of long-range radios, take photographs, make sketches, and to observe. Force reconnaissance teams can conduct deep inland reconnaissance. When SEAL Teams are not available, they may conduct hydrographic reconnaissance.

b. **Division Reconnaissance Battalion.** A larger Marine Corps collection agency is the reconnaissance battalions, which are organic to each Marine division.

(1) **Mission and Organization.** The mission of these organizations is to *conduct reconnaissance in support of a Marine division and its subordinate elements.* Due to the cadre of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, the current mission of the 1st and 3rd Reconnaissance Battalions is to *conduct reconnaissance operations in support of the Marine division and its subordinate elements and maintain a minimum capability of one combat-ready platoon organized, trained, and equipped for the conduct of deep reconnaissance operations in support of the LF.* The mission of the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion is to *conduct reconnaissance in support of the Marine division and its subordinate elements.* The battalion also has a limited capability for amphibious reconnaissance. This capability is supported by 28 rubber boats maintained in H&S company, a provision for scuba training for some members of the battalion, and occasional training exercises with submarines. Considering that SEAL Teams and force reconnaissance are available to provide amphibious reconnaissance, the reconnaissance battalions' primary emphasis is ground, not amphibious, reconnaissance. An exception to this would be in river-crossing operations where a limited form of amphibious reconnaissance might be performed by the battalion.

This battalion is primarily organized to conduct distant ground reconnaissance. By definition, distant reconnaissance is that *ground reconnaissance and surveillance conducted in the far portions of the CLF's area of influence.* The strength of the battalion is almost 500 men in one H&ST, and four letter companies. Each reconnaissance company has three reconnaissance platoons; each platoon has two squads; and each squad has 2 four-man scout teams. The deep reconnaissance platoons in the 1st and 3d Reconnaissance Battalions have a platoon headquarters and 3 four-man deep-reconnaissance teams. The scuba and parachute capabilities are retained in the new platoon. As in the case of the force reconnaissance company, the battalion is not designed to fight or to conduct screening and counterreconnaissance missions. It is organized and equipped to gain intelligence information through stealth, maneuver, and rapid reporting. The battalion relies on three means of transportation: foot, jeep, or helicopter. Going by foot offers considerable stealth, but time and space factors often rule out this means. The H&S company has sufficient jeeps to lift one company for those occasions when motorized patrols are feasible. The reconnaissance battalion depends quite heavily on helicopter support. Distant patrols and OPs can be emplaced and recovered quickly and efficiently by helicopter. In addition to using helicopters as a means of inserting and recovering patrols, there will be times when it will be desirable for them to join the patrols. Helicopterborne patrols can cover

large areas by observing while flying low over the ground. When something is seen that requires closer inspection, the helicopters insert the team which then conducts a physical reconnaissance.

(2) **Employment and Control. Maximum effectiveness is achieved by using the battalion as a unit division control.** This permits the most effective use of the battalion staff and the battalion logistic and maintenance assets. At times elements of the battalion are assigned to other organizations in the division. For example, a reconnaissance company would normally be assigned to a RLT when that RLT is employed on an independent mission or has an area of responsibility too large for adequate coverage by organic patrols. A reconnaissance company is normally assigned to a MEB or MEU. BLTs which are operating independently may be supported by a reconnaissance company or platoon if the situation warrants. In these cases, the principle of employment remains the same. The reconnaissance unit should be retained in general support under control of the unit to which attached. The organization of the reconnaissance battalion is designed to permit this flexibility in employment.

c. **Marine Observation Squadron (VMO).** The Marine observation squadron conducts visual aerial reconnaissance, aerial radiological reconnaissance, and limited low-level aerial photography. The squadron has 18 OV-10 aircraft. Because of their relatively low speed, these aircraft, with trained aerial observers (AO) aboard, are superior to high-performance aircraft for close reconnaissance and observation support of ground combat units. Ten air observers are organic to a VMO. Also, nine AOs are organic to the artillery regiment and provide aerial observation while performing their primary fire direction mission. These trained AOs provide accurate information on the terrain, enemy installations, and enemy activities.

d. **Marine Photographic Squadron (VMFP).** The Marine photographic squadron conducts aerial multisensor imagery in support of operations. Sensor systems used by the squadron include side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), thermal infrared (IR) systems, and conventional photography. Imagery derived from these sensors is processed by the squadron's organic laboratory equipment and exploited for items of intelligence value by imagery interpretation personnel.

e. **Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ).** The VMAQ conducts airborne electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare missions against noncommunicative electronic emitters. The squadron's reconnaissance functions are supported by an organic recording, processing, and analysis element. Intelligence derived from reconnaissance operations is used primarily in support of air combat actions.

f. **Marine Attack Squadron (VSTOL-AV-8B).** The Marine attack squadron performs an aerial attack mission; however, it does have a limited aerial photography capability. The AV-8 aircraft can provide oblique photography using a 70mm camera mounted in the port fuselage.

g. **Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP).** The SCAMP is located in the headquarters battalion of the division and provides the capability to conduct remote surveillance operations through the use of unattended, remotely monitored, ground sensors.

h. **Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Platoon.** The STA platoon is an element of the H&S company of the Marine infantry battalion. It consists of a platoon headquarters and three sections; an radar section, a night observation section, and a scout section. The platoon provides the infantry battalion with an electronic surveillance capability through the employment of ground surveillance radars and low list intensity observation devices.

i. **Interrogator-Translator Teams (ITT).** Marine Corps ITTs consist of one officer and 10 enlisted men trained to interrogate captured enemy personnel and translate documents. Six teams are organic to each Marine division. When required, a team can be split into three subteams of three enlisted men, each for assignment with an RLT or BLT. The type and scope of information such personnel can acquire is limited only by the information available from sources they exploit. **The value of information derived by this means is such that a command should ensure a flow of prisoners to this intelligence organization.** The six teams are normally employed as follows: one team to each assault regiment, and the remaining teams man the division POW collection and medical evacuation facilities, and to provide subteams to battalions operating independently. If the division is part of a MEF, the six teams will probably have to provide one or two teams to other elements of the MEF.

j. **Force Imagery Interpretation Unit (FIIU).** The mission of the FIIU is to derive information from aerial imagery produced from IR sensors, SLAR, and conventional photography. Most of this multisensor imagery comes from the VMFP squadron or its detachments. The FIIUs are under the operational control of the FMF commanders, but are under the administrative control of the MAWs, assigned one per wing. Full strength FIIU's consist of three officers and 22 enlisted Marines organized into a unit administrative section, two imagery interpretation van teams, a special studies element, and a technical support element. The G-2 section of the division/wing headquarters has two imagery interpreters for planning and coordination purposes.

k. **Immediate Imagery Interpretation Center (IIIC).** Just before D-day and throughout the operation, critical information must be obtained from imagery in the shortest possible time and disseminated immediately to affected units. To accomplish this, the IIIC is activated. It is composed of members of the imagery interpretation unit. The one purpose of the IIIC is to conduct a rapid interpretation of imagery received and to disseminate critical information by hot photo reports. Less critical information is disseminated by immediate imagery interpretation reports. The IIIC does not perform detailed interpretation, nor does it accomplish the processing and distribution of photography. Any required detailed interpretation is done by those imagery interpretation personnel remaining with the MAGTF headquarters and the air components. Since the reason for the IIIC is speed, it must be located immediately adjacent to the VMFP squadron so that there is no time lost in getting the imagery from the aircraft to the interpreter. Furthermore, a positive rapid means of communications must be provided between the IIIC and major units of the LF. The MAGTF/LF intelligence officer assigns the interpretation tasks. Not all imagery that is obtained requires immediate interpretation. Many times, it is used for map substitutes, for orientation purposes, or requires detailed interpretation. Accordingly, units requesting imagery will state if immediate interpretation is desired. The MAGTF/LF then approves and consolidates these requests, makes a final determination as to which of these missions will be submitted to the IIIC for interpretation and, in those cases where several missions are to be flown simultaneously, assigns priorities for interpretation.

l. **Counterintelligence Units.** Just as you seek intelligence about the enemy, so the enemy also attempts to develop intelligence about you. His commander is faced with the same necessity to make combat decisions and formulate plans as is your own commander--decisions and plans which must be based upon a sound, thorough knowledge of the opponent. Within the FMF, thwarting the enemy intelligence interest and protecting commands from enemy attempts at espionage, sabotage, and subversion is the mission of counterintelligence personnel.

(1) **Counterintelligence Teams.** CI teams consisting of five officers and 11 enlisted Marines are units attached to major FMF command headquarters to provide required CI support to the commander. While not organic to the command, the team falls under the staff cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who exercises direct authority over the team's activities. The team is capable of operating a unit, or of forming four subteams of one officer and two NCOs each.

(2) **Staff Counterintelligence.** The G-2 sections of each major FMF command contain an organic CI element consisting of one officer and either two or three NCOs depending upon the mission of the command. The CI officer acts as the primary assistant and advisor to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in CI and security measures affecting the command. Additionally, he advises the G-2 on matters concerning the employment of the attached CI team, and coordinates the team's activities with the team commander.

(3) **Counterintelligence Activities.** CI personnel formulate measures designed to deny, detect, and deceive the enemy intelligence structure. These measures may range from simple physical security procedures for classified information to comprehensive counterreconnaissance plans for a Marine division. While CI personnel plan such activities, their actual conduct becomes the mission of tactical elements. Obviously, the size of CI units dictates this requirement. While a CI team can plan a division counterreconnaissance effort, it is totally unable to conduct it.

4307. TROOP UNITS

All units of the LF are information-collecting agencies. The bulk of information is acquired by contact with the enemy. However, troop units can also acquire information by research. For example, engineer elements can produce terrain or beach trafficability studies from basic information contained on maps, photos, and in other studies. Information may also be collected by patrolling, capturing prisoners, securing enemy documents, equipment, and materiel, and by ground and aerial observation.

a. **Infantry Units.** Every infantry unit has numerous opportunities to collect information because of its combat role of closing with the enemy. Infantry may fight to obtain information, or may obtain information by scouting and patrolling, air and ground observation, interrogation of prisoners of war or civilians, and examination of enemy documents and materiel. Infantry units can furnish information on the enemy strength, disposition, location, identification, attitude, and characteristics of the area of operations. The observation capability of infantry units under conditions of low visibility is enhanced by the employment of battlefield surveillance radar and IR

devices. Infantry units can conduct radiological surveys, although a survey of a large area is time consuming.

b. **Artillery Units.** In carrying out its primary role of supporting the infantry by fire, the artillery locates and destroys enemy targets. To do this, Marine artillery has a versatile intelligence organization, designed not only to locate, but also to analyze and evaluate enemy targets. The necessary data is obtained from forward observers, liaison officers, artillery air observers, counter mortar radar sections, and from analysis of shell reports and shell craters. Unlike the infantry, the artillery does not usually have occasion to obtain enemy identifications and other detailed information from physical contact with the enemy. However, the artillery target information system effects liaison with the combat intelligence system at every tactical level from battalion to division, thus permitting use of target information to aid the production of combat intelligence at each echelon of command.

c. **Tank Units.** Tank units can acquire much of the same information in the same manner as infantry units. Because of their speed, mobility, and armor protection, they are, under favorable circumstances, capable of rapid penetration of enemy areas and can often obtain information over wider and deeper areas than infantry units. Tanks are limited by restricted observation from the vehicles and by restrictions imposed by weather, terrain, minefields, and other obstacles.

d. **Engineer Units.** Engineers furnish information on terrain, enemy fortifications and obstacles, enemy engineer troops, tactics, materiel, and capabilities.

e. **Combat Service Support Units.** Service units can provide a variety of information; e.g., medical units can provide information on the medical and public health aspects of the enemy and the area of operations. They also help to obtain information and documents from wounded personnel. Military police obtain information of both intelligence and CI value when operating straggler lines, patrolling forward and rear areas, controlling refugees and other civilian personnel, and guarding, evacuating, and processing prisoners of war.

f. **Communication Units.** Communication units can render technical assistance in determining the capabilities and limitations of enemy equipment and materiel and in identifying special items of equipment. They can also furnish information on the tactics and techniques employed by the enemy to jam or interfere with signal communications.

g. **Aviation Units.** Certain aviation units are assigned the specific mission or task of conducting visual, electronic, and multisensor imagery aerial reconnaissance. All aviation units may be assigned visual air observation as a primary mission or incident to another mission. The latter is normal since pilots are expected to report observations made in connection with their attack or other support assignments. Air transports may be directed to report sightings of enemy shipping and weather information. High-performance fighter and attack aircraft are best employed for distant reconnaissance and the detection of large targets.

SECTION IV. RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

4401. INTRODUCTION

a. The collection of information goes hand-in-hand with reconnaissance and surveillance. In December 1966, a Marine reconnaissance patrol operating in the foothills west of Hue, South Viet Nam, was observing a valley and a trail that appeared to be a focal point of Viet Cong activity. After several days, they spotted a large column of heavily armed Viet Cong moving east along the trail towards Hue in groups of 40 or 50, a Viet Cong regiment on the move to attack Hue. Quickly, the patrol reported the information to the division command post and as soon as the patrol cleared the area, all available weapons systems were laid in on the area. The Viet Cong were broken up and Hue was not attacked because of an effective reconnaissance effort that was part of the division surveillance plan.

b. **Definitions of Reconnaissance and Surveillance**

(1) **Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken, by visual observation or other detection methods, to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Although reconnaissance missions normally avoid combat, under certain circumstances these missions may require combat operations.

(2) **Surveillance.** Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aura, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes. It encompasses all techniques of accomplishing a continuous (all weather, day and night) systematic watch over the OA and enemy activities to provide timely information for friendly operations.

c. **Interrelationship of Reconnaissance and Surveillance.** Reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain mission information about a given subject, while surveillance involves protracted observation of an area or object in order to learn of any significant changes or activities. For example, prior to entering an OA, the MAGTF directs an extensive reconnaissance effort to determine the enemy's strength, location, and disposition, and to obtain information about the terrain, weather, and hydrography. This information is processed into intelligence for use in estimates, decision making, and planning. Subsequently, surveillance is maintained over all, or portions of, the enemy forces and avenues of approach in order to obtain timely warning on changes in the enemy's activities. This information is used to prevent surprise, to facilitate the prompt and effective use of supporting arms, and to permit timely maneuver of ground forces. However, the reconnaissance effort does not end when the surveillance effort commences. Requirements are all subject to change, consequently the reconnaissance effort continues until the MAGTF operations are completed. When the MAGTF is directed to accomplish an emergency deployment, the surveillance effort may commence at the same time as the reconnaissance effort. Furthermore, there may be occasions when both reconnaissance and surveillance are included in a single mission. For example, a patrol may be sent out to reconnoiter an area to locate an enemy unit, and then to maintain surveillance over that unit when located. In preparing his

collection agencies in performing both reconnaissance and surveillance.

d. **Types of Reconnaissance and Surveillance**

(1) **Reconnaissance and Surveillance of Surface Areas.** Reconnaissance and surveillance of surface areas is a collection effort directed at an area, locality, route, zone, sector, or other specified portion of the terrain, or the enemy forces located there. It involves the use of ground, amphibious, aerial, and communication-electronic collection agencies. These agencies use a variety of sensors, ranging from the human eye and ear to electronic devices.

(2) **Reconnaissance and Surveillance of Airspace.** Reconnaissance and surveillance of airspace is the actin taken to obtain weather data in areas where weather reports are not available. It requires the systematic patrolling and observation of airspace using electronic, visual, or other sensors primarily for the purpose of identifying and determining the movements of aircraft and missiles through that airspace.

4402. AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE

Amphibious operations place three special burdens on the intelligence officer in providing answers to his intelligence requirements that are not found in land campaigns. The first burden is that the OA is usually extremely remote, permitting no direct access to information about it or the enemy. The second results from the fact that during the period immediately following H-hour, the LF is in an extremely critical position, and failure to succeed in landing is more than a reversal, it is a catastrophe. Consequently, it is even more important that the intelligence officer present complete, detailed, and accurate intelligence in order to reduce uncertainties to a minimum, and to provide a basis for the commander to arrive at a sound decision. Last is the need for intelligence regarding hydrographic conditions within the OA, a vital consideration in determining if you can land, and if so, where and when.

As previously mentioned, there are numerous ways of collecting the necessary information. In addition to the area studies produced on national and theater levels and reports from informed persons and agents, there are aerial sensors from which you can get the bulk of your information during the last few days before D-day. On the other hand, area studies become out of date and informed persons and agents may not be trained military observers. Adverse weather conditions and enemy actions, such as camouflage, concealment, and air defense can seriously curtail the effectiveness of aerial sensors. Many objects or activities must be scrutinized from close range, before you can really learn enough about them. Under conditions like those cited above, nothing will replace an actual physical reconnaissance of the OA.

A definition of amphibious reconnaissance is "*A landing conducted by minor elements involving stealth rather than force of arms, for the purpose of securing information, followed by a planned withdrawal and/or recovery.*" The key words in this definition are *stealth* and *planned withdrawal and/or recovery.* The need for stealth is obvious. A lack of stealth could endanger not only the accomplishment of the

reconnaissance mission, but also the entire amphibious operation by exposing our interest in that area. The words *planned withdrawal and/or recovery* indicate that you plan to remove your reconnaissance elements from the OA or that you may plan to link up with friendly forces--assault or guerrilla.

The pre-D-day reconnaissance of YELLOW Beaches on Tinian in World War II showed the importance of an actual physical reconnaissance. The only indication of prepared defenses was a single row of antiboat mines. An amphibious reconnaissance patrol was landed at night for the purpose of ascertaining any additional defensive preparations by the Japanese. The reconnaissance patrol presented a detailed report that indicated a strong, well-camouflaged line of pillboxes and prepared rifle positions within the embankment behind the beaches. This report, together with the reconnaissance reports that WHITE Beaches 1 and 2 were undefended and not mined, led to the landings on WHITE Beaches 1 and 2. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Marine lives were saved. The Tinian landing is considered to be an example of a near perfect amphibious assault.

4403. AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Whether an amphibious reconnaissance patrol accomplishes its mission and survives depends to a large degree on how thorough, well thought out, and coordinated the planning has been. The following are the planning considerations which usually apply:

a. **Agencies.** From the previous discussion and definition of collection agencies, you will see that only three agencies meet the criteria for amphibious reconnaissance. These are SEAL teams, the force reconnaissance company, and the division reconnaissance battalions. Normally, SEAL Teams perform reconnaissance from the three and one-half fathom curve to the high-water mark while the force reconnaissance company performs reconnaissance from the high-water mark inland. Division reconnaissance units normally would be used only if the other two agencies were not available. However, members of all three agencies have received special training. This training provides them with the necessary skills and knowledge to acquire the desired information and to report it accurately.

b. **Missions.** The type of missions that might be assigned to amphibious reconnaissance elements includes the collection of information concerning hydrographic conditions, landing beaches, Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs), inland terrain, and enemy defenses. In addition, special type missions, such as establishing contact with friendly agents, could be assigned. Regardless of which missions are assigned, the point to remember is--keep them simple. A basic rule of thumb for most occasions is one patrol, one mission. Of course, there will be times when a single patrol could be assigned two successive missions, but these occasions will be exceptions, rather than the normal procedure. Instructions given to the reconnaissance agencies is of the broad mission type which leaves the unit some latitude as to how and where they will accomplish the assigned tasks. Tell them what you want to know, not how to get it.

c. **Coordinated Planning.** Preparation and coordination of plans for amphibious reconnaissance take place at several levels. On the LF level, the G-2, assisted by the ground reconnaissance officer prepares a plan for amphibious reconnaissance. This plan is coordinated with the G-3 to ensure that it dovetails with plans for operations of other units. It is submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval. Once the plan is

approved, in most cases it will then be submitted to the CATF for inclusion in the overall ATF reconnaissance plan. When you consider that most amphibious reconnaissance patrols are delivered and recovered by Navy ships and/or aircraft, and submit reports over Navy communications channels, it becomes apparent that the Navy actually directs and controls amphibious reconnaissance. Depending on how long before D-day the reconnaissance is conducted, the actual controlling agency could be the fleet, the advance force, or the ATF.

d. **Secrecy.** The requirement for secrecy is basic to amphibious reconnaissance. Information is passed out strictly on a need-to-know basis. Patrol personnel are segregated and isolated after their initial briefings. Each patrol is told only of its own mission. Normally, the patrol members do not know the number and missions of other patrols. Supporting units are told only as much as is needed to perform their supporting role. Secrecy is necessary to assure that the reconnaissance is truly clandestine, that capture of one patrol will not endanger the others, and that success of the overall amphibious operation will not be endangered.

e. **Transportation.** Amphibious reconnaissance agencies can paddle rubber boats, swim, or use underwater propulsion devices. Force reconnaissance company and elements of the SEAL teams can parachute into the OA. The real problem comes in getting them in position to swim or jump and, later on, in picking them up. As mentioned before, this is primarily a Navy problem, but the LF recommends the means to be used. In the line of aircraft, the type that can operate from aircraft carriers is the C2A, for delivery only--not pickup. Range factors usually rule out helicopters until just before D-day. At that time, LPHs may be close enough to the OA to land and/or recover teams by helicopter. Considering the use of ships, the submarine immediately comes to mind. It certainly offers the most advantages. If the enemy has a fairly unsophisticated surveillance system, it may be possible to use surface ships as a transportation means. Of course, the smaller and faster the ship, the better chance it will have of getting in and out undetected. Destroyers are probably the best suited of currently available ships. In considering the various types of transportation that might be available, the type and the method of entry/exit selected should be the one that will drop (or recover) the patrol with the least probability of detection, as close to the operating area as is possible, and as simply and rapidly as possible.

f. **Time Factors.** The controlling time factor is the date on which the desired information is required. Working backwards from that date, considering time required for submission of reports, recovery of the patrol, time needed to collect the information, and transportation to the OA, you can compute when the reconnaissance effort should commence. Also included should be a period of several days as a safety factor in the event that weather or enemy action delays any part of the overall operation. In considering the duration of operations within the OA, you need to consider two factors: How long it takes to collect the desired information, and how long can the patrol sustain itself. If living off the land is ruled out, the patrol will normally be limited to a stay of 5 or 6 days.

g. **Briefing and Debriefing.** Personnel who participate in amphibious reconnaissance patrols must receive an extensive intelligence briefing on the area of operations and the enemy. The command that directs the reconnaissance activities, which may be the ATF advance force, covers all pertinent intelligence on weather, terrain, hydrography, the enemy, escape, evasion, and survival. Subsequent and more detailed briefings are provided by the reconnaissance unit, the patrol leader, and the jumpmaster or ship

commander. The same individuals who gave the situation briefing should conduct the debriefing. Since time-space factors often make this impractical, the debriefing may be done by a member of the respective reconnaissance unit. Regardless of who does it, the debriefer should be familiar with the patrol mission, the area of operations, and the commander's EEIs so that he may conduct a thorough debriefing.

h. **Logistics and Communications.** As with all other planning for amphibious reconnaissance, the plans for logistics and communications support of amphibious reconnaissance elements must be detailed and thorough. If it is necessary to keep a patrol in the area for more than five or six days, delivering additional supplies will probably be required. You can do this by airdrop or by rendezvous with a submarine. If resupply is attempted, it must be done in a way that ensures that the supplies get into the right hands and that the presence of the patrol is not compromised. Alternate plans and positive identification procedures are essential. Communications means and planning must meet requirements for prompt reporting. Patrols may be equipped with communication equipment such as the portable VHF-FM sets for long- or intermediate-range transmissions. Under optimum conditions, this equipment can send transmissions for hundreds of miles. Using UHF radios, patrols can relay messages via high-performance aircraft. For purposes of security, transmission times and frequencies should be varied, the time on the air should be brief, and directional equipment and ciphering devices should be used.

4404. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

Before D-day, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance accomplish the most of the intelligence collection effort. After the assault is launched, the other types of reconnaissance and surveillance assume roles of increasing important; however, **aerial reconnaissance and surveillance remain the back bone of the collection effort.** There are three general types of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance--visual, multisensor imagery, and electronic. In addition, aerial radiological reconnaissance is a requirement in nuclear war. Making full use of these means should provide the intelligence section with a fairly good day and night capability of detecting the enemy. Electronic countermeasures and surveillance require certain security classifications so you will concentrate on visual collection and multisensor imagery in this course.

Aviation units play a major role in providing desired information. Aerial surveillance is described as route search, area search, and specific/point search. An important part of planning is to organize the collection effort to make the most efficient use of the collection means and provide the most comprehensive coverage with these means. It is impossible to predict the areas, routes, or specific points over which surveillance is required. You can assume that you cannot place the entire OA under surveillance, so prudent planning requires that you divide up the objective into separate parcels. (See figure 4-2 thru 4-6). Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance use both visual and multisensor capabilities.



Figure 4-2. SLAR linear coverage.

a. **Means.** Within the division, there are nine AOs in the artillery regiment. These AOs work with the VMO, which has 10 AOs organic to the squadron. The VMO has 18 aircraft to support aerial observation missions. As a general rule, for sustained operations, you should not count on having more than one-third of your available AOs and aircraft in the air at any given time. During critical points of any operation, you will have a greater percentage in the air. For each specific operation, the G-2 works closely with the various aviation units and AOs to determine exactly how many of each he expects to have available. Do not forget high-performance aircraft. Each pilot is trained to observe and report significant events and is briefed and debriefed for each mission to make sure that you get all available information. In addition, jet pilots can perform tactical air observation missions. In most cases, this mission is armed reconnaissance. The availability of aircraft to perform these missions depends entirely on the existing situation and the requirement for tactical missions. However, their use must be considered.

b. **Planning.** The VMO aircraft are not designed for deep missions. Normally, they do not go beyond the range of supporting arms, or about 10 to 15 miles beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Deep reconnaissance and surveillance missions, which may extend for 300 miles or more, must be accomplished by high-performance aircraft. As mentioned above, the three categories of visual aerial surveillance missions are area search, route search, and specific/point search.

(1) **Area Search.** In preplanning area search missions, three points must be considered. How large is an area? How can the observer identify it? How should it be designated for reference? In the question *How large is an area?* there are three determining factors. What type of aircraft is being used? What is the availability of concealment? How close is the area to your frontlines?



Figure 4-3. Visual/photo point target reconnaissance.



Figure 4-4. Visual/photo offset technique.



Figure 4-5. Visual/photo route reconnaissance.



Figure 4-6. SLAR area search.

Areas that are immediately adjacent to the FEBA should be scrutinized in great detail, while those areas that are remote should be scanned for significant items. In terms of square miles, close-in areas which are normally covered by VMO aircraft and which have moderate concealment should be 50 to 100 square miles in size. They must be bounded by easily recognizable terrain features: roads, streams, edges of woods, hill masses, and cities. One of the simplest methods in designating these areas is to draw them on an overlay, and then designate each one by a number, a letter, or a combination of both. Although there is no prescribed system, use a simple system.

(2) **Route Search.** There are three determining factors for route search. What routes should be selected? How long should the routes be? How should the routes be designated? If the OA has an extensive road network, it will not be practical to include all roads in your planning. Many of the roads will also be covered routinely as part of the area searches. Roads selected for route search should be limited to the avenues of approach into the area, and key lateral roads which could be used to shift reserves. Regarding length of selected roads, they should be fairly short (15 to 25 miles), in close to the FEBA, and lengthen out (200 miles or so) in the remote areas. Following these guidelines means that major highways will be broken into increments. These increments should start and end at easily recognizable terrain features such as road junctions, bridges, tunnels, and towns. In designating these routes, follow the same rules as for the areas. Route search is not limited to roads. It can include railroads, inland waterways, or any other avenue of approach.

(3) **Specific/Point Search.** Specific search is reconnaissance of a well defined locality for evidence of specific activity or conditions. This search is most frequently employed to confirm information derived by other intelligence collection agencies.

c. **Preplanned Aerial Visual Reconnaissance and Surveillance Missions.** Going back to the collection worksheet, you find a need for many missions involving aerial visual reconnaissance and surveillance. These missions can then be matched with designated areas, routes, and points. These preplanned missions can be shown on a list that indicates the following:

(1) Area, route, or point to be covered.

(2) Type aircraft to be used.

(3) Type coverage (reconnaissance or surveillance, frequency, and duration).

(4) Pertinent remarks such as what specific information is sought or the method of reporting.

d. **Aerial Multisensor Imagery.** Imagery is a major means of developing information about the enemy and natural conditions in the OA. It is particularly valuable before the assault phase of an amphibious operation, when close visual reconnaissance is very limited. There are three sensors involved in aerial imagery reconnaissance-photographic, SLAR, and IR.

(1) **Photographic.** Photography provides imagery which results from the use of black and white, color, camouflage detection, or infrared sensitive film used under varying natural light conditions and artificial illumination.

(2) **Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR).** SLAR detects differences in reflected energy. It can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in conditions of light rain, smoke, haze, and dust. Portrayal methods used by this device include radarscope presentations for instantaneous viewing and imagery recording on film for retention and detailed study. It also has a

moving target indicator (MTI) capability. However, it needs to be supplemented by other means such as visual observation and photography, which can better determine the exact nature of the activity detected by SLAR (scale of SLAR imagery is constant at 1:100,000). Airborne radar can over large areas quickly and can operate from behind the FEBA. SLAR depends on line of sight and may be detected, jammed or spoofed.

(3) **Infrared (IR).** Not to be confused with infrared sensitive film, thermal infrared sensors detect differences in temperature. IR is valuable in penetrating camouflage and in collecting information at night. However, its effectiveness is reduced by fog, clouds, and precipitation. As with SLAR, the information obtained must be corroborated by other means. Airborne infrared detection devices can cover large areas quickly, but are limited to line of sight coverage. These devices are not vulnerable to countermeasures, but are susceptible to enemy deception measures. Portrayal methods used by these devices include scope presentations for instantaneous viewing and imagery recording on film for retention and detailed study.

e. **Aerial Imagery Planning.** In aerial imagery planning, the Marine Corps adheres to the practice of requiring requesting units to be specific as to the type of imagery they want, leaving only a few options for the photo unit to decide on.

f. **Imagery Requirements**

(1) **Basic Coverage.** This is a term that applies to black and white coverage of large areas, such as the entire FBH. It serves primarily for general terrain analysis and to detect areas of major enemy activity. It may also be used to prepare mosaic photo maps. With currently available cameras and film, the most desirable scale is 1:25,000. Normally, this basic cover is flown only once--early in the planning phase. However, if a considerable period of time elapses before D-day, then the basic cover may be repeated to determine any seasonal changes or overall changes in the enemy situation.

(2) **Beach Photos.** Beach photos include both vertical and oblique photos. Early in the planning phase, photos of all possible landing beaches consist of black and white vertical strips at a scale of 1:10,000. Simultaneously, a high-oblique strip is also taken, looking inland. Later on, as definite beaches are decided upon, the beach photography gets more extensive. Vertical stereo coverage at scales of 1:50,000 or larger are taken. The area covered is the full length of the beaches and extends from at least 2,000 yards seaward to the key terrain features behind the beaches. Some missions include a combination of black and white and IR, while other missions combine color and camouflage detection. This photography is repetitive and increases in frequency as D-day approaches. The last mission is probably flown on D-1 to detect last-minute preparations or changes by the enemy.

(3) **Helicopter Landing Area Photos.** This photography usually includes vertical coverage at medium scales radiating 10,000 to 15,000 meters from the centers of the area and large-scale coverage of the zones proper, plus selected oblique photography. Color photography may be required on a one-time basis for soil analysis. Infrared and camouflage detection film should also be

used. This photography is used for the same purposes as beach photography. Selected photographs are reproduced lithographically and issued to helicopter pilots and helicopter team leaders. For assault phase preplanned helicopter operations, this photography is repetitive, with the last sorties flown on D-1. For subsequent helicopter operations, it is usually provided only on a one-time basis.

(4) **Maneuver Photography.** This photography helps the commander to select a scheme of maneuver and to determine probable areas of enemy maneuver. It consists of the following three areas:

(a) **Helicopter approach and retirement route photography** includes medium-to-large scale vertical strips, panoramic, and oblique photography taken with a forward firing camera along the axis of the approach and retirement lanes. This combination of photography is used to select checkpoints and to detect and identify enemy weapons. For the assault phase and preplanned helicopter operations, it is repetitive. For subsequent helicopter operations it can usually be provided on a one-time basis.

(b) **Surface assault maneuver photography** supports elements moving over land routes of approach. It includes medium-to-large scale vertical strip photography along the axis of advance, plus selected oblique photography. Used for terrain analysis and for detection and identification of enemy forces along the route of advance this photography, in effect, replaces *frontline cover* which is impractical over the areas involved in modern amphibious operations. Maneuver photography is repetitive before D-day and, subsequently, is flown on a one-time basis, usually on the day preceding the maneuver.

(c) **Enemy maneuver photography** of possible hostile routes of approach normally is vertical strip photography, medium-to-large scale, along the possible enemy axis of advance. When routes exceed the capacity of photographic units to provide complete coverage, sampling photography (photography of selected portions of the route) is taken. When movement of enemy forces at night is anticipated, this photography is flown at the earliest time light conditions permit detecting enemy units before they are well camouflaged and off roads and trails. Night photographic capability should be exploited for the same purpose. Enemy maneuver photography may be used well before the assault. However, it normally commences shortly before the assault and is repeated during the assault phase.

(5) **Special Cover.** This is photography of specific targets or objectives. Special cover is flown to obtain specific information or to verify or expand on information derived by other means, e.g., information that an enemy unit may be located in a certain area. Aerial photography may confirm this information and provide sufficient data for target analysis. Examples of other types of special cover are photography of enemy airfields, air installations, air defenses, and pre- and poststrike photography for target analysis including weapons effectiveness. Types of photography, film, and scales are selected on the basis of desired information.

(6) **Low-Level Runs.** Surface-to-air guided missiles present a serious problem in photo efforts. You cannot fly over or near their launch sites. The kill probability on high-flying aircraft is much too high to ignore. The next alternative is for the photo pilot to fly right down on the deck, thereby minimizing detection, and make just one pass through enemy-held territory. By using several aircraft at odd times, intervals, altitudes, and on different courses, you can fly several missions per day. Usually, the aircraft use forward oblique and panoramic cameras simultaneously. This method may not give you all the coverage you want and exposes the plane to small arms fire.

(7) **Night Photography.** For the most part, photography is limited to daylight hours. However, you have a limited capability for taking photos at night. As a general rule, the film is black and white, the type of photo is vertical, the scale is 1:5,000 or larger. A run cannot exceed 40 photos. As you can see, the prime use for night photos is spot checks along avenues of approach or assembly areas to get a sampling of the enemy's activity. This capability may be enhanced as new cameras and film become available.

g. **Aerial Imagery Plan.** Once the G-2 has completed the imagery planning and knows what types of photos he wants, what type of film, what scale, and how often he wants it taken, he has to prepare the photo plan. Bear in mind that for amphibious operations, up to the time control of air passes ashore, the CATF handles the imagery plan. However, the plan remains unchanged whether it is passed to the CATF for approval or to LF aviation for execution after control passes ashore. It is a list of all requested missions and includes the information that has been discussed so far. This list provides a quick, handy reference to see what missions have been requested and when they will be flown. Individual photo requests should support each mission. The operation order may not be published until very late in the planning period and the photo squadrons should have all the advance notice possible. Sending out individual photo requests helps them. The last paragraph of the photo request contains information on what use you want to make of the photography. This is for the pilot's use. If he arrives in the OA ready to fly your mission and discovers that the weather or enemy precludes him from doing so, he has two options. First, based on a knowledge of your needs and his own professional background in photography, he can decide to fly an alternate mission that will be useful to you, second, to abort the entire mission.

4405. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE

Once D-day arrives, the LF is going to have reconnaissance agencies in action. Every committed combat and combat support unit collects considerable information. Here is where good training and a sound intelligence SOP pay dividends. In addition to a standard collection procedure, the LF G-2 prepares specific missions for these units, such as the establishment of specific OPs, listening posts (LP), and the use of special reconnaissance patrols. There is also the use of division and force reconnaissance personnel. If you are not in contact with the enemy, these reconnaissance units should be used to find him. Division reconnaissance elements, using jeeps and helicopters, should be operating up to 10 or 15 miles in front of the LF, while force recon teams jump 50 to 300 miles in front. The only limiting factors as to how far in they go are how far the LF is interested in going and what enemy forces you are interested in locating. On the other hand if you are in contact with the enemy, you do not need these specially trained units to tell where his frontlines are. Your units in contact

provide that information. What is needed is good information on the location and activities of the enemy's general reserve. Here you can use the flexibility available in helicopters or parachute jumps to leap-frog recon teams over the battle areas and into the gap between it and the reserves. Reconnaissance teams can keep the enemy reserves under surveillance. If that is not feasible, then they can maintain positions and report significant movements. Aerial surveillance will not always do the same job, because night and rain reduce its effectiveness and dust knocks it out altogether. At times like this, the Marine on the ground proves invaluable and irreplaceable.

SECTION V. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

4501. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING

The planning process used by the intelligence officer in developing the CI program consists of two phases. Phase I consists of determining the enemy's capabilities for intelligence acquisition, espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Phase II is the development of countermeasures.

a. The CI officer determines the enemy intelligence capabilities in the CI estimate. A separate estimate is rarely prepared at division or lower levels. Instead, the estimate of enemy intelligence capabilities is included in the intelligence estimate, subparagraph 2b, Enemy Military Situation, and the guerrilla, psychological, subversive, and sabotage subparagraphs of subparagraph 2d, Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the intelligence estimate all may have portions of CI interest.

b. **Worksheet.** In your estimate, you arrive at certain conclusions regarding capabilities and start thinking about countermeasures (phase II of the planning process). Based on these conclusions, a CI worksheet is prepared. This worksheet is similar in content and purpose to the intelligence collection worksheet. In the CI worksheet, list each phase of the operation. Under each of these phases the five categories of CI operations are listed. List under each of the categories, specific CI measures to counter the enemy's capabilities arrived at in the estimate. Then, the units or agencies best equipped to implement the measures are noted. Based upon this, the CI plan is developed. The plan is a directive to the command to implement specific preplanned CI measures. It is disseminated to the command either as an appendix to the intelligence annex, or if very short, in paragraph 6 (Counterintelligence) of the annex itself. Fortunately, many passive measures can be written into an SOP.

4502. EMPLOYMENT

In developing this plan, the intelligence officer must understand the missions, functions, and availability of CI specialists. If some are attached, he must understand how to employ them to achieve the best results. This knowledge also helps to obtain support when requested. The following is a list of some of the appropriate missions or tasks for CI team or subteams.

a. **Mission.** To provide CI support for the FMF in accomplishing its mission.

b. **Tasks.** The mission and tasks can be assigned in a variety of ways--some in SOPs and others in paragraph 6 of the intelligence annex. Careful planning and an understanding of the overall CI picture are required if you are to obtain the best results from the limited number of CI Marines normally available. A sampling of appropriate tasks follows:

(1) Assist commanders in determining and implementing tactical security measures to defeat the enemy intelligence mission. Included in this function are such activities as assessment and evaluation of enemy intelligence capabilities, counterreconnaissance planning assistance, and the evaluation of unit physical and tactical interventions.

(2) Seize or uncover known or suspected espionage, sabotage, and political or subversive individuals, including known or suspected collaborators and sympathizers.

(3) Seize or uncover known or suspected enemy installations or areas, formerly or currently occupied by enemy espionage, sabotage, or subversive agencies, or by enemy paramilitary organizations and collaborators.

(4) Conduct security screening of indigenous captives and refugees; and interrogation of prisoners of CI interest.

(5) Assist responsible authorities in establishing security measures against sabotage of public and private installations vital to the unit mission.

(6) Assist responsible authorities in suspending operation of newspapers, periodicals, signal communications broadcasting stations, and schools as directed.

(7) Establish and maintain information nets to secure and develop all CI information which relates to the unit's zone, answers EEIs and OIRs.

c. **Other Considerations.** The characteristics of the area determine the CI assets required. In particular, CI requirements are affected by population density and political and sociological aspects of the area. The MAGTF commander normally retains control of attached teams. This centralized control provides greater flexibility, coordination of efforts, and efficient use of available assets. As mentioned earlier, teams are organized into subteams. This permits the detachment of all or a part of these teams to subordinate commands. It is important to include CI personnel in the operation as early as possible in the planning phase.

4503. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

CI operations commence at the first phase of amphibious operations and continue throughout all phases.

a. **Planning Phase.** During the planning phase, the intelligence officer performs two CI functions: the recommendation and implementation of increased security; and the commencement of CI planning to support the overall planning.

(1) **Increased Security Activities.** Information on the impending amphibious operation is most vulnerable to compromise during the planning phase. It is essential that rigid security control procedures be established.

(a) **Release information only on a need-to-know basis to properly cleared personnel.** The extremely sensitive nature of the impending operation may require that several members of the unit staff begin procedures for a higher clearance. It is necessary to determine which members of the staff actually *need to know* during the planning phase. It would be nice to inform the entire staff so that everyone can commence his part in the planning, but chances for compromise increase directly with the number who *know.*

(b) **Establish restricted areas for planning.** Every echelon of command involved in the operational planning must establish a restricted planning area. The area must be guarded, and entry must be through a positive identification system. Entry is on a need-to-know basis. Written material and conferences on the operation should be held within this area, and where possible, reproduction should occur here. Trained CI personnel can be used in screening the area for possible *bugs,* for recommendations on constructing perimeter barriers, and advising on the use of sentries.

(c) **Classification of all material referring to the projected operation must be appropriate.** It should contain instructions concerning its distribution within the command, with particular attention to those forward units that are more subject to capture. Quite often documents bear the notation, *Not to be carried in aircraft over enemy lines, or forward of battalion CPs.*

(d) **Censorship should be stressed constantly and, to be really effective, requires self-censorship by each individual.** It may be necessary to censor mail and telephone calls. The possession of diaries is normally forbidden, and personal cameras are rigidly controlled.

(e) **Code names and symbols may be assigned to the operations,** to a condition of readiness, to the OA, or to organizations. Frequently, place names on maps and charts are also given code names. The maps and charts have titles and sheet numbers removed. Code symbols are assigned to units for marking vehicles and organizational equipment.

(f) **Postponement of compromising activities** includes such obvious activities as the issue of special clothing or equipment, special medical supplies, or special inoculations. Whenever possible, these should be postponed until after embarkation. Similarly, exercise care to avoid hasty cancellation of local contracts and settlement of accounts. Usually a rear echelon unit is designated to take care of such matters after the combat unit has departed.

(g) **Leave and liberty schedules are handled similarly** since any sudden curtailment will give rise to speculation. It is better to decrease leave and liberty gradually, with total cancellation occurring just

prior to embarkation. A good example of an effective use of this procedure took place in New Zealand by the 2d Division just before the assault on Tarawa. Several of the senior officers who were in on the planning for that operation made a number of local officers who were in on the planning for that operation made a number of local commitments, such as hotel reservations well in advance, even though they knew that the division would be gone by the time the reservations became effective.

(h) **Security training is necessary** for all units on a continuing basis and must be strongly emphasized at the outset of planning. Security training should emphasize both the positive and negative. The troops should be told what not to say and what not to do to avoid disclosing information; at the same time, they should be told what to do if they detect a security leak or observe suspicious activities. Concerning this last item, the rule almost always is to report the leak or activities at once, and not to try to play counterspy. Additional training includes camouflage principles and blackout discipline.

(i) **Selection of staging and rehearsal areas must be carefully considered** during the planning phase. If at all possible, heavily populated areas should be avoided. Enemy agents can work with the greatest cover in such areas and speculation by the local populace could reach enemy ears. Of course, many times, selecting such areas is made by higher headquarters, and the embarking Marine unit has little to say in the matter. At times like this, the intelligence officer should recommend using several different routes to the embarkation area. Movements should be staggered over as much time as is available. Consider movements at night.

(2) **Requirement for Planning.** After the intelligence estimate is completed, the CI target list is compiled concurrently with the preparation of the intelligence worksheet. At this time, consideration should also be given to obtaining town and city plans to assist in locating CI targets of a facilities nature. The key points in these considerations are the mission of the command, characteristics of the area of operations, enemy situation and capabilities, the concept of operations, CI missions from higher commands, and finally, the availability of CI agencies, either organic, attached, or in support of the command. After the intelligence officer has thoroughly processed all these facts, he is ready to issue the CI Plan, which is normally included as an appendix to the intelligence annex. Included in this plan are all the CI measures which the command will undertake. Concurrently with the preparation of the CI plan, the intelligence officer has to coordinate various details with other staff officers to ensure that their plans include the necessary actions to implement the CI plan.

b. **Embarkation Phase.** There are two principal dangers of compromise during the embarkation phase: observations of movement and embarkation activities by enemy agents or sympathizers and contact between the troops and civilians who work in the port area. In this phase, some of the plans and training implemented during the planning phase are tested, including security lectures, emphasis on releasing information on a need-to-

know basis, covering or changing tactical markings, and selecting embarkation areas, routes, and times of movement. Other helpful measures are establishing civilian control along the route of travel and in the embarkation area, screening all civilians in the embarkation area, and establishing security of the staging area before commencing embarkation. The command not only attempts to avoid compromise, it also tries to avoid sabotage. For the most part, these measures must be accomplished above the battalion/squadron level. The S-2 recognizes his problem areas, decides how much and what kind of support is needed, and then initiates requests through the chain of command.

c. **Rehearsal Phase.** There are two principal dangers of compromise during this phase of CI operations. The first is unauthorized observation of the rehearsal, or unauthorized contact with civilians by members of the task force. This is particularly true if it is possible to deduce the landing area from an analysis of the rehearsal area. At such times, one of the best measures is to seal off the area by a security perimeter with the Navy providing the ships and the LF providing patrols ashore. The second danger involves communications security. To prevent the enemy from gaining information through interception and analysis of communications, you may have to reduce transmission power to a minimum or use frequencies and call signs which are different from those intended for actual operational use.

d. **Movement to the Objective Area.** Security measures during this phase are the responsibility of the CATF and usually consist of long-range screening and the imposition of radio silence. If it is planned to insert amphibious reconnaissance patrols into the OA during this phase, each patrol s given only that information which it needs to accomplish its mission. Meanwhile, the LF continues to emphasize security training and imposes censorship and counter sabotage measures. Instruction in the Code of Conduct including enemy interrogation techniques and methods of resisting interrogation is also conducted. During this phase, the troops receive detailed information of the operation. Undoubtedly, after rehearsal, they will have a good idea about the general scheme of maneuver and the time and place of attack. Now is the time to reveal D-day, H-hour, designated landing beaches, LZs, and the selected objectives and force beachhead.

e. **Assault Phase.** The CATF may commence this phase with several CI measures such as feints, demonstrations, and the employment of smoke. As the LF moves ashore, the various preplanned CI measures are implemented. Normally, these measures are accomplished by or under the supervision of trained personnel. Unquestionably, the availability of trained CI personnel greatly enhances the overall effectiveness of the CI plan. However, it is not unreasonable to expect a command to carry out a plan without having assigned personnel. CI measures initiated ashore during the assault phase are as follows:

(1) Local authorities and persons known to be friendly to your cause are contacted to obtain all available CI information and to commence screening indigenous personnel. Here is where the black, white, and gray list comes into play. The black portion of the list includes the names of all persons known to be supporting or sympathetic towards the enemy cause; the white portion lists the names of persons known to be friendly towards your cause; and the gray portion includes all those whose loyalties are uncertain. The black, white, and gray list for various areas of the world is compiled and

kept current on a national level and is available to an ATF once planning commences for operations in a particular area.

(2) Security against sabotage is established for all military installations including those civilian installations that you want to keep in operation. This includes such civilian installations as communication centers, public utilities, government buildings, schools, and hospitals. Accomplishing this measure requires both the establishment of physical security around the installations and the implementation of a program for screening all persons who will be allowed to enter these installations.

(3) CI interrogation centers are established. These centers are used for interrogating civilians who will locate any enemy agents, as well as interrogating enemy military personnel who are, or are suspected to be, connected with intelligence.

(4) Civilian control measures such as checkpoints, identification cards, and curfew are established.

(5) Contraband materials, such as arms, explosives, communication materials, food, medical supplies, or any other items which have not been surrendered in accordance with proclamations, must be located and recovered.

(6) Measures are instituted to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and material by your troops. Publishing instructions on the handling of captured documents and material, and information on handling, marking, reporting, and return of possible souvenirs usually accomplishes this.

(7) Compliance with camouflage and blackout regulations is enforced.

(8) The effective countersigns are published along with any instructions on the method of challenging. The method of challenging requires careful attention, particularly in joint or combined operations since other services and nations often use different techniques. For any operation, a standard method of challenging must be established.

(9) **Security checks are made of all areas vacated by your troops, particularly when command posts displace.** The purpose of the check is to determine whether any compromising material has been left behind, such as messages, overlays, maps, troop lists, and related documents.

(10) Counterreconnaissance measures are initiated. These include defensive screens which prevent the enemy from entering certain places, outposts, patrols, ambushes, and offensive screens which go out with the mission of locating and destroying hostile reconnaissance forces.

(11) CI targets are seized, exploited, and protected. To seize these targets, prepare careful, well-coordinated plans in advance. Some will be seized immediately after being uncovered by your advance while others will be seized while still under enemy control. Capturing targets located in enemy-

held territory involves special groups which infiltrate the target clandestinely or friendly guerrillas or agents working behind enemy lines.

f. **Employment Considerations**

As you recall, the specialist intelligence teams include CI teams, ITT, photo/imagery interpretation teams, and technical intelligence teams. Whether these teams are pooled at the LF level or whether they are assigned to subordinate units must be decided for each operation. The guideline is to get the most information in the least possible time. Whatever plan is used, there will be a need for close coordination between the LF and subordinate units, and between the G-2 and other staff officers.

SUMMARY

The intelligence officer is responsible for keeping all hands aware of the importance of CI. An effective training program is necessary in all units at all times and should be combined with intelligence indoctrination. CI operations are essential in all phases of combat to ensure the security of your forces and to achieve the element of surprise. Both active and passive measures should be used to destroy the enemy's intelligence effort, secure information against espionage, prevent subversion of your personnel, and to guard your bases and equipment from sabotage. An effective CI effort surprises the enemy and creates success for your forces. Without it, you can expect an ambush or trap, excessive casualties, and resultant failure.

Source refers to the actual person, activity, or thing from which desired intelligence information is obtained. In other words, you must exploit a source. This is accomplished by a collection agency which is any unit, person, or means that can obtain this information for you. Good reconnaissance and effective surveillance plans are part of collecting information. It is up to the intelligence officer to see that agencies obtain the needed information. Quite often he needs a lot of patience and more than a little tact in getting this done. Personal attention to each assignment is required of the G-2/S-2 if he is to get his information on time.

CHAPTER 4 EXERCISE: Answer items 1 through 8 by circling the letter or filling in the blanks to indicate the best answer. Check your responses against those listed at the end of this chapter.

Below is a list of intelligence responsibilities (Num. I-IV), use this list to answer item #1.

I Determination of intelligence requirements for planning by the LF
II Preparation of intelligence studies which relate to the mission and area of operations
III Establishment of a Target Information Center (TIC)
IV Preparation and distribution of an intelligence annex to the LF operation plan

1. Which intelligence responsibilities belong to the CATF?

a. I, II
b. II, III
c. III, IV
d. IV, I

2. Which collection agencies are organic to committed major FMF commands?

a. Force Reconnaissance Company, Marine Observation Squadron, SEAL teams, and intelligence teams.
b. Intelligence specialist teams, Marine Observation Squadron, Marine Photographic Squadron, Force Reconnaissance Company, and Division Reconnaissance Battalion.
c. Marine Photographic Squadron, Marine Observation Squadron, Interrogator-Translator Teams, and Division Communication Company.
d. Division Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Attack Squadron, Marine Observation Squadron, intelligence specialist teams, SEAL teams, and Force Reconnaissance Company.

3. What general types of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance are available to the Marine commander?

a. Radar, electromagnetic, and photographic
b. Deep electronic, visual route, and area photo reconnaissance
c. Visual, multisensor imagery, and electronic
d. Deep area search and route reconnaissance

4. Which of the following will conduct most pre-D-day reconnaissance in an amphibious operation?

a. Amphibious reconnaissance
b. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance
c. Force reconnaissance elements infiltrated by parachute
d. Periscope photography

5. The purpose of the JIC is to collect, _____ and _____ intelligence to the commands of the ATF and interested agencies.

a. update...disseminate
b. process...disseminate
c. summarize...process
d. prepare...process

6. **Which of the following is an automated shipboard tactical intelligence system that can be used to store and retrieve tactical information in support of intelligence analysis?**

a. MAGIS
b. CESM
c. NIPS
d. ASIS

7. **Which of the following is a subsystem of NIPS and is used primarily to continue support to the LF and ashore?**

a. SACC
b. CESM
c. SSES
d. MAGIS

8. **Which squadron contains the primary aerial multisensor imagery capability of the Marine Corps?**

a. VMAQ
b. VMO
c. VMFP
d. VMCJ

Chapter 4 Exercise Solutions

Question	Answer	Reference
1.	b.	4103
2.	b.	4306
3.	c.	4404
4.	b.	4404
5.	b.	4201(a)
6.	c.	4206(d)
7.	d.	4206(d)
8.	c.	4306(d)

CHAPTER 5

NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 1.5 hours

SCOPE: Includes factors which influence the conduct of amphibious operations in an NBC environment, characteristics of an NBC battlefield, use of NBC weapons, command responsibility, and nuclear and chemical defense considerations.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, you will be able to:

1. List the four factors which impact on the conduct of an amphibious assault in an NBC environment.
2. State the two dominant tactical factors used to decrease vulnerability in an NBC environment.
3. List the six major characteristics of an NBC battlefield.
4. Identify the three responsibilities of the CATF with regard to the employment of NBC weapons.
5. Identify the three responsibilities of the CLF with regard to the employment of NBC weapons.
6. Identify the NBC defense responsibilities of the CLF.
7. List the five active defense measures against NC attack.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Chapter 5

COMPLETE: Chapter 5 Exercise

CHAPTER 5

SECTION I. NBC CONSIDERATIONS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

5101. INTRODUCTION

During World War I, both the German and allied armies used chemical weapons. These weapons accounted for 2 million wounded or dead. During the Geneva Convention in 1925, the major powers agreed to prohibit the use of chemical weapons in future wars. In 1945, the atomic bomb was used against Japan. There have been no treaties established to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons (proliferation and tests; yes). The Soviet Union and some smaller Soviet aligned countries can employ Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons against the NATO countries. Many strategists predict that NBC weapons will play some role in any major conflict between NATO and the WARSAW PACT. If the Marine Corps is to fight and survive in this environment, the commander and his staff must know the uses and effects of NBC weapons, and take them into consideration when planning an amphibious operation.

5102. IMPACT ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

a. **Four Critical Factors of an NBC Environment**

Enemy NBC weapons systems exert an intense influence on the conduct of amphibious operations. The increase in combat power gained from these weapons is tremendous. The result of an engagement can be determined in far less time than would otherwise be required. Special measures are required to reduce the vulnerability of friendly forces, installations, and civilian populations in an active NBC environment. There are four factors that impact on amphibious operations in an NBC environment.

(1) **Doctrine.** Marine Corps doctrine for conducting amphibious operations in an NBC environment evolved out of the crucible of general war. World War II ended with the advent of primitive nuclear weapons, which were used strategically. Nerve gases were not a universal weapons resource, and the one belligerent which had developed these advanced chemicals did not employ them.

(2) **Tactics.** There are no universally observable organizational or procedural solutions to the tactical problem of existing in an environment of incoming kiloton nuclear weapons and heavy concentrations of chemical agents.

(3) **Disorder and Uncertainty.** Disorder and uncertainty will undoubtedly dominate any engagement involving the use of NBC weapons.

(4) **Advanced Concepts.** Technical progress in developing new amphibious ships, landing craft, and concepts of employment, enhances ATF control, mobility, and flexibility during the ship-to-shore operation. This progress offsets some of the problems encountered with NBC hazards in the AOA.

b. **Mobility, Flexibility and Control.** Current amphibious concepts reflect continual change to overcome the effects of NBC weapons on the amphibious operation. Improvements in ship design and assault craft have enhanced the chances of the LF reaching initial objectives. The vital need for dispersion of amphibious shipping has resulted in the sea echelon concept.

(1) **Amphibious Shipping.** The speed of new amphibious shipping is a defensive means. Ships maintain speed and dispersion, which reduce their vulnerability to an NBC attack. Dispersed amphibious ships rapidly congregate and deploy an LF and disperse again.

(a) Dispersion is one of the most important NBC defensive considerations at sea and ashore. Modern fast moving ships are deployed over wide areas where they provide small, less profitable NBC targets to the enemy. LF units and equipment are spread-loaded among the ships to minimize losses.

(b) Embarked troops and equipment below decks of amphibious shipping are protected from the effects of an NBC attack. The initial effects from a nuclear detonation do not significantly damage personnel and equipment unless the ship sustains extensive damage. NBC readiness conditions aboard ships reduce any contamination hazard to embarked troops.

(c) Decontamination equipment aboard ships reduces the hazards of persistent chemical and residual nuclear contamination on weather decks and allow the safe debarkation of troops and supplies.

(2) **Assault Craft.** The Marine Corps' current concept of amphibious assault places primary emphasis on helicopter assault techniques to rapidly deploy large numbers of troops from dispersed ships. Surface assault in landing crafts air cushion (LCAC) and covered amphibious vehicles launched underway complement vertical assault as required.

(a) Landing craft and transport helicopters are separated to the maximum extent possible. The speed of the modern landing craft and helicopters increases the defensive capability of the LF and reduces its vulnerability.

(b) Modern amphibious vehicles withstand 10-foot surf heights that may be caused by a surface or underwater nuclear detonation. During the assault, personnel embarked in assault vehicles receive some protection from the thermal and nuclear radiation effects of a detonation.

(c) Individual helicopters deploy rapidly from widely dispersed ships. Distances between flights of helicopters are maintained to reduce friendly unit vulnerability. In this manner, the LF can deploy into varied landing sites while maintaining flexible degrees of dispersion.

(3) **Sea Echelon Concept.** This concept reduces the concentration of amphibious shipping in the transport area to minimize losses due to enemy attack by mass destruction weapons. The sea echelon area is an area seaward of a transport area from which assault shipping is phased into the transport area and to which assault shipping withdraws from the transport area.

(4) **Seaborne Mobile Logistic System (SMLS).** This operational concept features the projecting forces ashore from the sea without the attendant large scale logistic buildup ashore. Logistic support functions are kept at sea, ideally in specifically designed, mission-oriented ships.

c. **Ships-to-Shore Movement.** The amphibious concept emphasizes mobility, flexibility, and control. It highlights the defensive projection demands of the amphibious operation in an NBC environment. During the movement from ship to shore, troops are especially vulnerable in the NBC environment. Effective countermeasures are required.

d. **Nuclear Warfare Centers.** The nuclear warfare centers are the task force unit's means of controlling ship-to-shore dispersion. Shipboard NBC centers initially respond to nuclear attacks by plotting ground zeros to provide a basis for considering further assault movement. The CLF uses control centers set up by FMF NBC units in COCs ashore to accomplish like tasks.

5103. BATTLEFIELD CHARACTERISTICS

Just as the impact of NBC warfare radically influences amphibious shipping procedures up through the assault phase, the impact of NBC warfare on FMF operations ashore radically affects the manner in which tactical air-ground operations are executed. An understanding of the tactical NBC battlefield environment is a prerequisite to understanding FMF operational doctrine.

a. **Dominant Factors.** Efforts to survive NBC attacks by enemy and friendly use of Nuclear and Chemical (NC) weapons dictate battlefield tactics. The vulnerability of personnel and installations in an NBC environment is sharply increased. The measures required to counter increased vulnerability provide the principal identifying characteristics of NBC warfare.

(1) **Dispersion.** To offset their vulnerability, forces operating ashore in an NBC environment must be dispersed to minimize presenting heavy concentrations to an enemy attack.

(2) **Mobility.** In the NBC environment, FMF forces must also be highly mobile to reduce vulnerability. The requirement to avoid contaminated areas through rapid traverse or evacuation operations adds an additional mobility dimension to conventional tactical movement. Tactical reserves also require increased mobility because of their position well to the rear or afloat (up to 25 nautical miles offshore).

b. **Nuclear Battlefield Characteristics.** The impact of nuclear warfare on the modern battlefield rests primarily on with the increased combat power that nuclear weapons provide. Nuclear battlefield characteristics include the following:

(1) **Radiation Casualties.** FMF units will suffer significant casualties due to radiation exposure.

(2) **Special Protective Measures.** Combinations of dispersion, movement, concealment, and shielding are required to survive nuclear attacks.

(3) **Limited Duration.** Tactical nuclear conflict will probably be of limited duration. The initial phase of a tactical nuclear battle is the most destructive. Subsequent phases are characterized by the antagonists continuing to seek nuclear dominance.

(4) **Nuclear Fires.** Nuclear fires dominate the battlefield. Every FMF troop unit, especially tank, motorized, and artillery units, is subject to nuclear fires.

(5) **Alternate Facilities.** In a tactical nuclear conflict, preserving the means for command and control is essential. Headquarters units are priority targets. Plans for retaining command and control when primary headquarters units are destroyed must be considered.

(6) **Tempo of Operations.** The combination of nuclear firepower and increased mobility significantly accelerates the tempo of operations. Engagements are of shorter duration and are characterized by extreme violence. Deep, decisive objectives are sought, causing the battle to be waged in great depth.

c. **Chemical Battlefield Characteristics.** The characteristics of the chemical battlefield which most affect FMF operations ashore are the following:

(1) Requirements for individual and unit protective equipment and the limitations to communications, control, and movement imposed by equipment.

(2) Need for extensive nonconventional technical equipment to detect chemical agents and to decontaminate personnel, equipment, and terrain.

(3) Denial of terrain in the objective area due to contamination.

(4) Psychological effects due to the insidiousness of gas attacks and the long enforced isolation of masked individuals.

SECTION II. EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

5201. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

NC weapons use is part of overall fire support planning. NC firepower supplements and may, under certain circumstances, largely replace conventional firepower. Command responsibility for planning NC fires during amphibious operations rests with the CATF and the CLF.

a. **CATF Responsibilities.** The CATF is responsible for the following:

(1) **Preparing the NC weapons fire plans.** He is also responsible for allocating the available NC weapons to meet the needs of all forces assigned to the ATF and for establishing the level of reserve weapons.

(2) **Planning the assignment of NC weapons**, including their component parts, to the various ships of the task force. In conjunction with the CLF, he makes plans to move nuclear weapons ashore when the tactical situation requires.

(3) **Preparing and disseminating signal instructions related to NC weapons** employment, to include communication codes used in the amphibious operation.

b. **CLF Responsibilities.** The CLF is responsible for planning for the NC weapons support of troop operations ashore including the **selection of targets** fired on and the **timing of these fires in relation to troop operations.** He is responsible for planning for the **security, maintenance, and movement of NC weapons displaced ashore.** After determining his requirements, the CLF presents them to the CATF. They include the following:

(1) Target priority list.

(2) A detailed plan for each target to include type, number, timing, and method of delivery if prearranged NC weapons are used with yields, ground zeros, and burst heights for nuclear weapons, and concentrations and agents for chemical weapons.

(3) Type and number of on-call and reserve weapons desired.

5202. NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS

a. **Initiating Directive.** The initiating directive provides the basis from which the CLF's staff begins planning for the advent of NBC warfare during the amphibious operation. Besides giving the CATF a mission and an AOA, it also identifies the likelihood of enemy employment of NBC weapons. Based on the initiating directive and the CATF's guidance, the CLF then develops a concept of operations based on the mission, the AOA, and the likelihood of an NBC attack.

b. **Concept of Operation.** NBC defense must be considered in developing the concept of operations. The concept of operations includes the overall plan for the landing. The probability of NBC warfare plays a very significant role in formulating the concept. Each of these decisions, the LF's mobility, flexibility, and control impacts upon the final outcome.

c. **Basic NBC Decisions**

(1) The intelligence effort plays a key role. Intelligence must determine the capabilities and intentions of the enemy to use NBC weapons during the assault. That intelligence will enable the commander to select adequate beachheads.

(2) Beachheads in an NBC environment will need to be larger to ensure the continuous landing of troops and equipment with enough dispersion to minimize the effects of an NBC attack. There is no doctrinal solution to the question of *How large a Beachhead?* In addition to beachheads, this type of intelligence alerts the ground commander to the NBC protection (individual and unit) necessary, and the requirement for additional medical supplies and decontamination materials.

(3) The number of landing beaches and LZs in an NBC environment is increased to include multiple beaches and zones to allow the necessary dispersion and rapid build-up of forces ashore.

(4) The date and hour of landing is affected if either side uses NC weapons. If advance force operations are supported by NC weapons, the LF exploits the immediate effects of the weapons and avoids the residual effects.

(5) During troop embarkation, forces should be spread loaded to avoid loss of entire units if a ship is lost.

(6) For the ATF, assault plans call for rapid dispersion after the objective is secured. The massed forces disperse to avoid becoming a lucrative nuclear target.

(7) The operation is usually terminated after completing the mission, according to the conditions contained in the initiating directive. However, even though the CLF may be established ashore, he must rely on the CATF for certain NBC considerations. These considerations must be examined before terminating the mission.

Before terminating the operation, there must be a centralizing of all active defense measures in the AOA. The CATF must protect the LF from nuclear strike by surface ship or submarine. The unit commander can consider down-grading his mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level, but only commensurate with the threat. The CATF's nuclear warfare control center afloat must provide early warning of NBC attacks, contamination predictions and a plan for rescue and salvage operations. The requirement for the evacuation of mass casualties must be considered. The last requirement is for sea based logistics, and the relay of communications during an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) blackout period.

d. **Unchanging Principles of War.** In the conduct of war, even NBC warfare, you are guided by fundamental principles governing the conduct of war and the decisions that are made. The principles of war do not change with the employment of NBC weapons. Certainly the degree to which different principles are applied changes, but no new principles are added, and certainly none are deleted. You need to remember that the most critical time during which the principles of war are evaluated and altered is at that point when conventional warfare ends and NBC warfare begins.

e. **Transition and Timing of NBC Operations.** Nuclear warfare can develop as a result of a planned response from conventional warfare or from an attempt to limit a conflict. To make the transition less damaging to the conduct of operations, contingencies are developed to cover each phase of the operation. Specifically, prepare contingency plans in the event NBC weapons are used.

(1) **Before embarkation.** Complete the NBC appendix to the operation order or the intelligence summary for enemy intention. Issue adequate protective and detection means. Continue troop indoctrination on immediate actions and effects and equipment uses.

(2) **While enroute to objective area.** Indoctrinate on effects and immediate action; complete issue, of protective equipment. NBC control center must tie in with the CATFs nuclear warfare center afloat.

(3) **During the ship-to-shore movement.** Review communication contingency plans for employment; ensure that the field commanders can communicate with the CATF's nuclear warfare center for NBC information on hazard limits.

(4) **During operations ashore.** Use NBC teams; know alternate command plans; establish aid/decontamination stations; implement dispersal plans.

(5) **Not Used.** Marines indoctrinated on effects and immediate actions. Protective equipment available immediately in supply train.

If you don't consider the impact of NC weapons, you may suffer unnecessary loss of combat assets, needless expenditure of time to achieve the goal, and possible devastation of the ATF.

f. **Mission.** The mission is influenced by nuclear weapons employment early in the amphibious assault. The CLF is involved with decisions on the use of nuclear weapons early in the planning phase of operations. For instance, the CATF and the CLF could have a shared mission or mission oriented task. Submarines launching cruise missiles or strike aircraft could also use nuclear weapons during advance force operations.

g. **Landing Force Vulnerability.** In determining the scheme of maneuver based on the massive use of nuclear weapons rather than on the maneuver of forces, the CLF considers the ability of his force to recover from a counterattack by enemy forces. The analysis of friendly vulnerability always assumes worst case situations. Helicopters are susceptible to blast effects. Dispersion commensurate with the size of the weapon, timing and the target are of primary concern. An RLT concentrated in a small area is a likely target for a single warhead. However, even dispersion does not completely negate the possibility of an attack using multiple small yield weapons.

h. **Level of Loss.** Mission is the overriding consideration in the CLFs decision making process. He must consider the level of loss or the casualty estimate when determining the scheme of maneuver. The nature of the threat also impacts--nuclear or chemical. If the number of casualties exceeds the planning guidance, it could render the LF incapable of completing the assigned task.

i. **Naval and Air Superiority.** To ensure the success of the amphibious assault, naval superiority over surface and submarine forces must be achieved. Combined with a preponderance of air power this forms the basis for ATF success. The ATF must have relative security from attack by forces outside the AOA.

j. **Task Organization**. Each factor is considered: dispersion, mobility, and flexibility-all effect task organization. Operations tend to be decentralized and performed by small units acting semi-independently on mission type orders. Further, these forces are not employed to gain the initiative, but to exploit it. Finally, all units must have personnel trained in NBC defense to provide the commander with information and recommend an alternate course of action in an NBC environment. Do not allow your NBC team personnel or officer/NCO in charge to get rusty. Make sure you task them in exercises, inspect their equipment and warehouse. Provide scenarios for them to get an idea of the physical limits and time constraints.

5203. PLANNING SEQUENCE

The initiating directive to the CATF formally initiates planning for the employment of NC weapons. Based on the guidance provided in the initiating directive, NC weapons support is planned as follows:

(1) Troops requirements are determined.

(2) Naval requirements are determined.

(3) The CATF consolidates the troop and naval requirements. Based on consolidated requirements, the number of NC weapons required to support the operation is determined. The troop requirements are approved and incorporated in the ATF NC fire plans. The CATF may request additional NC weapons if those provided do not satisfy the support requirements. If higher authority cannot make more NC weapons available, the CATF, in consultation with the CLF, adjusts plans accordingly.

(4) After the final allocation of NC weapons, the CATF designates the method of delivery used for each prearranged weapon and specifies the authority for using weapons on targets of opportunity.

(5) When a commander outside the ATF delivers NC weapons, the CATF provides him with the essential information involved in the specific delivery. Both commanders then prepare detailed plans.

5204. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The conditions under which NC weapons may be employed are indicated in the initiating directive for the amphibious operation and in other guidance provided by higher authority. When appropriate and when not prohibited by higher authority, the CATF may delegate the authority to use NC weapons. The specific conditions of this delegation must be defined.

Major considerations in planning for NC weapons employment are: weapon supply measures, selection of targets, selection of weapons, delivery means, coordination measures required for timely delivery and safety of friendly troops, and the effect of residual contamination on present and future operations.

5205. SELECTION OF TARGETS

The initial step in NC fire planning is determining the targets, their nature, configuration, and location on the ground.

a. **Preliminary Target Evaluation.** Make a preliminary target evaluation before selecting a target. Determine its suitability for attack by NC weapons and the extent of required damage. The requirements of the operation are the governing considerations in evaluating and selecting targets.

b. **Target Analysis.** Following the foregoing evaluation, make an analysis of each selected target. Study information on the enemy, terrain, and weather and determine the following for each target:

(1) **Nuclear Weapons.** Type and yield of weapon, height of required bursts, preferred means of delivery, time of delivery, number of weapons per target, and predicted effects on target and areas adjacent to the target.

(2) **Chemical Weapons.** Type of weapons and agents, required burst height or spray line release attitude, preferred means of delivery, time of delivery, number of weapons per target, and predicted effects on the target and areas adjacent to the target.

(3) When the various selected targets are analyzed, they are compared and a relative priority for their attack is determined.

5206. SELECTION OF WEAPONS AND DELIVERY MEANS

The factors which govern the selection of NC weapons and delivery means for any particular situation are as follows:

(1) Availability of weapons, including the number and types of weapons allocated for a particular operation, and time and space factors.

(2) Method of delivery, including aircraft, guided missiles, rockets, artillery, and naval gunfire. Each of these provides a variation in accuracy of delivery, magnitude of burst (nuclear weapons), area coverage (chemical weapons), range, and all weather capability.

(3) The target, classified by type, composition, location, size, vulnerability, value, and degree of importance.

(4) Weather and topographic conditions.

(5) Safety of friendly forces.

5207. TIMING OF ATTACK ON TARGETS

a. **Prearranged Fires.** NC fire plans provide for prearranged fire support. These fires are normally against fixed targets within the beachhead, fixed targets within the AOA, and are fires required to control the enemy reinforcing capability. The delivery of such fires in support of the LF must be timed to maintain the element of surprise; if practical, to support the scheme of maneuver; and to ensure the safety of friendly forces. In the event of nondetonation, a low order detonation (nuclear fires), or miss by a prearranged weapon, deliver another weapon or weapons without delay. Prearranged fire plans therefore include provision for standby reserve weapons ready for immediate delivery.

(1) **Pre-D-Day Prearranged Fries.** Surprise may be forfeited by using NC weapons during pre-D-day operations. However, such attacks may be warranted in the following situations:

(a) Existing enemy dispositions offer a concentrated and lucrative target.

(b) Low air, surface, or subsurface nuclear weapons are necessary to destroy certain hard targets.

(c) Chemical weapons are required to establish a barrier before D-day. The characteristics of the chemical agent and the terrain and weather where the barrier is established determine the required pre-D-day delivery time.

(d) Time and space factors or the fires against the enemy reinforcing capability preclude the enemy's ability to reinforce or react effectively.

(2) **D-Day Prearranged Fires**

(a) **Nuclear Fires.** Using nuclear weapons in D-day preparations may be advantageous when destruction over a wide area is required, when pre-D-day preparations are not used, when destruction must be accomplished in minimum time, or when simultaneous destruction of several targets is a priority.

(b) **Chemical Fires.** Using chemical weapons in D-day preparations may be advantageous when large area coverage is required, the target is ill defined, closed spaces must be penetrated, installations must be spared, and variations in effects from incapacitation to death are desirable.

b. **Targets of Opportunity.** Targets for NC attack may be available and profitable for short periods of time. The ability to attack such targets of opportunity depends on the following:

(1) Timely discovery of the target.

(2) Rapid and accurate analysis of the target.

(3) Authority and capability for NC weapons employment vested in the lowest practical echelon.

(4) Suitable NC weapons available in the ATF.

(5) Maintenance of NC weapons in an advanced state of readiness.

(6) Availability of rapid delivery means.

(7) An effective system for requesting, approving, and coordinating NC fire support.

c. **Planning Priorities.** Plans may include assigning priorities to certain important areas such as avenues of approach to the beach or helicopter LZs, open flanks, and potential assembly areas (AA) for armored units. This facilitates the delivery of fire on targets of opportunity. Specific provision should also be made in plans for target of opportunity responsibilities and authority for designated troop commanders. Such use of NC weapons is coordinated with other fires of friendly forces.

5208. CONTENT OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL FIRE PLANS

The nuclear fire plan usually is a separate document with appropriate portions included in other plans such as naval gunfire, artillery, air, and fire support coordination plans. The chemical fire plan also is a separate document similar in scope to the nuclear fire plan.

a. **Nuclear Fire Support.** The nuclear fire plan contains instructions on the nuclear support of the ATF. The basic plan indicates nuclear fire support provided by elements outside the ATF, delineates the concept of nuclear support, and assigns nuclear delivery tasks to elements of the ATF. This may include procedures for attacking targets of opportunity.

b. **Chemical Fire Support.** The chemical fire plan is similar to the nuclear fire plan. It contains information on the chemical fire support for the ATF. The basic plan indicates the chemical fire support which is provided by elements outside the ATF, delineates the concept of chemical fire support, and assigns fire support tasks to ATF elements.

SECTION III. DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

5301. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

Defense against NBC weapons includes a combination of intelligence on enemy capabilites and limitations, detection, and destruction of his delivery systems, and defense measures which reduce the effect of enemy NBC weapons.

a. **CATF.** The CATF is responsible for planning overall NBC defense for the ATF.

b. **CLF.** The CLF is responsible for determining and prescribing the active and passive NBC defense measures which the LF requires. He then presents the CATF with those requirements for active defense measures which other forces should provide.

5302. PREPARATION OF THE NBC DEFENSE PLAN

Operation plans include provisions for active and passive defense against NBC weapons. The factors that you must consider in planning for defense against NBC weapons include the following:

a. **Active Defense.** In general, the active protective measures used in defense against enemy attack are implemented as follows:

(1) Employ NC or conventional weapons to eliminate the enemy NC capabilities.

(2) Destroy enemy launch sites.

(3) Increase air defense measures.

(4) Increase air and ground reconnaissance.

(5) Increase communications security measures including the use of countermeasures.

b. **Passive Defense.** Passive protective measures used against other weapons give only partial protection against NBC weapons. Greater emphasis must be placed on unit separation, dispersion, mobility, warning systems, detection systems, and decontamination systems. Increased mobility during the ship-to-shore movement allows for greater unit separation and provides for greater passive defense against NBC weapons. In addition, provisions are made for the following items:

(1) Training and indoctrination of personnel.

(2) Individual protection.

(3) Collective protection.

(4) Distribution of trained NBC defense personnel.

(5) Decontamination of personnel, equipment, supplies, and terrain.

(6) Adequate air radiological monitoring system.

(7) Creation of NBC salvage units.

(8) Plans for handling mass casualties, including employment of mass evacuation units.

c. **Special Provisions for the Ship-to-Shore Movement.** Prepare plans to cover the required action if, during the ship-to-shore movement, the enemy attacks the ATF with NBC weapons, which result in any of all of the following:

(1) Contamination of beach or LZ.

(2) Loss of part of the force and corresponding requirements for alteration of the tactical plans or for unit replacement.

(3) Mass casualties requiring immediate attention.

5303. CONDUCT OF NBC DEFENSE

Effective conduct of an NBC defense requires that each appropriate naval commander establish a NBC defense center. Each appropriate troop commander must also assign responsibilities for NBC defense to his staff. These agencies perform the following functions for their respective commanders:

a. Collection, recording, and elevation of monitoring and casualty data.

b. Control of monitoring teams.

c. Supervision of decontamination installations.

d. Advise commanders on NBC defense matters including the determination of ground zero, the execution of special ship-to-shore movement provisions, and rescue and salvage operations.

e. Analysis of friendly positions and areas.

SUMMARY

You have studied the four factors that impact on amphibious operations in an NBC environment. The CATF and the CLF seek to employ their force against a weak point of the enemy. They also try to employ these forces without resorting to nuclear weapons and to prevent or deter the enemy from using the same types of weapons. Both the CATF and the CLF can employ the forces and weapons necessary to successfully complete the mission on the conventional or the NBC battlefield. Early consideration of NBC warfare planning can ensure that the amphibious operation is a success.

CHAPTER 5 EXERCISE: Answer items 1 through 7 by filling in the blanks with the correct answer. Check your answers with those located at the end of the chapter exercise.

1. **What are the four factors which influence the conduct of an amphibious operation?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

2. **What are the two tactical factors used to minimize vulnerability in an NBC environment?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

3. **What are the six major characteristics of an NBC battlefield?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

   f. _____

4. **What are the three command responsibilities of the CATF in dealing with the employment of NC weapons?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

5. **What are the three responsibilities of the CLF with regard to the employment of NC weapons?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

6. **What are the CLF's NBC defense responsibilities?**

   _____

   _____

7. **What are the five active defensive measures used against nuclear and chemical attack?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

Chapter 5 Exercise Solutions

Question		Answer	Reference
1.	a.	Doctrine	5102a
	b.	Tactics	
	c.	Disorder and Uncertainty	
	d.	Advanced Concepts	
2.	a.	Dispersion	5103a
	b.	Mobility	
3.	a.	Radiation Casualties	5103b
	b.	Special Protective Measures	
	c.	Limited Duration	
	d.	Nuclear Fires	
	e.	Alternate Facilities	
	f.	Tempo of Operations	
4.	a.	Preparation of NC weapons fire plans.	5201a
	b.	Assignment of NC weapons to ships of the ATF	
	c.	Preparation and dissemination of signal instructions related to NC weapons	
5.	a.	Selection of targets	5201b
	b.	Timing of fires in relation to troop movements	
	c.	Security, maintenance, and movement of NC weapons displaced ashore	
6.	a.	Determining and prescribing the active and passive NBC defense measures required for the LF.	5301b
7.	a.	Employ nuclear, chemical, or conventional weapons to eliminate the enemy NC capabilities	5302a
	b.	Destroy enemy launch sites	
	c.	Increase air defense measures	
	d.	Increase air and ground reconnaissance	
	e.	Increase communications security measures	

CHAPTER 6

SOVIET DEFENSE OF A COASTLINE

ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT: 2 hours

SCOPE: Includes basic principles of coastal defense, characteristics of the reserve, chemical defense, Soviet positioning, factors influencing coastal defense, and underwater obstacles.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon completion of this chapter, the student will be able to:

1. Identify the five basic principles of a Soviet coastal defense.
2. Identify the four factors influencing coastal defense.
3. Identify where the Soviets place underwater and surface obstacles.
4. Identify the weapons system's capabilities that the Soviets use in the defense of a coastline.

ASSIGNMENT

STUDY: Chapter 6

COMPLETE: Chapter 6 Exercise

CHAPTER 6

SOVIET DEFENSE OF A COASTLINE

6101. INTRODUCTION

Historically there are only two ways to defend against an amphibious assault: a mobile or a static defense. Static defenses are typified by fortified fixed positions on the beach with prepared reserve and counterattack plans. This form is expensive in manpower and equipment, and has never been successful in doing anything other than delaying the LF. The solid defense is typified by few positions on the beach, but with strong counterattack forces somewhat behind the beach. The Soviets recognize both of these and prefer the mobile defense. For key positions, they're willing to expend the efforts to prepare a defense. In Soviet doctrine these defenses is merely *variations on a theme.* Mobile defense is merely a variation on tank heavy mobile operations, and static defense a foreshortened standard defense.

6102. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF COASTAL DEFENSE

a. **Coastal Defense Doctrine.** The Soviets have written a coastal defense doctrine that was originally developed to protect the flanks of the Warsaw Pact alliance during a conflict with NATO. This doctrine has now been applied with new emphasis on the naval chokepoints around the world. Key areas the Soviets are interested in controlling are the naval chokepoints that could bottle up their four fleets and U.S. shipping routes that deliver oil from the Persian Gulf.

b. **Soviet Coastal Defense Principles**

(1) **Engage at Long Range to Destroy the Enemy in Water.** This includes not only the weapons organic to the motorized rifle limits that are physically defending the beach but also all naval and air assets that can be brought to bear on the amphibious task force while it is in transit to the amphibious objective area.

(2) **Overlapping Crossfires just off the Beach.** Here, the emphasis is on the weapons organic to the forces. In actuality, the arrangement of forces in a coastal defense is not very different from that of forces conducting a normal defense in an inland area.

(3) **Extensive Use of Obstacles and Barriers.** Greater emphasis is placed on the use of obstacles and barriers in a coastal defense because through these means, the Soviets hope to hold the enemy in the water as long as possible, where he is most vulnerable, and destroy him with fire.

(4) **Push the Enemy Back Into the Sea.** If the enemy manages to land, a maximum effort will be made to literally push him back into the sea by bringing maximum firepower to bear, and launching a decisive counterattack before the enemy LF can establish itself firmly ashore.

(5) **Extensive Maneuver of Weapons and Manpower Behind the Beaches.** This last point is a recognition on the part of the Soviets that they cannot hope to enjoy a numerical superiority at every possible landing point. The coastal defense will therefore be much more active than the standard defenses, and numerical superiority will be achieved through the wide use of maneuvering weapons and manpower behind the beach. To achieve this, the Soviet defenses will be **deeply echeloned**, more so than in a normal defensive posture.

6103. SOVIET THREAT TO THE ATF

a. In figure 6-1, the maximum ranges of engagement for various weapon systems deployed by the Soviets are noted. Wherever possible, the Soviet commander will attempt to engage the enemy amphibious force at least 500 km away from the landing area. Realistically, the Soviets surface fleet, presently is probably no match for the U.S. Navy. Its real strength lies in its submarine fleet, which poses a serious threat. Other significant threats beyond 200 km consist mainly of air strikes by missile-carrying aircraft. Inside 200 km, the main threat is posed by cruise missiles, fixed-wing attack aircraft, attack helicopters, and surface-to-surface missiles.



Figure 6-1. Soviet Weapon Systems (Maximum Ranges).

b. Examples of this long-range threat include the Bear, Badger and Backfire bombers. An additional major threat to the ATF closure is the Soviet's vast array of submarines and coast defense guided missile boats. The air forces of the Theatre of Military Operations (TVD) will, whenever possible, be added to the attack.

c. Ground force surface-to-surface missiles like the Frog-7 should also be considered. Obvious problems for the Soviets exist in the areas of coordinating of all these capabilities and in selecting targets.

6104. FACTORS INFLUENCING COASTAL DEFENSE

a. **Distance of the Enemy from the Coast.** The distance of enemy forces from the coastline is a measure of how much time the Soviet commander has to prepare his defenses. It is also a measure of how much time he has to engage the enemy at long range and destroy him.

b. **Terrain.** Terrain considerations include both the land areas behind the beaches and the hydrography of the area. A detailed terrain analysis is conducted in order to establish the most probable landing areas so that defensive preparations can be prioritized and the time of landing predicted with some degree of accuracy.

c. **Road Network.** The road network has a strong influence on one of the principles of coastal defense--the use of maneuver of behind the beaches. The quality, location, and extent of roads in the area will all be carefully evaluated and integrated into the counterattack plans. Roads close to the beach area may be mined, and most of the important bridges prepared for demolition.

d. **Weather.** The most important impact of weather on the defense is be on observation. Inclement weather aids the insertion of enemy reconnaissance forces and increases the requirement for radar and other electronic surveillance devices.

6105. SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND RANGE CAPABILITIES

The Soviet armed forces have gone from the largest ground forces in the world, at the end of World War II, to the largest modern armed forces in the world with extensive offensive capability at sea. The old coastal defense was made up of submarines, coastal defense boats, and coastal reconnaissance aircraft. Modern defensive developments include newer coastal defense boats armed with new and improved missiles, increased aviation reconnaissance and aerial electronic capability of the Soviet submarine navy, and continuous evolution of the Soviet air-to-surface missiles such as the AS-1 thru the AS-10.

The following is a summary of the weapon systems and range capabilities that Soviets would use to defend a coastline.

a. **Soviet Strategic Assets**

(1) 375 submarines; cover entire shipping lanes from their home ports to the objective.

(2) 400 naval long-range bombers; cover up to 8,300 km from their airfield bases.

(3) 800 long-range bombers; here a secondary mission to strike naval targets with air-to-surface missiles.

b. **Other Soviet Naval and Aviation Threat Assets**

(1) **Eight Surface Naval Groups.** The composition of a typical surface naval group is shown below:

(a) 1 Kiev Class (major combatant with surface-to-surface, surface-to-air and antisub capabilities)

(b) 4 cruisers (surface-to-surface capable)

(c) 2 guided missile destroyers

(d) 2 antisubmarine ships (various types)

(2) **Additional Aviation Threat (Encountered 100-500 km from the objective)**

(a) Air strikes from front or army air assets

(b) Intermediate missiles, SS-20, SS-21, etc.

c. **Soviet Division Fire Support Assets**

(1) SS-2 - 120 km range (found only in coast defense division)

(2) Frog - 7 - 70 km range

(3) 130 mm artillery 27 km

(4) 152 mm artillery 30 km

(5) 122 mm (BM-21) MRL 20 km

(6) 122 mm Howitzers 15 km

(7) 120 mm Mortars 5.7 km

6106. SOVIET COASTAL DEFENSE

a. **Soviet Motorized Rifle Division**

(1) If sufficient forces are available, the Soviet motorized rifle division defends in two echelons. The width of the division sector is 20 to 30 km, and the depth is 15 to 20 km. The mission of the first echelon is to engage and repel enemy LFs as they approach the coast. The mission of the second echelon is to counterattack, to destroy enemy penetrations, to destroy airborne or heliborne assaults, or to reinforce or replace units in the

first echelon where required. The division commander usually maintains a reserve force, of battalion size. The tank regiment is held in depth to act as a counterattack force, or to react to enemy landings on the flank of the division's defensive positions.

(2) The Soviet commander has been taught to respects the value of artillery and plans its use effectively, overlapping similar weapon systems, and making sure the enemy can be systematically engaged by a wide variety of weapon systems. Redundancy is the key here. The end result should sound somewhat familiar - the enemy is engaged by an ever-increasing volume of fire as he closes on the beach. All weapon systems engage as soon as the enemy LF is within range.

b. **Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion**

(1) The motorized rifle battalion in defense of a coastline is normally organized into two echelons and defends an area up to 5 km wide and 2 km deep. In areas where a landing isn't anticipated, a motorized rifle battalion could be assigned a defensive sector up to 8 km wide and 5 km deep.

(2) Whenever a battalion is defends a primary sector in the first echelon, it will receive substantial reinforcements in the form of artillery, tanks, air defense, engineers, and chemical defense. In addition, the regimental artillery group and probably the divisional artillery group as well provide support. The motorized rifle battalion in the first echelon has substantial amount of combat power to repulse an amphibious assault.

(3) To provide a substantial defense in depth, the second echelon motorized rifle battalion is usually positioned behind the first echelon battalion located in the most threatened sector. As a rule, second echelon battalions are not reinforced. While they are in their positions, they are not normally a concentrated force. If tasked to conduct a counterattack, the regiment provides some reinforcement for that specific mission. As soon as the counterattack is over, the reinforcements are withdrawn to the regimenal level. The Soviets are fully aware that the U.S. Marine Corps routinely employs heliborne assaults.

(4) The first echelon battalion is usually task organized using both organic and attached assets. Most assets are assigned to the company in the most threatened sector. As far as reserve units are concerned, Soviet coastal defense doctrine calls for a larger reserve than would normally be found in a conventional defensive operation.

6107. COASTAL DEFENSE AS SET BY A SOVIET COMMANDER

a. Since WW II Soviet military doctrine has emphasized the possibility of combat in a nuclear environment. Therefore, it is not surprising that they would consider this in planning a coastal defense. They are well aware that there is not much they can do to protect their troops if nuclear weapons were used. Their main emphasis then, is on rapidly maneuvering troops and weapons to the threatened sector before the enemy can exploit the effects of the nuclear strike. The Soviets plan on having about 20 minutes to complete all their maneuvers before the first waves of the landing force arrive on the beach.

b. The Soviets are not particularly worried about this because their army is probably the best prepared in the world for chemical defense. They are perfectly willing to use chemical munitions in the defense of their coastline. The most probable time for employment of chemical munitions is right after the LF has reached the beach. There are several good reasons for this. First, the landing forces' protective clothing may be wet, and therefore not as effective. Second, the LF is relatively concentrated in a fairly small area which makes it a good target. Immediately after landing, the LF may be somewhat disorganized, and therefore susceptible to surprise. Finally, by inflicting substantial casualties with a surprise chemical attack on the initial assault elements, the Soviets can cause confusion and severely reduce the combat power of the LF. This makes it much easier to counterattack and destroy the enemy at the waters edge.

c. A Soviet commander would not wait to use chemical munitions if he had them available, and their use was authorized by higher headquarters. If the commander waited, the enemy would have the opportunity to move off the beach and obtain protection through dispersion. The Soviet commander's best shot is hitting the LF at its most vulnerable point - immediately after landing. Writing wouldn't be in accordance with their doctrine which requires 90% assurance of effectiveness for the employment of chemical strikes.

d. Since the Soviet commander is well aware of our use of helicopters in amphibious operations he would carefully consider his area of responsibility with that capability in mind. The most probable LZs are most likely under observation and booby trapped. They are minimally targeted for indirect fire systems and considered in placing the reserve and second echelon. A Soviet commander also plans for counterattack forces against a heliborne force. He also takes measures to frustrate reconnaissance efforts.

e. The forward security element is established at the battalion level right on the beach to detect and destroy reconnaissance elements as they attempt to collect information on the beach, its obstacles, and the Soviets positions. The security element will be withdrawn into the second echelon just before the enemy landing. While it's in position, this platoon sized force will conduct patrols in the battalions area of responsibility, supported by the battalion's indirect fire assets--which could include a battery of 120 mm mortars and a battery of howitzers.

f. The Soviet commander routinely conducts active reconnaissance activities. An active patrol program is established to ferret out any reconnaissance teams placed ashore.

g. A Soviet battalion routinely prepares extensive positions whenever in the defense. In the coastal defense, many of the fighting positions are unoccupied until the naval gunfire lifts. Soldiers are in protected positions whenever possible. The depth and relative degree of fortification is a function of the time the Soviets have to prepare the positions. Remember that the Soviets motorized rifle division has an extensive engineering capability and that it will be used on the most threatened or highest value sectors.

h. The battalion commander plans his fire support in great detail with special emphasis on the creation of defense fire zones called *fire sacks*. These serve two purposes: to channelize and to destroy. The Soviet commander places heavy emphasis on his direct fire and antitank defenses. Whenever possible, barriers and obstacles will be covered by fire.

6108. TYPICAL SOVIET UNDERWATER OBSTACLES

a. **Categories.** The Soviets generally use two types of obstacles to prevent or hinder amphibious assaults: explosive and nonexplosive. Explosive obstacles are considered more effective, but are more easily neutralized by the enemy, so whenever time permits both types are installed. Additional time is required because of the difficulty of installing a system of heavy permanent obstacles. On the other hand, these heavier obstacles are more resistant to the effects of sea water and tides. They can usually withstand the effects of bombing and artillery fires and are very hard to remove by trawling or dragging.

b. **Belts.** Generally, underwater obstacles are established in three belts.

(1) **First Belt.** The first belt is found in water up to 15 meters in depth. Submerged naval mines, antisubmarine nets, anchored rafts, and even sunken ships are found here. The purpose of this belt is to prevent large landing ships from approaching near the coastline. Anchored rafts are not much of an obstacle, but they have lights on them which can be seen from the shore and are used to adjust artillery fires.

(2) **Second Belt.** The second belt is in shallower water, from 5 to 1 1/2 meters deep. This barrier has concrete blocks, metal hedgehogs, rock piles, and various barbed wire entanglements. This barrier is designed to stop amphibious personnel carriers, tanks, and personnel from reaching the beach.

(3) **Third Belt.** The third belt of obstacles is located on the beach itself. This belt includes mines, barbed wire, and various antitank obstacles. It is designed to frustrate the LF which actually reaches the beach by hindering movement off the beach and canalizing the assault force into fire sacks.

If the enemy LF lands on the beach itself, the Soviets try to hold it at the waterline with an extensive system of obstacles and barriers. The longer the enemy can be held at the waterline, the more susceptible he is to destruction by firepower and a decisive counterattack.

SUMMARY

Remember that the Soviets have an excellent capability to lay minefields and prepare barricades and positions. Soviet coastal defense doctrine is comprehensive and effective, but also has weaknesses. Command observation posts (COP), barriers, system of fire, insufficient forces, lack of security zone, predictable tactics--the key point is not to give the Soviets time to arrange their defenses in detail! These weaknesses can be exploited, and the principles of amphibious warfare, properly applied, can produce a successful landing against a Soviet defense, just as they produced successful landings in the past.

CHAPTER 6 EXERCISE: Answer items 1 through 6 by filling in the spaces provided or by circling the correct answer. Solutions are located on the following page.

1. **What are the five basic principles of coastal defense?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

   e. _____

2. **What are the four factors of influencing coastal defense?**

   a. _____

   b. _____

   c. _____

   d. _____

From the list below select the main threat to the ATF within 200 km of the landing area; then answer question #3.

I Surface fleet
II Cruise and surface-to-surface missiles
III Submarines
IV Fixed and rotary wing aircraft

3. **Which of the following are a threat to the ATF within 200 km of the landing area?**

   a. I + II
   b. I + III
   c. II + IV
   d. III + IV

4. **The first belt of obstacles is found in water up to _____ in depth.**

5. **The second belt of obstacles is found in water from _____ deep.**

6. **The third belt of obstacles is found _____.**

Chapter 6 Exercise Solutions

Question		Answer	Reference
1	a.	Engage at long range to destroy the enemy in water	6102b
	b.	Overlapping crossfires just off the beach	
	c.	Extensive use of obstacles and barriers	
	d.	Push the enemy back into the sea	
	e.	Extensive maneuver of weapons and manpower behind the beach	
2	a.	Distance of the enemy from the coast	6104
	b.	Terrain	
	c.	Road Network	
	d.	Weather	
3	c.	II + IV	6103a
4		15 meters	6108b(1)
5		5 to 1 1/2 meters	6108b(2)
6		on the beach	6108b(3)

*U.S.GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1990-262-337:20119

COURSE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

INTRODUCTION TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS-MCI-7640 (1990)

a. **Introduction**

To improve the instructional materials and methods of presentation in this course, we ask you to complete this questionnaire.

b. **Methods of evaluation**

(1) Please make your written comments only on the sheet provided.

(2) If you circle "*Strongly Disagree*," please submit your comments/recommendations or any other constructive criticism.

(3) **Criteria.** Abbreviations in the columns represent these terms.

SA - Strongly Agree
A - Agree
U - Undecided
D - Disagree
SD - Strongly Disagree

c. **Evaluation.** Circle the appropriate abbreviation.

(1)	I think that the purpose of this course has been fulfilled.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(2)	I think that the course learning objectives have been met.	SD	D	U	A	SA

My evaluation of the text follows:

(3)	The method of presentation was appropriate to an officer of my MOS.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(4)	The level of instruction was appropriate to an officer of my MOS.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(5)	The examples use contributed to the learning process.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(6)	My overall evaluation of the text is favorable.	SD	D	U	A	SA

My evaluation of testing procedures follow:

(7)	The chapter exercises contributed to the learning process.	SD	D	U	A	SA
(8)	My goals for taking this course have been attained.	SD	D	U	A	SA

(9) My overall evaluation of this course is favorable. SD D U A SA

d. **Comments and recommendations.** Your comments and recommendations will be used during the rewrite of this course. All input is appreciated.

_____

_____

_____

_____

e. How many hours did it take for you to complete the course? ____

If you desire an answer to a specific question, use the request for instructional assistance form (Section F).

f. Please provide the following

(1) RANK: _____

(2) MOS: _____

(3) CURRENT ASSIGNMENT: _____

f. If you have an instructions/administrative assistance problem, please write it below. Be sure to include your name and address so that the appropriate division can answer your question.

Name: _____
SSN: _____
Address: _____
_____
_____
Autovon Telephone: _____
Commercial Telephone: _____

STUDENT REQUEST/INQUIRY
MCI - R-11

DATE SENT: _____

COURSE TITLE

COURSE NUMBER

Section 1. Student Identification

RANK INITIALS LAST NAME MOS

SSN REPORTING UNIT CODE (RUC)

MILITARY ADDRESS

INSTRUCTIONS: Print or type name, rank, and address clearly. Include ZIP CODE. Only Class III Reservists may use civilian address.

Section 2. Circle the appropriate number and fill in the appropriate spaces. FOR REGULAR AND CLASS II RESERVE MARINES, THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE, e.g. TRAINING OFFICER.

1. CHANGE. The following information needs correction:

	From	To
Name	_____	_____
Rank	_____	_____
SSN	_____	_____
RUC	_____	_____

2. MATERIALS. The following materials are needed: Lessons _____ Manual _____ Answer Sheets _____ Other _____

3. EXAM OVERDUE. The last lesson was sent in on _____.

4. MISSING RESULTS. The exam was sent in on _____. (If not received at MCI a new exam will be issued).

5. MISSING DIPLOMA. The course was completed in _____ 19_____.

6. EXTEND. (Students are only eligible for one extension prior to their CCD).

7. REENROLL. (Students are only eligible for reenrollment once and only after their CCD. If already reenrolled and disenrolled, a new enrollment must be requested).

8. OTHER (EXPLAIN): _____

NOTE: This form will not be returned by MCI. If the request is valid, the transaction will show on next UAR or on MCI-R-1 Form.

SIGNATURE - TITLE OR RANK
(MUST BE CO. OR REPRESENTATIVE)
ATV _____

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U. S. C. 522A)

1. AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Sec. 301 Use of your Social Security Number is authorized by Executive Order 9397 of 22 Nov 43.

2. PRINCIPLE PURPOSE: The Student Request/Inquiry is used to transmit information concerning student participation in MCI courses.

3. ROUTINE USES: This information is used by MCI personnel to research student inquiries. In some cases information contained therein is used to update individual student records maintained by the Marine Corps Institute.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: Disclosure is voluntary. Failure to provide information may result in the provision of incomplete service to your inquiry. Failure to provide your Social Security Number will delay the processing of your inquiry/request.

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